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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Main Issues 
 
Sometimes the defence of an old answer may prevent one from seeing that the question itself is no 
longer the same – this is especially so in those cases when the old answer is applicable to the new 
question. Correspondingly, the demand for new answers may, in fact, aim at the elimination of old 
questions (Kettunen 1998: 33).    
 
This quote goes right into the basic issues of this thesis. The background for this academic 
project is the contention that since the late 1990s, there has been a new immigration agenda in 
Norway. The predominant Norwegian immigration policy is based on the principle of 
‘restricted and controlled immigration’. This principle is partly premised by the view that 
non-Western immigrants represent a burden on the welfare state. Allegedly, in the new 
immigration agenda non-Western immigrants are increasingly seen as producers of welfare. 
The trigger for the thesis was that while this contention has been put forward, there has not 
been made any significant alterations of the general Norwegian immigration policies. This 
may imply that while there is a change in the premises, the structuring of the general 
Norwegian immigration policies is relatively unaltered (Djuve and Rogstad et al. 1999, 
Brochmann [1968] 2003, Ringen 2004). Accordingly, this contradiction in the general 
immigration policies may indicate that the predominant Norwegian immigration policy may 
not be in coherence with the present immigration agenda.  
This is why I want to critically explore the present Norwegian immigration agenda. 
This objective initiates the question of how to explain whether there is a change in the 
Norwegian immigration agenda. And, what does a ‘new’ Norwegian immigration agenda 
mean? Hence, the underlying issue, in the broad sociological sense, is how we are to indicate 
change in social structures.  
First, it is necessary to obtain a perception of what is continuation and what is 
discontinuation within the present Norwegian immigration agenda. Secondly, as a corollary of 
the first issue, I will discuss the consequences of change in this agenda for the Norwegian 
immigration policy. Which tensions are implied, and where and why do they occur?  
In order to frame the issues of continuation and discontinuation, I employ the 
regulationist approach to capitalism. This approach sees economic and social contradictions 
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as inherent in capitalism, and perceives capitalist expansion to be dependent on non-market 
actors, especially institutions. Accordingly, capitalism can be seen as a significant social 
relation, also in terms of immigration policy. Through the regulationist approach to 
capitalism, I construct the present social and economic agenda of the Norwegian immigration 
policy: the global transformations of the knowledge-based economy. Increasing 
competitiveness through a more knowledge-based economy has become one the major 
political responds of Western European states to the challenges of globalization (Jessop 2002, 
Mjøset and Bohlin 1985). Accordingly, the main issue of the thesis may be broadly presented 
as:  
How does the predominant Norwegian immigration policy cohere with the 
knowledge-based economy? 
 
The general Norwegian immigration policies can be seen as the main object of research. It is 
within these policies that I will search for contradictions. Empirically, I have approached this 
object from the angles of two different institutions which are both significant to immigration 
policies and intertwined in the knowledge-based economy. The empirical relevance of these 
institutions is theoretically legitimized by the regulationist approach.  
The first angle is that of the state as an institution. I will analyse how the Norwegian 
state relates to the transformations of the knowledge-based economy and how this involves 
immigration policies. The second angle is the perspective of international labour migrants. I 
will claim that international labour migrants may represent an institution. Further, I will 
analyse one particular migrant institution which has become crucially implicated in the 
knowledge-based economy – that of the so-called ‘international knowledge-migrants’. 
Categorized by Norwegian governments as ‘specialists’, this type of labour migrants also has 
a distinct position within the general Norwegian immigration policies (Goss and Lindquist 
1995, Home Office and DTI 2002, Tjelmeland 2002). I then analyse the contradictions of the 
general Norwegian immigration policies based on these two institutional perspectives. 
Finally, I discuss the issue of the coherence of the Norwegian immigration policy in view of 
these contradictions. 
Accordingly, this thesis can be seen as a constructivist, institutionalist approach to 
Norwegian immigration policies. The overall aim of the thesis is to expand the understanding 
of Norwegian immigration policies as a social phenomenon.  
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1.2 Narrowing and Specification of the Project 
 
Obviously, the object of research – the general Norwegian immigration policies – is very 
comprehensive. In order to make the project feasible, I have therefore chosen to approach 
Norwegian immigration policies based on certain preconditions, which again will contribute 
to specify and narrow the topics of concern.  
Since the ban on labour immigration in 1975, non-Western immigration in Norway 
has primarily been legitimized on humanitarian grounds while non-Western economic 
immigration has generally not been legitimate. Nevertheless, immigration has in general been 
non-Western. The immigration flow has predominantly consisted of refugees and asylum 
seekers, and family members of immigrants in Norway (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003). 
The political basis for the profile of immigration to Norway is what I call ‘the structuring of 
the general Norwegian immigration policies’. Structuring can be defined as “the reciprocal 
flow of action and structure” (Abrams 1982: 192).  
This structuring is mainly premised by the intertwined and complex political concerns 
for the welfare state, the labour market and the nation. The principle of ‘restricted and 
controlled immigration’ of the Norwegian immigration policy has reflected the view on 
immigrants, or rather asylum seekers and refugees, as a predominantly economic burden on 
the welfare state. Accordingly, immigrants have not been seen as potential producers of 
welfare through participation on the labour market. Further there has been a prevalent view 
that too many foreign newcomers, especially from ‘distant’ cultures, would threaten the 
degree of state regulation and social cohesion of the Norwegian society. Accordingly, much 
of the Norwegian immigration policies have been legitimized by the aim to sustain the 
universal welfare state, even though the concern for the labour market and the nation has been 
implicated in this concern. Since the ban on labour immigration, the labour market premises 
have often been taken for granted. The immigration policies have generally been satisfactory 
for Norwegian industry and businesses and have not been very much in focus since the labour 
immigration ban. The national premises of Norwegian immigration policies, on the other 
hand, have been more controversial and often understated within politics and research 
(Brochmann [1968] 2003, Thorud 1998, Tjomsland 2002).   
The issue of the coherence of the Norwegian immigration policy will be analysed 
mainly in terms of these premises. This is based on the theoretical framing of the thesis, in 
which the welfare state, the labour market, and the nation are assumed to be seriously affected 
by the transformations of the knowledge-based economy. I relate these transformations to the 
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social, economic and political crisis that has emerged in the wake of the decomposition of the 
post-WW II mode of capitalist production and accumulation regime – Atlantic Fordism. This 
crisis has been evident in Western Europe since the early 1970s. Shortly, the crisis implies 
that Western European states are increasingly facing problems in terms of financing and 
legitimizing their welfare state system. Further, that the previously more nationally based 
economies have to deal with more international and/or global markets and capital flows. In 
the labour market, the Fordist way of organization and production has been replaced by more 
flexibility, focus on innovation and new globally competitive actors. These transformations 
involve that the paradigm of Atlantic Fordism is gradually being supplanted by the potential 
paradigm of the knowledge-based economy (Jessop 2002). Accordingly, I employ the term 
‘immigration agenda’ in order to point out present contradictions and issues within 
Norwegian immigration policies regarding the welfare state, the labour market and the nation 
that are imposed by these transformations of the knowledge-based economy.1 
  Methodologically, I operationalize and analyse the impact of transformations of the 
knowledge-based economy on the Norwegian state by making a comparison of the Norwegian 
government’s and EU’s strategies which are launched to increase economic competitiveness 
in accordance with the knowledge-based economy. This comparison is based on documentary 
research of the EU ‘Lisbon Strategy’ and the Norwegian government’s action plan ‘From Idea 
to Value – The Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy’ [hereafter ‘From 
Idea to Value’]. Further, I operationalize and analyse ‘international knowledge-migrants’ 
through the experiences of Indian IT-workers in Norway. India is the world’s largest exporter 
of IT-professionals and significant in the knowledge-based economy. Since the late 1990s, 
Indian IT-professionals have become attractive expertise in the IT-industry in Norway and 
many other Western countries. Correspondingly, I have performed interviews with a group of 
Indians working with IT in Norway (Mashelkar 2005, Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 
2003, www.europa.eu.int/growthandjobs, Xiang 2001).  
When it comes to the Norwegian immigration policies, the new immigration agenda 
can especially be seen in the light of the ban on labour migration. I will therefore concentrate 
on the Norwegian labour immigration policies. I will especially focus on the juridical 
                                                 
1
 The choice of the term ‘agenda’ rather than for example ‘discourse’ is also based on the aim to critically 
illuminate indications of transformations connected to the knowledge-based economy more than already 
established and/or pervasive social practices in institutions. Because of this analytical aim, the ‘agenda’ of the 
present Norwegian immigration policy should not be seen as fully juxtaposed to the ‘knowledge-based 
economy’. However, the indications of social transformations are perceived to occur on the discursive as well as 
on the empirical level and I do not aspire to make a strict analytical division between these two levels (Goss and 
Lindquist 1995, Neumann 2001). 
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arrangements for so-called ‘specialists’ since the specialist provision of the Norwegian 
immigration act is the most relevant arrangement for non-Western expertise like Indian IT-
workers.  
   
1.3 Labour immigration Policies in Post-war Western Europe  
 
The intention of this section is to give a broad overview of the post-World War II history of 
labour immigration in Western Europe and especially Norway. In the end of the section, I will 
explain the historical background for the contention of a new immigration agenda in the 
Norwegian immigration context. This historic overview will also include the development of 
labour immigration policies.  
 
1.3.1   Western Europe in General  
 
The post-WW II period initiated the first era of non-Western immigration to Europe in newer 
history. Initially, the deficit of labour was covered by internal labour supplies from the 
economically more underdeveloped regions of Europe, mostly Southern Europe and the 
European peripheries. As internal European labour supplies became more and more 
insufficient, labour import from Asia, Africa and Latin- America became a structural feature 
of Western-European economies. The major recruitment strategy in such countries was the 
guest-worker system. The guest workers provided both flexible and cheap labour. Foreigners 
were invited to stay temporarily, as long as their labour was needed. Throughout Europe, 
guest workers had status as non-citizens and had limited work- and social rights (Castles 
2000, Castles and Miller 1993).  
In the 1970s this immigration scenario was to turn. Western European countries had so 
far showed little concern for providing for the social needs of the immigrants or assessing the 
possible large scale impact of immigration on society. There was now growing anxiety about 
the social and political costs of large numbers of immigrants. Further, many Western 
European countries began to realize that the majority of the immigrants would not repatriate 
and that the number of immigrants was increasing because of family reunions. In the wake of 
the oil-crisis and the beginning economic recession, most Western European governments 
stopped labour immigration in 1973/74. During the mid 1970s and the 1980s, the ban on 
labour migration did not contribute to significantly alter the actual stock of immigrants, but it 
changed the structure of immigration in Western Europe. The proportion of Southern-
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European immigrants declined while immigration from non-Western countries increased. As a 
corollary of increased family immigration, there was also an increase in female immigrants 
and decrease in the average age of immigrants (Collinson 1993, Castles and Miller 1993).  
The composition of immigrants after the ban on labour immigration has implied that 
the stock of labour immigrants has been reduced compared to the total immigration stock. 
During the 1990s political attempts were made to restore the balance between labour 
immigration and immigration in general. However, the actions taken to strike a balance were 
targeted on reducing the number of asylum seekers and refugees rather than increasing the 
number of labour immigrants. Labour immigration policies in Western Europe have continued 
to be aimed at immediate needs in the labour market and not on permanent immigration, even 
if the actual consequence of short-term labour contracts often has been permanent settlement 
(Djuve and Rogstad et al. 1999).  
 
1.3.2   Norway 
 
The new immigration era was introduced to Norway some years later than in most of Western 
Europe. In Norway, the incentive to labour immigration is very much related to the discovery 
of oil on Norwegian territory in the late 1960s. This was a significant turning point in the 
Norwegian economy and one of the first indications of an economic boost was the demand for 
foreign labour. Because of the recent discovery of oil on Norwegian territory, the economic 
boom prevailed in Norway even after the international oil crisis in 1973. The Norwegian 
economy thus differed from most of Europe in this period. Hence, as Europe restricted 
migration partly due to economic recession in the early 1970s, the Norwegian labour market 
became more attractive to foreigners as the economy boosted and many labour immigrants 
that otherwise would have gone to other European countries, came to Norway.  The expansion 
of the economy also gave incentives to a restructuring of the domestic labour force in terms of 
enhanced opportunities for labour mobility. Less attractive jobs in parts of the industry and 
the service sector were now increasingly left by domestic workers causing the door to open 
more for foreign workers. The first foreign workers in Norway were mostly unskilled males. 
They predominantly came from Pakistan, but also from countries like Morocco, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003).   
In the 1970s, Norwegian authorities feared the consequences of implementing a 
different immigration policy than the rest of Europe. Even though Norwegian economy 
seemed solid and immigration to Norway hardly had begun compared to most of Europe, 
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Norway implemented immigration ‘stop’ in 1975. However, in reality this was not a stop, but 
rather a restructuring of the predominant immigration profile.  Immigration to Norway still 
prevailed because of the exemptions that were made from the stop. Exemptions were made for 
asylum seekers, refugees and close relatives of established immigrants and, for so-called ‘key-
personnel’. The latter exemption was targeted on needs in the oil industry, and was thus 
issued for short-term, skilled workers from OECD countries. As a corollary, the immigration 
stop only affected general labour migration from outside OECD while other types of 
immigration to Norway from non-Western countries continued to increase, especially because 
of family reunions. Hence, the immigration stop may rather be defined as a general ban on 
labour immigration from non-Western countries (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, 
Tjomsland 2002).  
The labour immigration stop was supposed to be only preliminary on the reason given 
that it would ease the integration of the immigrants that had already arrived. The stop was 
officially abolished in 1981. The term ‘immigration stop’ was now changed to ‘immigration 
regulation’. However, the general policy that had been established through the ‘stop’ period 
continued as the main principle of the following Norwegian immigration policies. The 
significance of that principle is reflected in that ‘restricted and controlled immigration’ has 
become a main objective of Norwegian immigration policies. Because of the stop, the 
structure of the immigration was reorganized. Similar to the rest of Western-Europe, one can 
refer to three so-called post-WW II waves of immigration to Norway: the first wave was 
composed of labour migrants, mostly young and single males. Shortly after the labour 
immigration ban, came the second wave – the families of the foreign workers. And, from the 
early 1980s there was a significant increase of refugees and asylum seekers which can be 
categorised as the third wave. However, family immigration has prevailed throughout the 
period (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Thorud 1998).  
During the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, much of the Norwegian immigration 
agenda was dominated by the social and economic problems of non-Western immigrants in 
the Norwegian society. The unemployment rates for non-Western immigrants as a group were 
significantly higher than for so-called ethnic Norwegians. In this scenario, there emerged a 
general perception of ‘immigrants’ as predominantly receivers of social welfare. In 
accordance with the initial ‘immigration stop’, immigration policies have generally been 
aimed at minimizing non-Western immigration to Norway (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, 
Tjomsland 2002). 
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1.3.3   The New Immigration Agenda 
 
From the mid-1990s Norway and Western Europe in general went into a new economic 
upswing. Along with the prevailing negative employment rates among non-Western 
immigrants, there was scarcity of labour supplies especially within building and construction, 
the ICT sector and the health sector. In Norway, parts of the labour shortages were reduced by 
a significant increase of internal European labour migration.2 However, because of these 
economic conjunctures, Norway and several other Western European countries began to 
facilitate their strict labour immigration policies towards highly skilled labour migrants from 
countries outside the EEA/EU (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003). This latter shift was 
especially connected to the ICT sector in Western Europe. From the late 1990s, there was a 
cry for IT competence around the world and it was estimated that the need would increase in 
the coming years. In the European IT industry, it was assumed that there would be a lack of 
1.7 million IT workers only in 2003. In 2001, the Norwegian government estimated that the 
Norwegian IT industry would need about 1500-2000 foreign IT-workers (www.digi.no 
21.03.01 and 23.03.2003).  
The actual number of non-Western labour migrants that have arrived in Western 
Europe in the after the entrance regulations have been adjusted has been very modest. When it 
comes to the ICT sector, this moderate number can partly be connected to the global recession 
in this sector in 2001. However, both Norwegian and other Western European governments 
have come to realize that Europe is not necessarily the most attractive region to non-Western 
highly skilled workers (Ringen 2004, Mahroum 2000, WITSA 2004).  
Further, it has become evident that Norway shares many of the demographic features 
of Western Europe. The general population is ageing because birth rates are decreasing while 
life expectancies are rising. This means that Western European countries will face increasing 
future problems in terms of securing economic growth. Increased immigration has therefore 
been suggested as one of the means to mend this demographic development (Djuve and 
Rogstad et al. 1999, Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003).   
What can be called the new immigration agenda has several aspects. It is both 
connected to economy and demography. First of all, there is deficiency in Western European 
skilled and highly skilled labour resources. Secondly, it is being recognized that it will not 
                                                 
2
 The largest group of foreign labourers were Swedes, who especially went into the building- and construction 
sector. The Norwegian oil-sector attracted many British workers. In the health sector there was an increase of 
Danish, Swedish, Finnish and German labour (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003). 
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suffice to cover this deficiency through internal labour supplies. That means that Western  
Europe will also have to use labour from outside Europe and from non-Western countries. 
These two latter aspects of the new immigration agenda are relatively parallel to the 
immigration situation in Western Europe before the labour immigration ban. However, it can 
be argued that the third aspect of the new immigration agenda differs both from the one 
before and after the ban, because it can be connected to a new global, economic and social 
paradigm – the knowledge-based economy: Norway and Western Europe need to attract 
highly skilled, non-Western labour because the global economic scenario has shifted since the 
ban on labour migration in the 1970s. It can be claimed that this shift also can be seen as the 
reason why today’s Western Europe, as opposed to the era before the immigration ban, is not 
getting hold of the most attractive non-Western labour migrants. The shift in the global 
scenario implies that Western Europe is no longer as competitive on international labour 
migration as previously (Mahroum 2000, Ringen (ed.) 2004).  
The new immigration agenda does not imply that the principle of ‘restricted and 
controlled immigration policies’ has be altered. However, parts of the labour immigration 
policies have been adjusted. Those adjustments will be elaborated in the next section 
(Brochmann 2002, Brochmann 2003).  
 
1.4 Norwegian Labour Immigration Policies 
 
Since Norway became an EAA (European Economic Area) member in 1994, the Norwegian 
labour market has been open to labour migration from all the EEA/EU member states and 
EFTA (in practice Switzerland). In 2001, Norway joined the Schengen association. Through 
the membership in the EEA, EEA/EU citizens and their families have the right to entrance, 
residence and work in other EEA/EU countries. This means that they do not need a work 
permit and have permission to residence if they are able to get a job within six months. The 
European labour market does not allow any countries in the market to discriminate on the 
basis of citizenship when it comes to labour conditions. This means that in practice, the 
Norwegian immigration act is only relevant for labour immigration from outside EEA/EU 
(Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, OECD 2004). 
In 1999 a working group appointed by the government, presented a report on the 
future requirements of labour and recruitment from abroad. The report came up with 11 
proposals that were aimed at making Norway more attractive to labour migrants. Most of the 
proposals have been carried through. The so-called ‘specialist paragraph’ has been extended 
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in order to include skilled workers. Seasonal workers are permitted to work three months in 
the country without any restrictions in terms of season or type of industry. In January 2002 
some amendments to the Immigration Act § 6 and the Immigrant Regulation came into force. 
The amendments are supposed to ease the recruitment of non-EEA labour migrants. The 
amendments in the Immigrant Regulation only concern the procedures for applying for a work 
permit, not the conditions for receiving a work permit (Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet 
1999, OECD 2004, Tjomsland 2002).  
Further, the procedures for issuance of work permits have been facilitated. Now the 
police may issue temporary work permits that allow foreign citizens to work while the 
application for a permanent work permit is being handled. Also consular or diplomat practices 
may issue work permits if the respective requirements are clearly fulfilled. From February 
2003 employers having a site or business in Norway were allowed to apply for work permits 
on behalf of employees. The basic condition for obtaining a work permit is that the applicant 
holds a binding offer of employment from a Norwegian employer. Skilled workers or persons 
with special qualifications who are looking for work in Norway may be issued a three-month 
visa. Within this period it is also possible to apply for a work permit from the respective site. 
However, the general rule is still that all foreign nationals who intend to work in Norway must 
have a work permit. A working permission has to be renewed after one year. After three years 
of employment in Norway, the applicant can apply for permanent settlement (NOU 2004:20, 
OECD 2004).  
Also, annual quotas for specialist workers have been introduced. At the time being, the 
quota is set at 5000 specialists. This regulation entails that in terms of being granted a 
specialist work permit, it is no longer required that domestic or EEA labour have the first 
claim to a respective position until the quota has been filled. After the quota is full, 
application for specialist work permits will be dealt with according to an ‘economic needs 
test’. Work permits issued to specialists are significant because they can give the right to 
permanent settlement after three years of employment in Norway. Seasonal workers do not 
have the right to permanent residence based on their work permits (NOU 2004:20, OECD 
2004, www.udi.no).  
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1.5 Significant Concepts and Terms 
 
The Specialist Provision: The term refers to § 3a in the Norwegian foreigner 
regulation/provision [No: Utlendingsforskriften]. Paragraph 3 relates to foreigners who have 
the right to permanent settlement. A specialist is defined as “a person who has a trade or who 
has special qualifications” (http://www.udi.no/templates/Page.aspx?id=4674 [05.08.2005]). 
Specialists make out the only category of labour immigrants which both have the right to 
renew their work permission and the right to permanent settlement (www.udi.no). 
 
Visa: A visa can be defined as “an entry permit issued by the authorities of state to foreign 
citizens” (Bø 2002: 79). All aliens who are citizens of countries that are not exempted from 
the general visa requirement, must have a visa permit before being permitted to cross the 
border. Visa can be issued either on a three month tourist basis or for a more permanent stay. 
Aliens who can freely enter Norway without a visa encompass citizens from North-America, 
most of Latin America, several countries in South-East Asia and most of Europe. People who 
have a work permit in Norway automatically also get an entry visa for Norway (www.udi.no).  
The Norwegian visa polices are based on foreign policy, security policy and 
immigration policy. The contents of so-called ‘immigration policy concerns’ (No: 
‘innvandringspolitiske hensyn’) may be various. However, the general immigration policy 
connected to visa policies revolves around the consensus on ‘restricted and controlled 
immigration. Visa is systematically required from citizens of countries from which a 
significant number of immigrants or asylum seekers have arrived or are expected to arrive in 
the near future. In practice, the Norwegian visa polices are directed on nationals which 
Norwegian governments often have experienced will not leave once they have entered 
Norway. The visa polices are also based on calculations as to whether the general living 
conditions in the country of a visa applicant implies that he/she is likely to remain in Norway. 
Immigration regulation concerns are not to be taken into account in cases of work permissions 
for foreigners (Humlen 1998, NOU 2004: 20). 
 
The knowledge-based economy: The term ‘knowledge-based economy’ is contested, and 
there are several conceptually related terms like the ‘knowledge-driven economy’, the 
‘information society’, the ‘new-economy’. Here, the basis of the term is the increasing 
importance of knowledge in the economy, especially in terms of politics and in industrial 
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relations (Cappelen 2001, Coates and Warwick 1999, Jessop 2002). Accordingly, the 
knowledge-based economy may be defined as: 
 
[…] an economy in which the generation and exploitation of knowledge have come to play the 
predominant part in the creation of wealth. It is not simply about pushing back the frontiers of 
knowledge; it is also about the more effective use and exploitation of all types of knowledge in all 
manner of economic activity (Coates and Warwick 1999:12) 
 
 
International knowledge-migrants: This is a concept which I have constructed in order to 
refer to the international migration of knowledge-workers. In this thesis, the term ‘knowledge-
workers’ is building on Drucker’s [1962] notion of the most significant category of workers in 
the 20th century (see Khadria 2001). This category would comprise the highly educated, 
intellectual, technocratic and managerial elite of the world. For the purposes of this thesis, 
‘knowledge-workers’ generally refers to people occupied within the ICT sector (ICT = 
information and communication technology. ‘Migration’ in terms of knowledge-workers here 
refers to the movement of natural persons for the purpose of work in a foreign country (Home 
Office and DTI 2002, Jessop 2002, Khadria 2001). The migration could either be on a short-
term or a longer term (see chapter 3). 
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. In chapter 2, I present the general theoretical framework 
of the thesis. This theoretical framework comprises the regulationist approach to capitalism, 
the role of human resources in globalized capitalism and theories on international labour 
migration. In chapter 3, I elaborate the methodological basis and process of the thesis. 
Chapters 4 to 6 make out the analysis. In chapter 4, I analyze the Norwegian Government’s 
‘From Idea to Value’ and compare this with EU’s ‘Lisbon Strategy’. In chapter 5, I establish 
and analyse international knowledge-migrants as an institution. In chapter 6, I implement the 
findings from the two previous chapters of analysis in order to discuss various contradictions 
of Norwegian immigration policies. Through these three chapters of analysis, I have 
established a basis for discussing the issue of the coherence between the Norwegian 
immigration policy and the knowledge-based economy. This issue will be dealt with in 
chapter 7 which concludes the thesis as a whole. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Theory may be applied in various ways in qualitative research.  The use of theory reflects the 
acknowledgement that the immense complexity of empirical phenomena demands some tool 
of organization. A theory can be employed as a set of pre-conceptions that contribute to frame 
the objects of analysis. In other words, an object that is being analyzed will always become a 
theoretical construction to some degree and the theoretical approach will influence the 
structure of the analysis (Abrams 1982, Andersen 1997).    
I have intended to employ theory that could capture as much as possible of my data 
material. According to that intention, the regulationist approach represented through Bob 
Jessop’s ‘The Future of the Capitalist State’ is the main theoretical framework of the thesis. In 
addition to Jessop, I have added theory on human resources in globalized capitalism and on 
international labour migration that I will claim to be compatible with the regulationist 
approach.    
 
2.1. The Future of the Capitalist State 
  
In ‘The Future of the Capitalist State’ (2002), Bob Jessop seeks to analyse the role of the state 
in the reproduction of capitalism, especially during the postwar era. Jessop analyses the crisis 
of the postwar Keynesian welfare state in the relation to the rise, consolidation and crisis of 
Atlantic Fordism and discusses the rise of the Schumpeterian Competition State in the wake 
of these crises. He acknowledges the regulationist approach as one of his main theoretical 
perspectives.  
One of the elementary perceptions of the regulationist approach to capitalism is that the 
market is not and cannot be the only contributing factor of capitalist expansion. In that regard, 
the term ‘regulation’ points out the way that non-market actors are involved in capitalist 
relations. ‘Regulation’ may be broadly defined as: 
  
[…] the conjunction of economic mechanisms associated with a given set of social relationships, 
of institutional forms and structures (Boyer 1979 in Mjøset and Bohlin 1985: 45).  
 
Theorists of the regulationist approach especially focus on the way that institutions relate to 
the contradiction between regulation implying factors securing long-turn stability of economic 
growth, and regulation as determined by social struggles and compromises. The 
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institutionalist perspective holds that the market is not capable of stabilizing social and 
economic relations, and therefore needs to be stabilized by institutional forces.3 The state is 
one but several of these institutions. The state is historically and conceptually premised by the 
institutional separation of the economic and the extra-economic in capitalism (Mjøset and 
Bohlin 1985).  
 
2.1.1   The Contradictions of Capitalism 
 
In line with the regulationist approach, Jessop performs his analysis based on certain pre-
conceptions of capitalism. These aspects are significant to capitalism as a mode of production 
and an object of regulation.  
Drawing on Marx, Jessop argues that the most prominent characteristic of the 
capitalistic way of producing goods and services for sale is the way labour-power is being 
generalized into the form of a commodity. In the capitalist labour market, workers offer their 
labour-power for sale to capitalists. In exchange of wages, the capitalists get to control the 
workers’ labour-power in the production process. Further, the capitalists obtain the right to 
make use of the profits from the sale of products and services. When the workers spend their 
wages on consumption means, they simultaneously contribute to reproduce the demand for 
their labour-power so that it can be sold again. This way, labour-power becomes incorporated 
in the production process in almost the same way as other means of production, like natural 
resources. However, as Jessop points out, labour-power will never be exactly compatible with 
a commodity. Labour-power will always be a fictitious commodity, because even if it can be 
bought and sold like a commodity it is not created in the profit-oriented labour process. Other 
fictitious commodities are nature, knowledge and money.4   
Capitalism revolves around one general law – the law of value. In accordance with this 
law, capitalists tend to provide resources for production because they expect profit.  The law 
of value is mediated through market forces and price mechanisms, but it is based on the 
                                                 
3
 The theoretical tradition of the institutional approach must be seen in line with Karl Polanyi and his major 
classic work on the ‘The Great Transformation’ (1944). In this book, Polanyi seeks to describe the rise and fall 
of the market economy in Europe through a critique of liberalism. This critique is based on the liberal idea of 
organizing social relations purely according to the self-regulating market. Polanyi sees the liberal project to 
commodify all the three factors of production – land, labour and money as a threat to the very basis of society. 
Polanyi defies the idea that the market has developed as an autonomous institution throughout history. He points 
to the necessary interference initiated by powerful institutions like the state to protect society from some of the 
most anti-collectivist tendencies of the market. Without the protection systems provided by these institutions, the 
human and natural basis of society would have been destroyed (Mjøset and Bohlin 1985). 
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production process. New values can only be created through production, and hence, through 
labour power. The law of value implies that capitalism will entail contradictions:  
 
In general terms, the law of value suggests that more time will be spent on producing commodities 
whose market price is above their price of production as measured by the socially necessary labour 
time involved in their creation. Conversely, less time will be spent on producing commodities 
whose market price is lower than their price of production (Jessop 2002: 17). 
 
The logic of this law is based on the contradiction inherent in the exchange- and use-value 
aspects of the commodity form. The exchange-value means the commodity’s monetary value 
for the seller. This value is mediated through the market. The use-value means the 
commodity’s material and/ or symbolic value to the purchaser. The contradiction lies in that 
without exhange-value, commodities would not be produced for sale and without use-value 
they would not be purchased. Based on this, Jessop claims that:   
 
all forms of the capital relation embody different but interconnected versions of this basic 
contradiction and that these impact differentially on (different fractions of) capital and on 
(different strata of) labour at different times and places (Jessop 2002: 16). 
 
What can be derived from these contradictions of capital, is that capital is never simply a 
means of production. Capital relations are a complex mixture of economic and extra-
economic mechanisms. As a corollary, it can be claimed that capitalism depends on other 
systems and the lifeworld. Capitalism cannot be reproduced only through the value form. This 
is an important point to be made in terms of the issue of ecological dominance. Transferred to 
social systems the term of ecological dominance refers to: 
 
structural and/or strategic capacity of a given system in a self-organizing ecology of systems to 
imprint its development logic on other systems’ operation far more than these systems are able to 
impose their respective logics on that system (Jessop 2002: 25).  
 
Based on the inherent limits of capitalism, it can be stated that the development of a capitalist 
economy never follows a purely economic logic. However, because of its internal complexity 
and flexibility, a capitalist economy does have the capabilities necessary to obtain ecological 
dominance. Nonetheless, even if economic capitalism becomes ecological dominant, its 
development should not be seen as deterministic. Other systems and their actors will be 
relatively capable to influence its path. The eventual ecological dominance of capitalism is 
always contingent and historically variable.     
Because of its contradictions, capitalism will be prone to so-called ‘market-failure’. 
Market failure occurs when the capitalist system does not function efficiently according to its 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 See Polanyi (1944): The Great Transformation. 
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basic cycle of production and sale. Further, these contradictions will influence the rest of the 
society and be reproduced as capitalism is being reproduced. This entails that capital does not 
or cannot govern itself. Market forces within capitalism will need to be regulated and 
governed by non-market actors. This is where the capitalist state comes in.  
Jessop approaches the capitalistic state as a social relation. The role of the capitalist 
state is to balance the inter-relation between the capitalist drive to commodification and non-
commodity forms of social relations. The division between the capitalistic and the non-
capitalistic is not a fixed border, but shifts according to various accumulation regimes and as 
ways of capitalist regulation change through history.   
 The state and state power is essential to these alterations, both in the shaping of 
capitalist accumulations systems and in being shaped by them. In order to illuminate the dual 
relationship between capitalism and the state, Jessop applies the postwar type of state as the 
main focus of analysis. According to Jessop, the relation between the postwar state and 
capitalism is quite distinct: 
 
I interpret this form of state as a historically specific political regime that corresponds with a 
historic specific stage of capitalist accumulation in a particular economic and political space within 
the world economy (Jessop 2002: 2).  
 
 In the postwar era there can be traced three main stages in the relation between the basic 
features of capitalism and the state. These are, broadly: 1) the early post-war years to the 
beginning of the 1970s. This was the 'heydays' of the Keynesian Welfare National State, or 
the KWNS, and the Atlantic Fordist mode of capitalist production and accumulation, 2) mid- 
1970s which involved decomposition of the Atlantic Fordist regime and the beginning of a 
crisis in the KWNS, and 3) the late 1970s to the present, implying the development of the 
knowledge based economy and the corresponding emergence of the Schumpeterian 
Competition State. 
 Underneath, the ideal-type characteristics and dynamic of these three stages will be 
described more thoroughly: 
 
2.1.2   The Keynesian Welfare National State and its Crisis 
 
The ‘Keynesian Welfare National State' (KWNS) refers to the form and function of the 
capitalist state of Atlantic Fordism.  Jessop defines Atlantic Fordism as:    
 
an accumulation regime based on a virtous autocentric circle of mass production and mass 
consumption secured through a distinctive mode of regulation that was discursively, institutionally 
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and practically materialized in the Keynesian welfare national state (or KWNS) (Jessop 2002: 55). 
 
The dynamic of Atlantic Fordism was based on the Fordist labour process which spread from 
the US to other Atlantic Fordist economies and on mass production and mass consumption 
within this whole economic area.5 The Atlantic Fordist states comprise the economies of 
postwar USA, Canada, North-Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand.  
 The KWNS aimed to secure full employment within a rather closed national economy.  
The KWNS’ focus on welfare was evident on several areas. Collective bargaining was 
regulated according to the aims of full employment.  Further, the surplus of economic growth 
was to be distributed among all citizens, not predominantly between the male workers. 
Patterns of mass consumption were now generalized to all full citizens.  
 The economic and social policies of the KWNS were closely connected to the nation. 
Citizenship was the criteria that coordinated the state’s expanding institutionalization of 
economic rights, and the primary area of Keynesian welfare responsibility was the territorial 
nation state. Replacement rates for unemployment benefit, sickness benefit and pensions were 
all increased within the frames of the nation state. These institutional arrangements may be 
seen as preliminary alleviations to the contradictions of capitalism: 
 
[…] the distinctive contribution of the KWNS to the regulation of Atlantic Fordism was its 
capacity to manage, displace or defer, at least for a while, the contradictions in different forms of 
capital relation and their strategic dilemmas as these were expressed in Fordist accumulation 
regimes (Jessop 2002: 75). 
 
During the 1970 and the 1980s, the Keynesian welfare state went into a crisis. The crisis was  
evident on several areas. It can be seen as an economic, a financial, political and social crisis. 
Part of the crisis was caused and/or enhanced by the continued growth of the KWNS per se.  
 On the economic area, there were domestically generated crisis-tendencies and 
mechanisms that gradually undermined the closure of the national economies. Fordist firms 
began to expand into foreign markets and to resort to foreign credit to reduce costs and tax 
bills. Further, the Fordist production system was decreasingly functional in many branches of 
production, like services. There was increasingly more capital intensive production and 
continuing search for ways to increase productivity. In the wake of this, there were attempts to 
restructure the labour process and restrain labour costs, like wages. The Atlantic Fordist 
accumulation regime depended heavily on oil supplies. As this regime began to expand, the 
                                                 
5
 The regulationist theory on post-war Fordism and the era of mass-consumption has especially been developed 
by French theorists like Aglietta, Benassy, Boyer and Lipietz during the 1970s. The agenda of these pioneers of 
the regulationist school was to find a way to relate the institutionalist orientation to the contemporary era (Mjøset 
and Bohlin 1985). 
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need for oil increased and also altered the underlying structural balance of the regime. The oil 
crisis in the 1970s can be seen as a reflection of this.  
 Further, the effectiveness of KWNS in terms of economic and political regulation was 
weakened because of the increased complexity of domestic and international economic 
relations. The typical policy objectives of the KWNS like full employment, economic growth, 
stable prices and ‘sound’ balance of payments became increasingly more difficult to maintain. 
Regional and local economies increasingly found that their problems could not be solved by 
the usual national macro-economic policies or centre-oriented, standardized industrial 
policies. Instead, interventions and policies were sought for that would allow local, regional 
or national economies to operate more effectively in the global economy. This was connected 
to a crisis in the US economic hegemony and struggles over the shaping of new international 
regimes. It was also linked to a shift in the paradigm of the Fordist growth model and its 
accumulation strategy to one of more flexible production, innovation, scope economies, 
innovation and rapidly shifting and differentiated patterns of consumption. 
 The crisis of Fordism had severe consequences on KWNS finances. Much of the 
expansion of the KWNS had depended on increasingly high levels of taxes both from the 
private sector and the working class.  Now state revenues began to decrease as unemployment 
began to increase and capital flows became more international and often escaped national 
taxes. At the same time, demands for state expenditure increased because of the various social 
repercussions of the crisis. The general fiscal crisis of the state was followed by conflicts and 
hostility towards the general financial system of the KWNS, especially in terms of welfare 
costs. 
 The general effect of the changes has been to erode the KWNS. The worst scenario, in 
Jessop' view, is that they have caused not only a crisis, but produced an organic crisis in the 
KWNS. An organic crisis implies a progressive loss of state unity, declining effectiveness, 
representational crises and a legitimacy crisis. 
 
2.1.3   The Schumpeterian Competition State 
 
According to Jessop (2002), the result of various economic, political and social responses to 
the crisis-tendencies described above, is the tendential shaping of a new type of state – the  
competition state.  This state is supposed to promote economic and extra-economic conditions 
that are more appropriate to the post-Fordist accumulation regime: 
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Competition state is used here to characterize a state that aims to secure economic growth within 
its borders and/or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its borders, even where 
they operate abroad, by promoting the economic and extra-economic conditions that are currently 
deemed vital for success in competition with economic actors and spaces located in other states 
(Jessop 2002: 96). 
 
Part of the significance of the competition states is that their strategies always are meditated 
through the operation of the world market as a whole. There are various forms of competition 
states, but the dominant type is the Schumpeterian Competition State. The term 
‘Schumpeterian’ stems from this state’s engagement with “technological change, innovation 
and enterprise and its attempt to develop new techniques of government and governance to 
these ends” (Jessop 2002: 96).     
 The tendential emergence of the Schumpeterian Competition State is linked to the 
paradigm of the knowledge-based economy that has partly replaced Atlantic Fordism:  
  
This paradigm has gradually become hegemonic as a rationale and strategic guide for economic, 
political and social restructuring, resonates across many different systems of the lifeworld, and 
reflects the general importance attributed, rightly or wrongly, to knowledge as a ‘factor of 
production’ in the post-fordist labour process, accumulation regime and mode of regulation 
(Jessop 2002:  97). 
 
This paradigm implies that economy is seen as knowledge-based and/ or knowledge-driven.  
Implied in this is that the knowledge is being commodified. As a corollary, states are 
increasingly involved in promoting and spreading the commodified forms of knowledge.  
 The post-Fordist labour process is characterized by flexible production like flexible 
machines and systems. This requires a flexible workforce, where multi-skilled and unskilled 
workers are combined in flexible ways.  ICT and software is crucial to the flexibility of the 
post-Fordist labour process. Within the post-Fordism labour process application of knowledge 
is being pre-supposed by production of knowledge.  
 An important aspect of the transition to the knowledge-based economy is that the 
primary discourses on competitiveness and strategies of competitiveness have changed 
significantly since the heydays of Atlantic Fordism. Here, Jessop makes a distinction between 
static comparative and dynamic competitive advantages. Having a static comparative 
advantage, means being superior in control over natural resources, or so-called natural factor 
endowments, compared to trading partners or competitors. Dynamic competitive advantages 
imply a clearer aspect of socially created factors that can be socially transformed and become 
objects of strategic intervention. Because factor-based advantages usually are difficult to 
sustain, Jessop suggests that longer-term competitiveness should be based on dynamic 
advantages. The more broadly dynamic competitive advantages are understood, the more 
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competitiveness has become structural or systemic.  
 The works of the political economist Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) is very significant 
to the social creation of competitive advantages. The Schumpeterian approach to 
competitiveness emphasizes the importance of long waves of technological innovation and 
capital to economic growth. What characterises the Schumpeterian competition approach is 
that it incorporates a wide spectre of extra-economic factors of competition compared to 
traditionally economic competitiveness approaches. The Schumpeterian approach can be seen 
as a social mobilization program aimed to raise the aggregate level of innovation and hence 
economic growth and effectiveness in the capitalist society. In the Schumpeterian perspective, 
entrepreneurship is not predominantly an individual characteristic, but a superstructural, 
collective mentality of society. This mentality further transcends into the individuals, and say, 
areas like politics and culture (de Vecchi 1995, Jessop 2002, Swedberg (ed.) 1991). The 
Schumpeterian approach is opposed to the Keynesian approach to competitiveness which 
presupposes relatively closed national economies. Within the Keynesian approach, full 
employment of national resources, including labour, is assumed to increase economic 
efficiency.  
 Within post-Fordism, the economic competitiveness of the most advanced economies is 
increasingly attached to structural/systemic competitiveness and to enhancing the knowledge-
base as the main source of dynamic competitive advantage. A matter of significance is that 
this entails that economic competitiveness increasingly depends on extra-economic factors:  
 
Discourses and strategies of structural and systemic competitiveness emphasize not only firm- and 
sectoral-level factors but also the role of an extended range of extra-economic institutional 
contexts and sociocultural conditions in which economic actors compete (Jessop 2002: 109). 
 
Competition is a driving force behind capital accumulation and a core to capitalist 
contradictions. Competition contributes to the search for new ways and areas of profit. In that 
regard, competition is an incentive to and inherent in globalization processes.  Globalization is 
further significant to accumulation regimes, modes of regulation and the state. According to 
Jessop: 
  
[… ] what globalization involves both structurally and strategically is the creation and/or 
restructuring of scale as a social relation and as a site of social relations (Jessop 2002: 116).   
 
Jessop perceives globalization as “the complex emergent product of many different forces 
operating on many scales” (Jessop 2002: 114). Structurally, globalization implies processes 
where actions, organizations and institutions obtain increasingly global interdependence 
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within various functional subsystems like economy, law, politics, science etc. and within 
various spheres of the lifeworld. Strategically, globalization implies that actors attempt to 
coordinate their activities globally within these functional subsystems and the lifeworld 
without having to be physically present at all places in the globe. The condition is that the aim 
of their activities is to create global effects.  
 In the wake of globalization, new scales emerge as well as new mechanisms and actors 
to coordinate them:  
  
Thus, far from producing homogenized global economic space, the many and varied processes 
involved in globalization actually involve the reordering – across a wide range of economic spaces 
on different spatial scales – of differences and complementarities as the basis of dynamic 
competitive advantages (Jessop 2002: 117).  
  
This implies that an increasing number of actors, among them the state, focus on the global as 
the horizon of action and relate to the implications of changing scalar divisions. Because of 
the continuing decomposition of Atlantic Fordism and the emerging economic and extra-
economic tendencies:  
 
[…] the principal political response can be summarized briefly as the attempt by state managers, 
officials, economies and other forces to transform the Keynesian full employment state into a 
Schumpeterian competition state, to rescale and rearticulate activities, and to develop new forms of 
government and governance to address the emerging problems of the state as well as market 
failure (Jessop 2002: 123). 
 
As Jessop emphasises, post-Fordism does not suspend the contradictions and dilemmas of 
capitalism. Rather, incorporation of extra-economic factors into the expanding logic of 
capitalism and economic competitiveness contributes to enhance these contradictions and 
dilemmas and spread them more fully into social relations.  
 
2.2 Human Resources in Globalized Capitalism 
 
Jessop’s emphasis on labour-power as a fictitious commodity is important to the way workers 
may be perceived. It implies that workers are not wholly an aspect of capitalism. Rather, their 
labour-power can be seen as a generated human capacity (Jessop 2002):  
 
Employees do not systematically orient their entire lives to opportunities for increased income 
(despite growing pressures on us all to become enterprising subjects and to welcome the 
commodification of our entire lives) at the cost of other social relations. In short, although most 
people must sell their labour-power to be able to live and to participate fully in social life, they are 
not actually commodities – merely treated as if they were (Jessop 2002: 14-15). 
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This perspective can be argued to be compatible with certain theoretical approaches to 
‘human resources’ within globalized capitalism. This is especially relevant in terms of the 
emphasis on ‘competence’ and ‘flexibility’ in contemporary working life. Pauli Kettunen 
(1995) connects the focus on competence and flexibility to what he terms ‘the discourse on 
competitiveness’ which permeates contemporary working life agenda. The focus on economic 
competitiveness is often seen as an imperative of the drastic challenges caused by 
globalization.   
Kettunen’s mission is to draw attention to the way power is being concealed within 
this working life agenda. By the term ‘discourse’ Kettunen refers to “the process of defining 
and circumscribing the field of legitimate questions” (Kettunen 1998: 35). Having the power 
to define an agenda is compatible with having a hegemony. According to Kettunen, economic 
competitiveness has an overwhelming power in defining the agenda of working life. Hence, 
the discourse on competitiveness may contribute to making research on working life 
compatible with the given agenda. Based on this, Kettunen addresses the necessity of critical 
researchers who can “take reflexive distance from the discourse in which he or she 
participates” (Kettunen 1998: 36). As a corollary, the discourse per se should become the 
object of research.  Such research should be based on the understanding that “the discourse on 
competitiveness, knowledge, innovation, communication and participation is, indeed, an 
aspect of the very same phenomenon as its references: increasing reflexivity” (Kettunen 1998: 
36). Here it is important to be aware that reflexivity is a crucial aspect of competitiveness per 
se.  Reflexivity can be defined as “the continuous and conscious self-monitoring of 
organisations and actors” (Kettunen 1998: 36).  
Kettunen’s second argument for doing research on the discourse on competitiveness is 
that the notion of ‘new challenges’ in this discourse tends to preclude both aspects of 
continuity as well as aspects of discontinuity.  This especially concerns continuities and 
discontinuities connected to the national ‘us’ and the ‘human factor’ within the discourse on 
competitiveness.  
Kettunen claims that the most significant problem about accounts on globalization is the 
ways in which the national ‘us’ is reproduced and modified in the context of globalization. In 
terms of the national economy, it is rather evident that globalization implies that the meaning 
of national ‘home base’ has changed:  
 
The thought according to which “our” national economy is represented by “our” enterprises in the 
world markets has certainly not lost all of its analytical nor political power but, however, in the 
time of globalised financial markets and transnationalised corporations the struggle for 
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competitiveness shapes “us in a different way. “Our” national competitiveness means “our” ability 
to attract domestic or foreign companies with global competitiveness (Kettunen 1998: 58). 
     
It may be assumed that the notion of the national ‘us’ is ideologically strengthened as national 
policy-making focus more on external conditions. Anyhow, communities now need to be 
‘imagined’ to a stronger degree than earlier (Kettunen 1998, Papastergiadis 2000). The 
comparison between ‘us’ and ‘others’ which is inherent in competition is a strong incentive to 
imagining. This entails that because of globalization, reflexivity in the form of comparison 
will be more vital to all who are involved in industrial relations. Comparative practices can be 
seen as an aspect of competence both of managers and employees. It is required that both 
managers and employees have “the ability to monitor one’s own work from the point of view 
of the competitiveness of the company or the production unit” (Kettunen 1998: 64). 
Various communities’ search for competitive advantages has resulted in a strong 
‘model consciousness’. International comparison has become an integral part of political and 
economic practises: 
 
“We” within a given national or local framework are supposed to make ourselves more attractive 
and competitive than “others” in the face of those who compare national and local conditions from 
a transnational perspective in their decision-making regarding the flows of money, investments, 
and the location of production and jobs (Kettunen 1998: 34). 
 
However, Kettunen notes that communities tend to express their particular competitive 
advantages in rather the same way. Knowledge and innovation are both the basis of ‘our’ 
competitiveness and for local and national competitiveness strategies.  In Nordic discussions, 
the Nordic social model is often argued to be saved by modifying it to serve various strategies 
of competitiveness. Competitiveness is to be promoted through innovation, training, increased 
competence and stronger emphasis on ‘human capital’6.  
 
2. 3 International Labour Migration 
 
From a sociological perspective, my aim has been to develop a ‘holistic’ approach to 
international labour migration. The contents of such an approach are not obvious. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is based on the perception that labour migration from developing 
countries often is the victim of reductionist analyses. In accordance with the regulationist 
                                                 
6
 According to Gary s. Becker’s classic theory on human capital, investment in the education and training of 
individuals is directly compatible with business investment in equipment. Becker’s study hence focuses on the 
measurable economic effects of education on employment and earnings (Becker [1964] 1993].  
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critique of mainstream economic theories on capitalism, migration research is often reduced 
to the circulation of labour power, while the social, cultural, political and institutional aspects 
of migration often are subordinated to an economic logic (Brettel and Hollifield (eds.) 
Fuglerud 2001, Hollifield 1992). 
According to Goss and Lindquist (1995), this kind of reductionism stems from the 
failure to integrate macro and micro scales of analysis. They claim that the core of this issue is 
how to coherently articulate structure and agency within labour migration theory. Their 
contribution to the issue is to apply Anthony Giddens’ [1984] theory of structuration on 
international labour migration.   
   
2.3.1    Conventional Approaches 
 
According to Goss and Lindquist migration literature has traditionally concentrated on two 
distinct approaches that both have an economic basis. The two approaches are the 
functionalist and structuralist approaches. These approaches have different starting points, but 
both end up with the same assumption about the labour migration process that it should be 
viewed as a response to wage differentials or socioeconomic inequalities between the source 
and host country.  
 One of the main differences between the two approaches is that functionalism focuses 
on microeconomic processes, while structuralism focuses on macroeconomic processes. In 
functionalist theory it is assumed that the migration process starts out with individuals who 
want to improve their lives by taking account of what they perceive as inequalities in the 
distribution of economic opportunities. The structuralist perspective focuses on the specific 
macroeconomic processes that cause the sosiospatial inequalities that give incentive to 
migration. 
 While the functionalist perspective assumes that the aggregate effect of the individual 
migration processes will eventually reduce the spatial inequalities and reduce the migration 
stream, the structuralist perspective does not expect an economic equilibrium because of 
migration, but rather enhanced inequalities due to the loss of human capital in the sending 
migration countries 
 Functionalist approaches to migration build on modernization theory and neoclassic 
economic development theory. The modernization theory and neoclassic development theory 
both perceive migration as a corollary of the transition of surplus labour in rural economies to 
urban, industrialised economies. Migration is conceived as either an aspect of modernization 
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and/or economic progress. And, both of these theories have a micro-social approach to 
migration which sees migration as being initiated by rational individuals who seek to utilize 
their social or economic potential. 
 Within the structuralist approach migration is a result of the receiving countries' 
political and economic exploitation of the sending countries. Drawing on Marx, people are 
assumed to become victims of migration because of their class position. Migration patterns 
here are not mainly seen from the individual micro perspective, but from social and spatial 
structures that provide the necessary conditions for labour migration. An example of this 
macro level perspective is the historical-structrualist perspective. Within the historical-
structuralist approach the context of migration is the global economy, core-periphery 
relations, and the development of underdevelopment. The perspective is significantly inspired 
by Marxism but also on dependency theory and world system theory. Migration is according 
to the historical-structuralist perspective a result of the inequal distribution of the proletariat 
between labour exporting, low-wage countries and labour importing, high-wage countries. So-
called 'development' in poor or underdeveloped societies increases economic and social 
inequalities, but also awareness of the inequalities. Migration is hence encouraged by 
development. The historical-structuralist perspective analyses the global market and national 
and international economic or political policies and their relation to local population. The 
focus is therefore not the individual migrant per se (Wood 1982). 
 
2.3.2    The Structuration Perspective  
 
Goss and Lindquist (1995) employ Giddens' theory of structuration as a tool to develop a 
more coherent approach to labour migration theory. Many theorists assume that a coherent 
approach to labour migration would entail an integration of the functionalist and structuralist 
perspective, and have called for an integrated approach that connects different levels of social 
organization. Goss and Lindquist claim that even the different previous attempts of integrating 
the approaches have principally failed because of the inability to coherently articulate 
structure and agency. 
 According to Goss and Lindquist, Giddens proposes to transcend the classic 'structure-
agency' problem of the social sciences with the concept of a 'duality of structure'  through 
which structures are perceived as rules and resources which both enable and constrain the 
actions of human agents as they are drawn upon in their everyday lives: "Our goal is to 
demonstrate the feasibility of linking institutions with aggregate flows of migrants and 
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individual decisionmaking" (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 336). 
 Social practices are reinforced and integrated in institutions because individuals 
regularly and repeatedly invoke rules and exploit resources in everyday social action and 
interaction. When individuals act or interact they draw upon the institutional modalities and as 
a result reproduce the structures of society. Giddens' structuration model of human agents 
implies that individuals are knowledgeable relatively to the constraints and opportunities 
presented by social structures. The knowledge of the individuals can be divided into three 
levels of consciousness. Firstly, on the unconscious level motivations cannot be articulated, 
secondly, on the level of practical consciousness knowledge of personal motivations and 
institutional rules/resources can be exploited to provide a rationale for action but not be 
verbalized, and thirdly, on the level of discursive consciousness knowledge can be employed 
and communicated in verbal explanation. The individual can discursively account for and 
justify action because of reflexive monitoring or habitual examination of action and 
motivation. However, this account is limited because of the involvement of unconscious 
motivations and because most knowledge exists at the practical level. Therefore, social 
knowledge is always limited and an individual's actions are normally influenced by the 
actions of other individuals. I will argue that the view of international labour migrants as 
knowledgeable agents accounts well with Kettunen's description of reflexive employees. Like 
the knowledge of migrants, the capacity for reflexivity is both structuring other social 
structures as well as being constrained by them.  
 Social action is a complex product composed of the unacknowledged conditions of 
action and the unintended consequences of actions. Goss and Lindquist argue that the basis of 
Giddens' non-functionalist conception of social reproduction, is the 'mix' of unconscious with 
reflexive, goal-oriented action, and the unacknowledged and unintentional dimensions of all 
action.  
 The guidelines provided by Giddens as to the further application of the structuration 
theory in empirical research are according to Goss and Lindquist rather limited. From a sketch 
based on Giddens theory of structuration, they have tried to develop an alternative approach to 
international labour migration. Goss and Lindquist focus on migrant networks, claiming that 
what has previously been identified as migrant networks should rather: 
 
[…] be conceived as migrant institutions that articulate, in a nonfunctionalist way, the individual 
migrant and the global economy, 'stretching' social relations across time and space to bring 
together the potential migrant and the overseas employer (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 335). 
 
Based on this, potential migrants can be seen as knowledgeable agents who:  
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[…] employ their understanding of the rules of interaction and exploit their access to allocative 
and authoritative resources within the migrant institution in order to obtain overseas employment 
(Goss and Lindquist 1995: 335). 
 
In Goss and Linquist's approach, international labour migration is tightly interconnected with 
processes of globalization. They claim that the increased scale and diversity of international 
labour migration both is caused by and reflect globalization:  
 
International labour migration can thus be conceived as a process whereby individuals transcend 
the limits to presence-availability and negotiate their way across boundaries between locales in 
order to establish presence and control over resources in a distant place (Goss and Lindquist: 335). 
 
Defying both functionalist and structuralist perspectives on the relation between globalization 
and labour migration, Goss and Lindquist suggest international and national institutions as the 
core of this relation. The complexity of international and national institutions enables them to 
transcend the boundaries of states and locales and to link employers in the developed or 
rapidly developing economies with more peripheral and less developed economies. One of 
Goss and Lindquist's main points is that there is an ongoing institutionalization of migration:  
 
An international migrant institution is a relatively permanent feature of social life that results from 
the regularization of social interaction for the purposes of overseas employment and which in turn 
regulates interaction and structures access to overseas employment through the operation of 
institutional rules and resources (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 336). 
 
Accordingly, this model allows that the phenomenon of international labour migration may be 
analysed as a complex combination of individual actions and social structures. I will approach 
international labour migration not only in the context of market relations but also in the 
context of other social relations. The structuration perspective on international labour 
migration in which migrant networks are perceived as institutions, allows that the actions of 
migrants are perceived as implicated in the international labour migration phenomenon.   
 
2.4 Summary 
 
The choice of theories in this chapter is not based on an attempt to develop a fully coherent or 
intertwined theoretical approach. However, I will emphasise that the choice of theories stems 
from the aim of developing a holistic, sociological approach to international labour migration. 
Further, I will point out some of the eminent compatible aspects of the different theories that I 
have presented. The first aspect is the regulationist view of capitalism as a complex economic 
and social phenomenon. This perspective’s emphasis on labour as a fictitious commodity, 
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leads on to Kettunen’s elaboration on human resources in globalized capitalism in which the 
lifeworld of reflexive workers extends that of merely professional concerns. Finally, the 
structuration perspective on international labour migration accords with the regulationist 
approach on capitalism and especially its focus on institutions. The structuration perspective 
on international labour migrants as ‘knowledgeable agents’ is also compatible with the 
understanding of employees in globalized capitalism as reflexive human resources. These 
interconnected aspects can be seen as the main theoretical keys to the further empirical 
analysis. 
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3. Methodology 
 
 
 
The starting point for reflecting on methodology is that all social phenomena are complex 
phenomena. The issue of method is how to capture the complexity of the phenomena of 
research and how to make sense of it in a sound way (Corbin and Strauss 1990). In this 
chapter, I will elaborate the methodological basis and process of the thesis.  
 
3.1 The Choice of Data 
 
Scientific research needs to be grounded in data. The choice of data in research should be 
based on their suitability to illuminate the object of research. The data that I have employed in 
the analysis are predominantly qualitative. In contrast to more quantitative data, that means 
that the data in this research are not numerical or categorised in quantitative measurements.  
The choice of data can also be seen as a question of generalization, reflecting the ambition 
that data and data analysis should be relevant beyond the specific empirical context in which 
data are collected. This can be achieved by making links between the data collected, and a 
wider, relevant empirical context, in such a way that the data and the analysis of data can be 
used to say something positive about this broader context. But is may also be achieved by 
connecting the analysis of data to a more general, analytical framework, in such a way that the 
analysis may contribute to the elaboration of (parts of) that framework (Kvale 2001, Flick 
1999, Holter and Kalleberg (ed.) [1982] 1996, Corbin and Strauss 1990), and this is how 
generalization is conceived of here. More specifically the analysis may contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between the competitive state, the knowledge-based 
economy, and immigration policy. In this section, I will therefore substantiate the empirical 
relevance of the respective documents of the Norwegian government/ministries and the EU 
Commission/Council, and the use of interviews with Indian IT-workers, by relating them to 
the broader, analytical framework I have chosen.   
3.1.1   The State and Governmental Documents 
 
The competitiveness strategies of the Norwegian government and the EU Commission are 
seen as empirically relevant because they are part of the continuous political and institutional 
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reforms established at the national level of European countries as a response to international 
and global transformations during the last three decades. These reforms have generally been 
associated with ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) (Larbi 1999). NPM seeks to make the 
public sector more efficient and profitable by enhancing its management. NPM can be seen as 
management ideology or thought strongly inspired by the private sector. Accordingly, NPM 
emphasizes the need for market based public services rather than public administration. This 
is to be performed through de-centralization of management, less bureaucracy and through 
exposing the public sector to market based competition (Christensen og Lægreid 2001, Larbi 
1999). The transformations of the knowledge-based economy are in this thesis seen as the 
driving force of these reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2002, Jessop 2002). It is my aim to 
show that immigration is one of the policy areas that are significantly related to and affected 
by such reforms. Of course, whether the EU Council and Commission directly represent the 
governments of the EU member states may be questioned. For the purposes of this thesis and 
as long as there has not been implemented a supra-national EU constitution I choose not to 
take this issue into concern. Again, it shall be noted that the issues of this thesis are more 
focused on the discursive relevance for research on these documents 
(www.europa.eu.int/growthandjobs, Christensen and Lægreid 2002, Neumann 2001). I will 
therefore concentrate the document analysis of the competitiveness strategies on the discourse 
on the concept of ‘competitiveness’ rather than NPM reforms as such. 
 
3.1.2   Indian IT-workers  
 
Indian IT-professionals may represent empirically interesting linkages between international 
labour migration, immigration policies and the knowledge-based economy. As I will elaborate 
underneath, the significant Indian knowledge-revolution has entailed that Indian IT-
professionals have become one of the most sought after categories of workers in the world. 
This has also led to adjustments of Western European labour immigration policies (Khadria 
2001, Xiang 2001). Before the recession in 2001 in the IT-market, there was also much focus 
on retaining Indian IT-personnel in the Norwegian IT-industry (www.digi.no 21.03.2001).7 
                                                 
7
 While only 15 came in 2001, around 50 Indians came to Norway on a specialist provision each year from 2001 
to 2003. In 2004 the number had decreased to 35 (www.udi.no). I do not have any statistics on how many of 
these specialists were IT-workers. From mid 2001 there was a severe global recession in the IT-market, and the 
demand for personnel in the Norwegian IT-industry was largely cut off. There has been a gradual upsurge in the 
market from 2002 (WISTA 2004, www.computerworld.no 11.2 2003).  
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The development of the IT-industry can be divided into three stages – hardware before the 
1970s, software from the 1970s to the mid-19990s and internet/e-commerce technologies 
from the mid 1990s. From the late 1990s the migration of IT professionals became a global 
issue. This issue was connected to later stages of the IT-industry, in which software became 
widely applied in various businesses and the internet was commercialized. During this period, 
the IT industry became a major global sector of capital. The implementation of the new ICT 
technology made it possible and practical for businesses to increasingly ‘de-territorialize’ 
production and management. Hence, because the use of ICT now significantly enhanced the 
development of global capital flows and markets, a huge demand for IT professionals arose in 
many of the developed countries in the world. Indian IT professionals have especially been in 
focus (Xiang 2001). 
The more eminent signals that India was emerging as a major actor in the knowledge-
based economy became evident in the international media from the late 1990s. The stories in 
the media suggested that Western countries were increasingly loosing competitiveness on 
highly skilled jobs in favour of India. These jobs were predominantly related to IT and 
science-based firms. Since year 2000, more than 100 high-tech companies within the fields of 
IT and science have established themselves in India. Since the early 1990s, when the country 
was literally ‘bankrupt’, the impact of IT on the Indian economy has been tremendous. In 
1999, the IT industry made up 1.3 % of India’s GDP. In 2004, it had increased to 3 %. The 
beginning of the Indian knowledge-‘revolution’ can be traced back to the early 1960s. The 
development an indigenous Indian software sector is very much part of a process in which the 
Indian state and local companies have been significantly involved. One of the major 
contributions of the Indian government is the establishment of a huge number of educational 
institutions within IT. India has increasingly internationalized its economy and is competing 
with China to become the leading Asian country in the global economy  
(Chandrasekhar 2001, Lakha 1994, www.newscientist.com 19.02. 2005, 
www.innovasjonnorge.no).   
 
3.2 Collecting the Data 
 
3.2.1    Documents 
 
The documents that I have employed have predominantly been published on the official web-
sites of the Norwegian government and ministries and the EU Commission 
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(www.odin.dep.no, www.europa.eu.int/growthandjobs). These websites include a number of 
documents that may have been relevant for the analysis. For practical reasons, I have only 
used some of these documents. I have not picked these documents according to strict criteria 
of selection. Rather, the selection of documents can be seen as part of the process of research 
and analysis. I have searched for documents in the process of finding core aspects and keys 
related to the topics of the thesis. However, as the issues of the thesis have evolved and 
become more specific, I have increasingly sought for documents that could illuminate official 
perspectives on national competitiveness and innovation. Further, I have searched for 
documents that could establish a link between national competitiveness and innovation and 
immigration.   
 Throughout the process of document analysis, it has been necessary to keep updated 
on political changes connected to the competitiveness strategies that would need to be taken 
into consideration in the analysis. During the work on the thesis I have therefore tried to be 
aware of potential changes in the empirical context of the documents that I have employed.   
 
3.2.2    Interviews 
 
Getting access to respondents and informants:  
As respondents for the interviews, I wanted Indian IT-professionals who were working in 
Norway on a relatively short term, and who had come to Norway on a specialist basis.8  
In order to get hold of respondents, I contacted a Norwegian company that recruited 
IT-personnel from India to Norway. Through this company, I was connected with an Indian 
specialist who was working in Norway. This specialist can be seen as the door-opener to the 
respondents. He contacted and gave a name- and e-mail list of other Indian IT-workers that he 
knew of in Norway. They all lived in the Oslo region. Out of these, 15 persons seemed to be 
relevant according to my criteria. I contacted these via e-mail in which I presented my project  
and asked them to be respondents.  
In the inquiry, I only required the potential respondents to be “Indian IT- professionals 
working in Norway” (see Appendix 1). This rather open inquiry was intentional, because I 
hoped it would encourage more people to volunteer, than if I set stricter criteria from the start. 
I figured that it would be better if I got too many potential respondents and would have to 
                                                 
8
 I have categorised these respondents as ‘international knowledge-migrants’ during the process of analysis, after 
the interviews had been performed. 
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reject some of them, than too few. When people contacted me and wanted to join the project, I 
also required that they would have to have come to Norway on a specialist basis, and that they 
needed to be working with IT in Norway at the time when I would do the interviews. Based 
on these inquiries and according to my requirements, I got 7 positive answers. Later on, 
during the period of interviewing, one more of the persons from the inquiry list contacted me 
and joined as an interview source. Through the interviews I was also connected with one 
female interview source.  
It turned out that not all of those who wanted to be interviewed were strictly IT-
professionals in terms of having a formal education within IT. However, they were all 
occupied within IT in some way or another, and all but one of them had obtained work permit 
in Norway on a specialist basis. Hence, I decided that it was sensible to accept all of them as 
interview sources. According to whether they were IT-professional or ‘just’ had an occupation 
within IT, they can be referred to as either ‘respondents’ or informants’. The persons whom I 
term ‘respondents’ are those that fit directly to my criteria of selection. These respondents are 
people who can be categorized according to my definition of ‘international knowledge 
migrants’. ‘Respondents’ can be perceived as actors who are directly involved in the 
phenomenon of research. Those that I term ‘informants’ are the persons who do not fit 
directly into the category of international knowledge migrants. ‘Informants’ can be seen as 
persons who are not directly involved in the phenomenon but still have a position in the 
empirical context which can give valuable information in terms of the phenomenon  of 
research (Thagaard [1998] 2002). I finally ended up with 6 respondents and 3 informants. 
Because they are not all professionals, I refer to the respondents and informants in general as 
‘IT workers’.  
 
Selection criteria:  
As we see here, the degree of selection of respondents and informants was flexible. First, it 
depended on how many persons my contact person would come up with. Then, it depended on 
how many of these that would contact me. After I had started doing interviews, I got one more 
informant through tips from a respondent. The selection process can thus be seen as following 
the ‘snowball-effect’ (Repstad [1987] 1998).   I wanted primarily specialists, because I did not 
want ‘regular’ immigrants, but people who had come to Norway in the context of their IT-
profession.  Another point was that I wanted ‘fresh’ impressions of Norway from people who 
had not lived in Norway for a very long time. Further, the objective to avoid ‘regular’ 
immigrants was also motivated by the fact that specialists are not very much in focus, neither 
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in the general public debate on immigration, nor in immigration research in Norway 
(Tjelmeland 2002). I hence wanted to be able to present a relatively different empirical angle.  
None of the respondents are women. This can be seen as a reflection of international 
migration of IT-workers as a phenomenon. Many of the characteristics of working life within 
the international IT industry – like long working hours and frequent travelling – are difficult 
to combine with the primarily female responsibilities of reproduction and family care (Devi 
2001).There were a few women of those that I asked to be interviewed, but none of them 
responded. Hence, during the first interviews I asked if the respondents/informants knew of 
any female Indian IT-professional in Norway. This way, I got in contact with one Indian 
woman who was working within the Norwegian IT-industry. However, she was not an IT-
professional and did not come to Norway on a specialist basis. Because of that, I will not 
categorize her as a respondent. Nevertheless, I see it is an objective per se to aspire to enhance 
the complexity of the data-material also according to gender. Further, I consider this woman 
as a significant informant because of her position as an Indian in the Norwegian IT-industry. 
However, both practically from the performance of the interview and analytically, I have 
learned that in this project the division between data from respondents and data from 
informants is artificial. I did interviews with the informants in the same way and according to 
the same questions that I did with the respondents. And, during parts of the interview with the 
respondents, they also came up with more general or external information which could be 
seen as ‘informant’ data.  Hence, I will hereafter refer to all of the persons that I have 
interviewed as respondents. This is also done for the sake of anonymity of the interview 
sources.  
 
Coding and protection of the respondents’ identity:  
I have made the respondents anonymous by categorizing them as either on a short-term or a 
long-term in Norway. Those that have stayed in Norway for one year or less, have been 
categorized as ‘short-term’. I have coded ‘short-term’ as ‘A’. There were two short-term 
workers. Hence, these are coded as A-1 and A-2. The other respondents were hence on a 
longer term in Norway. ‘Long- term’ is coded as ‘B’.  The seven long-term workers are hence 
coded as ‘B-1’, ‘B-2’, ‘B-3’ and so forth. I have coded myself as an interviewer as ‘Q’.  
The categorization is very rough, because I want to protect the anonymity of the 
respondents as much as possible. Because there are so few respondents, I do not want to 
categorize them according to too many and specific factors. However, I will present some 
general information on the respondents. The categorization of short-term and long-term could 
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be issued, since none of the respondents had stayed in Norway for more than 6 years 
(Mahroum 2000). However, I have made these categories according to the assumption that it 
will take about one year to become relatively familiar with a working and living in Norway.  
Hence, I want to indicate that the respondents may have different perceptions and experiences 
from living and working in Norway based on whether they have lived in Norway for one year 
or not. Six of the respondents were employed in a Norwegian company. The other three 
respondents were employed in Indian companies. All of the respondents had education on a 
bachelor, master or Ph. D. level, but this was not necessarily in IT. Three of them had their 
main education within other fields, but had gained considerable experience or taken secondary 
education within IT. The six others were educated directly within software. Two of the 
respondents had obtained permanent settlement permission in Norway. The respondents were 
between 25 and 40 years old – most of them were in their 30s. All but one of them were 
married, and five of them had children.     
 
The interview guide:  
When I started the project, I had some key issues of research but they were in general rather 
provisional. Further, I had limited knowledge in the areas that I was to research. For example, 
I was not familiar with the IT-industry. Hence, it can be claimed that this phase of research 
was rather exploring. According to this, it was appropriate to use semi-structured interviews. 
These would allow me to keep some kind of thematic direction in the interviews while at the 
same time they allowed me to incorporate new empirical aspects. The semi-structured 
interview was also based on my conviction of a more balanced relation between the 
researcher and the respondent. Through a semi-structured interview, I figured that the 
empirical data would be less ‘dictated’ by me as a researcher, and more influenced by the 
respondents. Before the first respondent interview, I had a meeting with my door-opener who 
had set me in contact with the respondents. I talked with him as a preparation before the 
interviews to get a bit more insight in the research area before the interviews started. The 
interview guide was shaped according to this conversation.  
 The interview guide was based on three sections (see Appendix 2): personalia, 
profession and work, and identity. The interview was hence based on a certain dynamic. It 
started out with rather formal questions, which should not be too controversial, private or 
complicated to answer. As the ‘ice’ between me and the respondent had started to break, I 
went on to working life issues, which would demand a bit more reflections from the 
respondent, but would generally not be of the private kind. After this section, it is likely that 
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the respondent would feel more ‘familiar’ with me and free to speak about relatively more 
personal issues (Kvale [1997] 2001).  
 
Performing the interviews: 
When I made closer appointments in front of the interviews, I asked the respondents where 
they preferred to do the interviews. I had figured that it would be best to do the interviews 
either where the respondent was working or at a café. Some of the first interviews were done 
in a café/restaurant. However, I soon experienced that this could be rather noisy and 
disturbing surroundings, so in preparing the next appointments I asked if we could do them at 
an office where the person was working. Hence about half of the interviews were done in 
café/restaurants and half in the office. One interview was done in the respondent’s home. I did 
all the interviews during July 2002 and February 2003. Most of them were done before 
November 2002.   
  The interviews were taped, so that I would avoid having to take notes and could 
concentrate fully on the conversation. Having interviews taped is also practical for getting 
more precise quotes and the tape is available for repeated listening after the interview has 
been recorded. When I made the interview appointments I asked if I could tape the interview, 
and under the very interview I also repeated this question before I started the recording. None 
of the respondents rejected the interview being taped. The interview situation lasted from 
about half an hour to three hours.  
During the very interview, I tried to turn it into more of a conversation. One reason for 
this was that I thought that a more ‘conversation’-like setting would make both me and the 
respondents feel more relaxed, and therefore make them speak more openly. As I began to 
learn the interview guide by heart, the aims of a conversation-like setting became easier to 
achieve. After I had done the three first interviews, I made a few changes to the interview 
guide, but I predominantly kept to the original script. However, I also talked to the 
respondents and asked about things that were not integrated in the interview guide. In the 
beginning, I especially asked them about IT and the IT-industry. Since the research had an 
explorative profile, I hoped that a more conversation-like setting might accelerate new issues 
that I had not caught in the interview guide. This also showed to be the actual interview 
scenario. Several things that have become relevant in the analysis are issues that the 
respondents came up with when I ‘allowed’ them to speak freely beyond what they were 
strictly questioned about. 
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A more conversational approach also became necessary because several of the interview 
questions turned out to be too theoretical and literary shaped to be directly transferred to an 
oral setting. Especially the application of the term ‘identity’ in the interview guide should be 
seen as more relevant for the researcher than the respondent. In other words, I had not fully 
considered the distinction between research questions one the one hand, and interview 
questions on the other (Kvale [1997] 2001). This recognition implied that while I tried to 
broadly follow the interview guide, I would also have to reformulate some of the questions 
during the very interview situation.9  
 The problems of communication during the interview were also related to language. 
None of the respondent knew Norwegian language sufficiently to do the interview in 
Norwegian. Hence, all the interviews were done in English. English is an official language in 
India, but it was not the mother tongue of any of the respondents and neither for me. The use 
of English during the interviews generally worked well. However, it shall not be understated 
that there was an aspect of language difficulties which scope would vary from interview to 
interview.  These were partly compensated for, by both me and the respondents reformulating 
and asking things over again. However, because of the social dynamics that often will be 
implicit in such interview settings and the time available during the interview, there often was 
a prevalent aspect of lacking communication.  
 After the interviews were taped, I began to transcript them. Transcription of interviews 
involves a degree of manipulation of the data material which is relevant in terms of its 
reliability. Obviously, all the visual and social aspects of the very interview situation cannot 
be taped. Accordingly, a transcription is a literal construction of oral communication (Kvale 
[1997] 2001). In that regard, I think the problems with language should be emphasised.  The 
language problems were repeated during the transcription of the interviews. I often faced 
semantic problems when trying to transcript what the respondents were saying. 
This means that I did not get the precise meaning of a word or of sentences. Even if I have 
missed out on a word from time to time I have predominantly been able to understand the 
general contents of the interviews. Hence, I do not think that this problem severely influences 
the general validity of the thesis. In the analysis of this thesis, I have marked single words that 
I have not been able to catch with ‘[?]’.  
                                                 
9
 For example I often experienced that the respondent did not understand what I meant when I asked the question 
under the ‘identity’ section: “Do you have something you feel especially connected to/dependant on (person, 
place, religion, interests, principles), in the way that it influences the choices you make in life?”. 
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The respondent quotes that I have used in the thesis have also been transformed into relatively 
standardized English. This is partly because of the semantic concerns for the reader and also 
in order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents. In the transcription I have tried to avoid 
manipulating the interviews more than necessary. However, I have focused on what the 
respondents have expressed in actual words. Hence, I have let out other aspects of oral 
communication like laughter, sighing etc. This is because I have not wanted to go too far into 
psychological factors.10   
 
3.3 Analysis of the Data 
‘Analysis’ means a way of interpreting and systemizing data. Shortly, the analysis is 
performed through dividing the data material into smaller fractions and then linking them 
together according to some sort of analytical framework. However, there is still a number of 
different ways to perform an analysis. A prevalent issue of analysis is the relation between the 
use of empirical data and theory. The question is how the respective empirical and theoretical 
aspects are to structure the analysis. Shall the analysis be grounded in the empirical or in 
theory? For the purposes of this thesis, it has been my aim that the empirical data should be 
the predominant guide of the analytical process. This objective implies that I have tried to 
adjust theory according to empirical findings, rather than the other way around. However, I do 
not perceive the empirical and the theoretical as neatly separated, but rather reciprocal aspects 
of the analysis and of research in general. Often, these aspects cannot be clearly separated 
from each other. A researcher may not be able to make empirical observations without the 
influence of theoretical perceptions and vice versa. Nevertheless, the analysis of this thesis 
has been generated through an ongoing oscillation between the empirical and theoretical 
perspectives (Andersen 1997, Kvale [1997] 2001, Corbin and Strauss 1990). 
Because of the provisional starting point of my project, the analysis posed severe 
challenges. The core of the analytical problems was that I was uncertain of which 
phenomenon I actually was researching. Accordingly, it was difficult to construct a basic 
analytical framework. In other words, I did not exactly know what to look for in the analysis 
(Andersen 1997, Holter and Kalleberg (eds.) [1982] 1996).  
When I started the project, I knew that I wanted to do research on a group of 
immigrants which was not too much in focus. Hopefully, such research would contribute to 
                                                 
10
 For the sake of the reader, I have also let out interruptions between words and sentences and also spoken 
interjections like “eh” or “uh” etc. 
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bring up a bit different perspectives on the immigration scenario in Norway. In that regard, 
Indian IT-professionals in Norway caught my attention. At the time being there was quite a 
lot of media focus on the need to get Indian IT-professionals to Norway (www.digi.no 
21.03.2001). I was curious to know more about why these Indians had ‘ended up’ in a 
relatively unknown country like Norway and what they thought about working and living in 
Norway. Hence, the interviews with the Indian IT-workers became my first source of data.  
I had initially thought that my project would ‘only’ deal with labour immigration and 
Norwegian immigration policies. However, I experienced that compelling new issues were 
generated already from the first stage of analysis. These issues were very much generated by 
the respondents themselves. Many of them had asked me questions about the economic and 
political system in Norway that I could simply not answer. They wanted to know about things 
like the Norwegian tax system, why the Norwegian government did not simplify the visa 
regulations, why there were so few specialists in Norway, why Norway did not focus more on 
IT, etc. Further, I became increasingly aware that many of them were unsatisfied with their 
social situation in Norway, and that many of them connected this to their ethnicity. When I 
studied the interviews, I also became aware that the term ‘competition’ was often mentioned 
in various ways. As I tried to figure whether there was a potential link between the issues that 
the respondents had brought up, I began to realize that the potential scope of research was 
much larger than I had imagined.  
I first tried to find some framework of analysis through immigration theory. However, 
I gradually got the perception that most immigration theory could not be used as general 
framework to systemize the data material.  Further, I also realized that since these respondents 
were mostly specialists, the general Norwegian immigration policies were not directly 
relevant to them. I hence became interested in what Norwegian governments in general were 
doing in order to attract specialists. This is how the document data came into being. As I 
searched through the Norwegian government and ministries’ web-site (www.odin.dep.no) for 
more information on policies towards specialists, I became aware of the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ and 
later ‘From Idea to Value’. Here, I noticed the frequency of the terms ‘competitiveness’ and 
‘knowledge-based’ in these documents. As I began to search for theory on competition and 
competitiveness, an analytical framework gradually emerged. This framework was based on 
the links between competitiveness, labour immigration/immigration policies and the 
knowledge-based economy. These links were enhanced as I discovered more and more 
economic and sociological theories that could support them. Then, I again tried to substantiate 
and scrutinize these links through the data material. Throughout the analysis, this cycle of the 
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empirical and the theoretical has been continuously repeated. The main issues of this thesis 
have been developed through a creative process in which analytical progress has been 
accelerated by the very lack of an analytical framework.  
 
3.4 Validity  
 
The issues of validity can be related to the whole process of research. Validity is here seen as 
various aspects of the soundness and integrity of the research. The issue of validity concerns 
whether the project actually researches the object/issue that it aims to research. This question 
hence implies the extent as to which the researcher performs what he/she thinks or claims to 
be doing. Here, I will constrict the issue of validity to the coherence between empirical and 
theoretical aspects of the analysis (Kvale 2001, Flick 1999). I aim at coherence in the way that 
the connection between the empirical and theoretical has to be accounted for according to a 
relatively consistent logic. 
The view that the competitiveness strategies of EU and the Norwegian government are 
applicable to illuminate the issues of this thesis is presupposed by the perspective that “moral 
values and legal procedures are integrally connected in the systems of surveillance and social 
control that are responsible for official record-keeping” (Scott 1990: 61). I hence assume that 
the present institutional ideology/discourse of the state will be reflected in its official 
documents. That way, the methodological starting point is compatible with the regulationist 
approach to institutions as permeated by and connected to the general historical and structural 
context. These assumptions about the state as an institution also legitimize the use of these 
documents in the analysis of Norwegian immigration policies. This methodological 
acknowledgement calls for a critical and reflexive approach to these documents. They should 
not be seen as ‘neutral’ publications. On the other hand, it legitimizes that these documents 
are fit to explore the broader issues of the state concerned by this thesis (Jessop 2002, 
Kettunen 1998, Neumann 2001, Scott 1990).   
The quotes from the respondents make out the bulk of the data in the analysis. 
According to the structuration perspective, the international labour migrants as an institution 
can be seen as a link between the global and local, the institutional and individual. I therefore 
insert the respondents as ‘international knowledge-migrants’, as a link between the 
knowledge-based economy and the national, and between the Norwegian state’s immigration 
policies and the individual migrant. It may be issued whether these respondents should be 
categorized as ‘migrants’ since many of them are short-time workers and not even included in 
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the official migration statistics (Kommunal- og regional departementet 1999, www.ssb.no). 
However, in accordance with the issues of this thesis, I aim to substantiate their relation and 
relevance to the general Norwegian immigration policies by terming them ‘migrants’. In 
chapter 6, which is the main chapter of the analysis of Norwegian immigration policies, I have 
only used empirical quotes from the respondents. I will account for this based on the claim of 
the significant position of international knowledge-migrants in this thesis. This emphasis on 
the relevance of individual perspectives in analysis of immigration policies is also based on 
the lack of focus on this type of migrants in general migration research (Findlay 1995, 
Tjomsland 2002).  
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4. The Competitiveness Strategies of EU and        
         Norway 
 
 
 
The starting point of this chapter is the Norwegian state’s engagement as a competition state 
in the knowledge-based economy. The intention of the chapter is to relate the Norwegian 
competitiveness policies to immigration polices. I will perform this by comparing the 
Norwegian Government’s strategy ‘From Idea to Value’ with EU’s ‘Lisbon Strategy’. The 
comparison will be based on the Schumpeterian concept of competitiveness.  
 
4. 1 The Lisbon Strategy 
 
During the last decades European birth rates have been continuously falling while life 
expectancies are rising. Working together, these two demographic forces cause a severe 
result: the general European population is ageing. EU expects that by year 2050 the average 
ratio of persons in retirement will be almost equal to the working-age population in Europe. 
Further, the EU economy as a whole is considered to be less dynamic than other comparable 
economies. Since the 1990s, Europe’s economic productivity growth has been declining, 
especially compared to the US’ more innovation-driven economy and increasingly compared 
to many Asian economies (ERT 2003, Report from the High Level Group 2004, Yssen 2004): 
 
Throughout the 1990s the US raced ahead with its domination of new areas of technology, greater 
acceptance of market forces. Closer link between higher education and business, its ability to 
retain the highest calibre researchers, its relatively youthful population and its active policy of 
immigration of the best and brightest (ERT 2003: 3). 
  
According to EU documents, the decline of the European productivity rates is largely 
connected to a lower investment per employee and to a decrease in the rate of technological 
progress. There has been an increase in the employment rate within EU, but too many jobs are 
low-productivity jobs. Low productivity growth is associated with the EU member states’ 
insufficient priorities in knowledge-intensive sectors. The low productivity growth within EU 
is connected to lacking investment in R & D and education, low capability to commercialize 
scientific research and relatively low performance in ICT industries and services: “The 
evidence is overwhelming that the higher research and development expenditure, the higher 
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subsequent productivity growth” (Report from the High Level Group 2004: 19). In the EU it 
is feared that if this economic situation prevails, the general level of welfare in Europe will be 
difficult to maintain. Based on this scenario, the Lisbon Strategy was launched on an EU 
summit in Lisbon in March 2000 (Report from the High Level Group 2004):  
 
The Lisbon European Council rightly recognised that Europe’s future economic development 
would depend on its ability to create and grow high-value, innovative and research-based sectors 
capable of competing with the best in the world (Report from the High Level Group 2004: 19). 
 
Shortly, the Lisbon Strategy can be seen as a comprehensive framework established to 
achieve one principal and strategic aim within the year 2010. The main objective was that EU 
should become (Report from the High Level Group 2004, Yssen 2004): 
 
[…] the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion for all (COM 
(2000) 567 final:  4) 
 
The Commission is here anticipating that being in the lead in terms of competitiveness and a 
knowledge-based economy are the new preconditions for sustaining the more traditional main 
priorities of Western European policies like having a stable economy, high labour market 
participation and a high level of social integration. Accordingly, the economy of EU member 
states is to be reformed in compliance with the demands of economic globalization and the 
knowledge-based economy (Yssen 2004, ERT 2003): 
 
In a global economy, Europe has no option but radically to improve its knowledge economy and 
underlying economic performance if it is to respond to the challenges of Asia and the US (Report 
from the High Level Group 2004: 12). 
 
The Lisbon Strategy is based on the perception that both increased cooperation and 
competition between the EEA/EU member states will enhance the general economic 
competitiveness of EEA/EU as an economic region. This implies that the Lisbon Strategy is 
both an external and internal competitiveness strategy. It is external, because its main object 
of competition is outside the EU/EEA area, and mainly the US. On the other hand, the 
strategy is internal because its external objectives are to be achieved through increasing the 
internal competition (COM (2003) 336 final, COM (2003) 704 final).  The Lisbon Strategy 
can be seen as an essentially economic reform because it is first of all aimed at the European 
economy, which transition to a knowledge-based economy is regarded as the only option. 
However, the next quote, claiming that the transformations must be consistent with the 
“values and concepts of society” indicates something more: 
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The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the 
challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of 
people’s lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy. The Union must 
shape these changes in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society and also with a 
view to the forthcoming enlargement (Lisbon European Council 2000)   
 
Traditionally, most of the modern Western European states have been structured according to 
a complex compromise between capitalistic and social concerns. In much of European 
politics, these concerns have become interconnected and presupposed by each other through 
the development of the welfare state (Barth and Moene et. al (eds.) 2003, Esping-Andersen 
2000, Jessop 2002).  Therefore, the juxtaposition of economic and social concerns in the main 
objective of the Lisbon strategy can be seen as a continuation of traditional European politics. 
It seems likely that this is part of the reference of the EU Commission when it is stated that 
the reforms have to be "consistent with the values of the Union". This is also substantiated by 
the claim that: 
 
The Lisbon strategy is not an attempt to become a copy-cat of the US – far from it. Lisbon is about 
achieving Europe’s vision of what it wants to be and what it wants to keep in the light of 
increasing global competition, an ageing population and the enlargement (Report from the High 
Level Group 2004: 12). 
 
When the EU is distancing the Lisbon Strategy from the US, it is reasonable that this is partly 
because the US economy represents a different social model than Europe (Hall and Soskice 
(ed.) 2001). This quote seems to suggest that the Lisbon Strategy attempts to transform the 
EU member states into the knowledge-based economy not only without giving up the 
comprehensive social model of Europe, but as a the way to preserve it (Lisbon European 
Council 2000).  
Enhanced innovation is seen by the EU Commission as one of the preconditions for 
achieving the main objective of the Lisbon Strategy (COM (2000) 567). 
 
Innovation must permeate our economy and be embraced by society for the Lisbon goal to be 
achieved: Innovation is essential for European enterprises to be competitive, and is therefore a 
major component of enterprise policy, as well as one of the main objectives of research policy 
(COM (2000) 567 final:  4). 
 
In this quote, the EU Commission has prospects in terms of making innovation into a 
significant social structure of the member states. This is seen as a basic condition in order to 
fulfil the Lisbon objective. This extensive, innovation-based approach to competitiveness is 
largely in accordance with the Schumpeterian competitiveness approach. The Lisbon Strategy 
may therefore not only be seen as an innovation strategy, but a program for social 
transformation of society. The perception of the Lisbon Strategy as being aimed at broader 
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social transformation is substantiated by looking at the various policy areas that are 
incorporated in the Lisbon Strategy. Initially, the programme of the Lisbon Strategy was to 
build knowledge infrastructures, enhance innovation and economic reform, and modernise 
social welfare and education systems (Lisbon European Council 2000). Later on 
environmental issues were added to the programme (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 
2004).  
A significant aspect of the Lisbon Strategy is the strategic coordination of the 
implemented policy areas. The Council claims that it is necessary to "ensure more coherent 
strategic direction and effective monitoring of progress" (Lisbon European Council 2000). 
This is to be achieved through what the EU Council terms "a new open method of 
coordination"  (Lisbon European Council 2000).The performance of the member states on the 
various areas of the strategy are to be compared through so-called structural indicators. The 
present 5 main categories of structural indicators are employment, innovation and research, 
economic reform, social cohesion and environment, as well as the general economic 
background (EU Commission 2004). One of these policy areas, ‘employment’, also includes 
immigration concerns. Following, I will analyse and discuss how immigration has been 
integrated in the Lisbon Strategy. 
 
4.1.1   The Lisbon Strategy and Immigration  
 
In a white paper from 2000, which is not part of the Lisbon Strategy, the EU Commission 
argues that immigration is taking on a new profile due to the globalisation of the economy, the 
skill shortages and the demographic changes and projections in the EU. On this background, 
the Commission calls for a ‘fresh’ approach to immigration in the EU. The Commission notes 
that the EU member states’ immigration policy the last 30 years has been based on the 
premise that Europe does not need economic immigration (COM (2000)757 final): 
 
There is a growing recognition that, in this new economic and demographic context, the existing 
“zero” immigration politics which have dominated thinking over the past 30 years are no longer 
appropriate (COM (2000)757 final: 6). 
 
When the Commission refers to the “thinking over the past 30 years”, it probably refers to the 
immigration scenario that initiated the European ban on labour migration in the mid- 1970s. 
The so-called immigration stop meant that humanitarian based immigration became the only 
legitimate form of immigration from countries outside OECD (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 
2003. What the Commission here points to when referring to “this new economic and 
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demographic context” is the scenario compatible with what has been described as the new 
immigration agenda in this thesis. The Commission is concerned about the labour shortages in 
certain sectors in many European countries. As we have seen, this situation became 
increasingly prevalent in Europe from the late 1990s. Another interesting remark in this white 
paper is the notion that:  
 
In particular the Commission proposes to examine how the complex issues related to the 
admission of economic migrants, which were only touched on briefly in the Tampere Council, 
should be developed within a Community immigration policy (COM (2000)757 final: 6). 
 
The Tampere Council in 1999 agreed on the development of a common EU immigration and 
asylum policy.  As we see from this quote, economic migration was not especially in focus at 
Tampere.  The council rather sought to establish some key elements in order to handle the 
general migration flows of EU. Some of the main issues at the council were a common system 
for asylum seekers and to improve the cooperation with migration-sending countries, 
especially in terms of the problem of brain-drain (COM (2000) 757). The aim of common EU 
asylum- and refugee policy is part of the development of a more common policy of EU in 
general. The period of time when the Commission calls for increased “management of 
immigration flows” in EU occur is not coincidental.  It is related to the preparation of an 
enlarged EU in 2004, which supposedly would cause increased pressure on EU governance 
and require more firm and effective common policies. Accordingly, immigration has been 
included in what can be seen as NPM reforms of EU. NPM inspired reforms have been 
launched in Western European for a couple of decades. However, according to the EU 
Commission, it is only during the recent years that immigration and asylum matters have been 
recognized and perceived as a separate policy area at the EU level. Hence, the aim of a 
common EU immigration policy is not only the result of the EU states under strain, but also a 
new political attitude to immigration (COM (2000) 757, CDMG (2000) 11 rev, Larbi 1999).  
Since the publishing of this white paper in 2000, immigration has become included as a 
policy area of the Lisbon Strategy. According to the EU Commission, the inclusion of 
immigration in the Lisbon Strategy can be seen as a continuation of the development towards 
a common European immigration and asylum policy (Com. (2003) 336 final: 9). Considering 
its inherent focus on cooperation and coordination, the Lisbon Strategy seems like a 
reasonable instrument in terms of developing a common immigration policy. However, the 
new issue in the Lisbon Strategy compared to the Tampere Council, is not internal 
cooperation on immigration in general, but rather the enhanced external competition on 
economic and in particular highly skilled labour migrants:  
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In an overall economic and social context characterised by a number of skill and labour shortages, 
competition for the highly skilled in a globalised economy and accelerating demographic ageing, 
immigration is taking on a new profile in the EU (COM (2003) 336 final: 9). 
 
Hence, if we move from the topics at Tampere in 1999 to the communication above from the 
EU Commission in 2000, we see a gradual enhanced focus on economic migration. Within 
migration theory ‘economic migrants’ is often referring to the motivation for migration of the 
individual immigrant. However, the EU Commission’s notion on ‘economic migrants’ seems 
to reflect the motivation for encouraging immigration of the EU member states. Therefore, the 
new profile on immigration in EU means that this motivation is increasingly based on 
European economic concerns (Fuglerud 2001). The new immigration profile is hence linked 
to many of the economic and social issues of EU which make out the back cloth of the whole 
Lisbon Strategy. As a corollary, immigration is employed as a complex instrument in the 
effort to increase EU’s economic growth through innovation based competitiveness:   
 
While immigration should be recognised as a source of cultural and social enrichment, in 
particular by contributing to entrepreneurship, diversity and innovation, its economic impact on 
employment and growth is also significant as it increases labour supplies and helps cope with 
bottlenecks (COM (2003) 336 final: 10). 
 
The perception of immigration as contributing to entrepreneurship and innovation is 
compatible with the Schumpeterian approach to human resources. Following, it can be argued 
that immigration is viewed as an extra-economic factor of competitiveness which may 
enhance EU’s economic competitiveness in general. However, this perspective should bee 
seen as only relatively new considering the whole postwar-immigration history in Western 
Europe. During the 1950s and 1960s foreign workers and immigrants were implemented in 
the state strategies of economic growth in several European countries like France, Germany 
and Switzerland. In France and Germany, foreign supplies of labour were used to avoid 
inflation caused by relatively full employment (Hollifield 1992). This illustrates that 
immigration as a key to competitiveness is not initiated by knowledge-based economy, but is 
an aspect of modern capitalism (Cohen 1987, Jessop 2002). Accordingly, what the ‘fresh’ 
approach to immigration in the Lisbon Strategy might involve needs to be discussed more 
thoroughly.  
In the previous quote, the economic impact of immigration is seen as a positive factor 
in terms of the labour market. This is interesting since it is here just referred to ‘immigration’. 
However, the next quote shows that the category of immigrants is not random in the Lisbon 
Strategy:  
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The migrants most likely to match demand and supply are those adaptable enough to face 
changing conditions, in the view of their qualifications, experience and personal abilities. The 
selection mechanisms must be geared towards these would-be migrants and offer them sufficiently 
attractive conditions. This is likely to result in increased competition within the Union and 
between OECD countries. Such a competition calls for co-ordination to secure a level playing field 
(COM (2003) 336 final: 16). 
 
What we see here, is the conception of immigrant selection of the Lisbon Strategy. However, 
any implementation of immigration policies will involve a mechanism for selecting 
immigrants (Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003). The issue here is therefore not immigrant 
selection per se, but the criteria of immigrant selection. According to the wish for them to be 
‘adaptable’ it seems like the migrants sought for here will need to be reflexive persons. This 
aim accords with the requirements of human resources in the globalized economy described 
by Kettunen (1998). However, in this quote the Commission itself also seems to be reflexive 
in terms of the need for EU to be attractive to these migrants. Hence, it can be claimed that the 
EU is here signalizing an increased aspect of institutional reflexivity on immigration 
(Ketttunen 1998, Jessop 2002).   
The EU’s so-called new immigration profile can also be considered as a change in the 
perception of Western Europe’s pull factors. The existence and complexity of various 'pull' 
and 'push' factors is part of the main frameworks of migration theory and research. Push 
factors are conditions in a country that give incentive to emigration of individuals. The 'pull' 
factors refer to the specific conditions in a country that attract individual immigrants.  
Deficiency in labour market supplies has been considered as one of the most significant pull 
factors (Fuglerud 2001).  
Before the labour immigration ban, Western European governments considered the 
labour market as the major pull factor of Western European countries. The ban on labour 
immigration was partly based on the fear that Western European countries would function as 
welfare ‘magnets’. This can be seen as the view that immigrants are more attracted by the 
welfare states of Western European countries than their labour markets (Borjas 1999). This 
perception was also enhanced as a consequence of the ban because refugees and asylum 
seekers now became a larger component of the total immigrant stock. Refugees and asylum 
seekers will generally require more welfare services than many other categories of 
immigrants. After the ban on labour migration, the pull factors have represented what Western 
European governments wanted to protect from immigration. In the Lisbon strategy we see that 
this tendency is about to turn again. There seems to be an increased awareness on that 
Western European labour markets need to obtain factors which may attract immigrants. 
However, it shall be noted that this perspective is most relevant for the categories of 
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immigrants that are most likely to create to economic growth. According to the discourse on 
competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy these immigrants would be the highly 
skilled immigrants. This type of immigrants are one of the means to sustain welfare, and can 
therefore be described as welfare ‘magnets’ for the Western European countries. Western 
European governments, here represented through EU, have began to draw their attention to 
these migrants for the sake of the sustaining welfare.  However, the ‘pull-factors’ of today’s 
EU are weak, and hence the capability to attract the right human resources will be difficult 
(Borjas 1999, Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Fuglereud 2001): 
 
The main challenge will be to attract and recruit migrants suitable for the EU labour force to 
sustain productivity and economic growth. In the context of increasing skills gaps and mismatches, 
which require time to overcome, it is becoming recognised that economic migration can play a role 
in tackling labour market imbalances, provided the qualifications of immigrants are appropriate 
(COM (2003) 336 final: 15). 
 
This quote illustrates that the significance of the emphasis on economic and highly skilled 
migration in the Lisbon Strategy is that it is linking immigration to the transition in the 
discourse on human labour generated by the knowledge-based economy (Gudmundsson 1998, 
Jessop 2002). This discourse can be argued to have become more evident in the revised 
version of the strategy: 
 
4.1.2   The Revision of the Lisbon Strategy 
 
Since the launching of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, there is a rather mixed picture in terms of 
the progress of the strategy’s objectives. All in all, however, the competitiveness gap between 
Europe and US on one hand and Asia on the other has continued to increase. In terms of the 
knowledge-based economy it is stated that “The US threatens to consolidate its leadership” 
(Report from the High Level Group Nov. 2004: 12). In February 2005, the original version of 
the Lisbon Strategy was revised and its objectives moderated. The revision is based on the 
recognition that the initial aggregate objectives of the Union that were to be achieved within 
2010 will not be possible to reach (COM (2005) 24, SEC (2005) 622/2). According to the EU 
Commission: “We are now half-way through the process and the results are not very 
satisfactory. The implementation of reform in Member States has been quite scarce” 
(http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/index_en.htm  [Aug.5. 2005]). 
The main elements of the Lisbon Strategy – the maintenance of the European social 
model and the environment within the frames of the knowledge-based economy – are 
continued in the revision. However, in the revised Lisbon Strategy there are no longer 
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prospects for EU to be “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world”. Rather, there is now to be implemented more realistic objectives and the focus of the 
strategy has been tightened. The main effort is to be directed mainly on economic productivity 
and employment (http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/index_en.htm). This is signalised in the 
next quote, by President of the EU Commission Jose Barroso: “Our clear aim is to create 
more and better jobs in a more dynamic, innovative and attractive Europe. With this strategy I 
believe we now have the right tools to achieve our goals” 
(http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/index_en.htm [Aug. 5. 2005]). 
The implementation of the revised Lisbon Strategy proposes an ‘integrated approach’ 
to economic and employment policies. It entails re-organization and simplification of the 
coordination of these policies. However, by re-focusing on economic productivity and 
employment, the Lisbon Strategy can be argued to be back where it started at the Lisbon 
Council in 2000. Initially, the intention of Lisbon Strategy was to make EU focus on two 
policy strands. These were: 
-Pursuing economic reform to prepare the knowledge economy 
-Strengthening the European social model by investing in people (COM (2000/7): 11).  
 
These two pillars can be claimed to comprise one of the major premises of the Lisbon 
Strategy – the relation between economic growth and investment in so-called ‘human capital’. 
The concept of human capital is very broad, and in the case of the Lisbon Strategy, “investing 
in people” is obviously encompassing the whole spectre of human resources concerned by the 
European social model. For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on links between human 
capital and human labour that are implicated in the Lisbon Strategy. According to a Lisbon 
Strategy document, human capital “has to do with the knowledge and skills embodied in 
people and accumulated through schooling, training and experience that are useful in the 
production of goods, services and further knowledge” (de la Fuente and Ciccone 2000: 9). 
The coupling between ‘knowledge’ and ‘skills’ in this quote illustrates the discursive 
transition concerning human labour as the key to economic competitiveness which is being 
reflected in the Lisbon Strategy. Again, it shall be noted that according to a regulationist 
perspective, human labour as an aspect of economic competitiveness is not a new trait of 
contemporary capitalism. Hence, the ‘new’ aspect of the knowledge-based economy is the 
particular way that human resources are approached to in the present discourse on 
competitiveness (Jessop 2002). 
 From the end of the 1950s many economists began to suggest that economic growth is 
not only a question of quantitative growth and improved allocation of labour and capital. 
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Instead, the importance of a ‘third factor’ was increasingly considered. What the ‘third factor’ 
actually is was contested, but it was often related to technical progress and education. 
However, there was a broad consensus that production is increasingly depending on science. 
Accordingly, the ‘skills’ of workers within traditional craft and mechanical industries needed 
to be more rationalized by science. This involved that the “knowledge structure of the skilled 
trade was to be penetrated by scientific rationality, which was to rearrange the structure of 
qualification in a radical manner with the aid of educational reforms and rationalization 
manners” (Gudmundsson 1998: 182). The decreased emphasis on practical training in favour 
theoretical training during the process of education involved that there was referred to the 
‘qualifications’ of workers rather than their ‘skills’. Hence, it can be argued that this 
discursive change on human labour has involved that ‘knowledge’ increasingly is being 
perceived as a separate source to economic growth. Further, knowledge is also viewed to be a 
more relevant key to the ‘third factor’ than skills.  
The division between skills and knowledge may further be connected to the 
undergoing transition in the discourse on competitiveness since the 1950s. ‘Skills’ are 
required from human labour within the more traditional, manufacturing industries. As we 
have seen, such industries signify competitiveness based on natural factor endowments. This 
approach to competitiveness may also be seen as a more quantitative approach to 
competitiveness. It reflects the idea that competitiveness is based having more of a physically, 
measurable factor than other competitors. ‘Knowledge’ is the required of human labour within 
knowledge-based industries.  Knowledge as a key to economic growth is a more qualitative 
approach, in the way that competitiveness is less based on physically measurable factors and 
more on immaterial and social factors. The quantitative approach can be seen as most 
characteristic to the discourse on competitiveness of the Atlantic Fordist regime. The ‘third 
factor’ can be seen as more in coherence the more qualitative approach to competitiveness in 
the knowledge-based economy (Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2002). However, in the Lisbon 
Strategy both of these approaches to competitiveness are relevant in terms of human resources 
as a matter of economic growth.  This shows that there is a relatively reciprocal relation 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy.  
The quantitative part of the issue can be seen as the matter of demography. It concerns 
increasing economic productivity by utilizing the full potential of the European work force. 
This is related to improving the EU employment rate both because of the demographic 
prospects of Europe and the employment gap between Europe and the US. The decline of the 
European work force is to be reduced through higher labour market participation of the total 
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working age population. This involves enhancing employment rates for women, immigrants 
and other groups. Further, the aggregate number of employment years could be increased. 
This means enhancing the labour market participation of both the younger and the older 
working age population. The US employment rate is higher than EU on all of these areas. In 
1997, the US employment rate was 74 % of the working age population while EU’s rate was 
60.5% (Employment in Europe 2004).       
The ‘third factor’ in the Lisbon Strategy can be claimed to be ‘knowledge’.  This part 
of the issue involves increasing the economic productivity per employee by transmitting a 
larger part of the work force into more knowledge-intensive production like high-tech 
manufacturing and ICT. As we have seen, knowledge-intensive industry is assumed to have 
more impact on economic growth than manufacturing/capital-intensive industry.   
 
The available empirical evidence suggests that the importance of human capital as an input has 
grown over time as production processes have become increasingly knowledge-intensive (de la 
Fuente and Ciccone 2000: 10). 
 
Labour productivity growth is assumed to be significantly generated by increased R & D 
spending, and R & D spending is assumed to have significant spillover effects into other areas 
of the economy. However, EU has not succeeded in the Lisbon objective to boost spending of 
R & D to 3 % percent of GDP (Report from the High Level Group 2004):11   
 
One of the most disappointing aspects of the Lisbon strategy to date is that the importance of R & 
D remains so little understood and that so little progress has been made (Report from the High 
Level Group 2004: 19). 
 
Increased spending in R & D is crucial in order to attract researchers to Europe: 
 
Europe needs to dramatically improve its attractiveness to researchers, as too many young 
scientists continue to leave Europe on graduating, notably for the US. Too few of the brightest and 
the best elsewhere in the world choose to live and work in Europe (Report from the High Level 
Group 2004: 20). 
 
Accordingly, increasing R & D spending can be seen as a significant way of enhancing the 
‘pull’ factors of Western European labour markets. Western Europe needs to attract the most 
‘highly skilled’ in terms of the most highly educated people in the world because they are 
perceived to represent the most eminent source to knowledge (Becker [1964] (1993). Hence, 
it can be argued that how Western Europe is to attract highly skilled people like international 
                                                 
11
 At the present, the EU R & D spending represents 1. 96% of GDP, as against 2.59% for United States, 3.12% 
for Japan and 2.91% for Korea (http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/areas/fiche05_en.htm, [05.08.2005]).  
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knowledge-migrants has become an issue of how to establish the ‘third factor’.  It can further 
be claimed that the ‘new thinking’ on immigration in the Lisbon Strategy, is compatible with 
an increased focus on the need for immigrants with the right ‘knowledge’ rather than the right 
‘skills’. Hence, I will argue that while the era of post-war non-Western immigration to 
Western Europe was imposed by the demand for human labour with the right ‘skills’ the 
‘new’ immigration agenda reflected in the Lisbon Strategy is characterised by the demand for 
‘knowledge’. 
 
4.2  From Idea to Value 
 
As an EEA member, Norway is not directly committed to the Lisbon Strategy. Nevertheless, 
the Norwegian government has in general subscribed to the Lisbon Strategy. The subscription 
is related to Norway's EEA agreement. Through the EEA, Norway is especially concerned by 
the Lisbon Strategy policies in terms of internal market issues (Yssen 2003). However, the 
Norwegian government has also launched its own national innovation strategy, called ‘From 
Idea to Value’. ‘From Idea to Value’, was launched in October 2003. The main goal of this 
action plan is this: 
 
Norway shall be one of the most innovative countries in the world, where resourceful and creative 
enterprises and people are given opportunities for developing profitable business. Norway shall be 
in the lead internationally in important areas, in terms of knowledge, technology and wealth 
creation [My transition] (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 5).  
 
There is a competitive spirit in this quote – “Norway shall be one of the most […]” and 
“Norway shall be in the lead […]”. Part of this vision for Norway is in starker contrast to 
reality than in other similar Western European countries. Many parts of Norwegian industry 
rely on innovation, technology and knowledge. However, Norway is one of the advanced 
countries that still relies more on capital-intensive rather than knowledge-intensive industries. 
It can be maintained that energy production has been the structural basis of modern 
Norwegian economy. It started out with hydroelectric power in the early 1900s and continued 
with petroleum in the 1970s (Andersson et al. 2004, Furre 1992).  
Through the launching of ‘From Idea to Value’, it is clearly signalled by the Norwegian 
government that the Norwegian economy is to be transformed according to the international 
demands of innovation and entrepreneurship: 
In Norway, as in many other western countries, innovation and entrepreneurship are priorities to 
the Government. Since we have traditionally been a primary goods-producing country, with fish, 
aluminium, and in the last decades oil and gas as main commodities, we have not been forced to be 
as innovative as many of our trade partners. We now realise that petroleum reserves will not last 
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forever. And we have an expensive welfare state to maintain. Thus exploring other ways of 
securing our future has become a matter of necessity (Speech by Helle Hammer, State Secretary, 
27 May 2004). 
 
The state secretary is here describing the economy of Norway as traditionally relying on 
natural resources, or so-called natural factor endowments. Most of Norwegian industrial 
exports consist of raw materials and semi products. The petroleum sector has had a 
tremendous impact both on the economy and the society of Norway in general. It has 
provided growth in other industrial sectors and secured the expansion of the public sector. The 
oil sector makes out about 10 % of GDP and has provided a tremendous surplus in the 
Norwegian state. Since 1990, this surplus has been infused into the Norwegian state’s 
petroleum fund. The profitable returns from the petroleum sector entail that the Norwegian 
society does not face an immediate economic crisis. This is also what seems to be implicated 
in the remark “we have not been forced to be as innovative as many of our trade partners”. 
Norwegian governments have been able to rely on the country’s relatively exclusive 
economic situation without being compelled to find new ways of economic growth and public 
financing. However, this remark also seems to suggest that there is a connection between 
relatively low national level of innovation and a high level of national wealth. This indicates 
that relying on the petroleum sector may be risky both for the economy and the welfare 
(Andersson et al. 2004). The main concern of the government in this quote is that the 
petroleum resources are limited. The prospect of the petroleum sector means that the corner 
stone of Norwegian economy is diminishing. As we see from this quote, this is worrying in 
terms of the expensive financing of the welfare state. Like many other Western European 
countries, the demographic scenario of Norway is falling birth rates and an ageing population. 
And, it is estimated that in the years to come, the petroleum fund will not suffice to finance 
the pensions of the ageing population. This means that there has to be found another way of 
compensating for increased public expenditures. When it is uttered that “exploring other ways 
of securing our future has become a matter of necessity” it is referred to the search for a new 
economic basis in order to finance future welfare costs (Jessop 2002, Reve and Jacobsen 
2000).   
An intensifying factor of the state’s declining revenues from petroleum is that natural 
resources based industries are becoming less competitive and are calculated to be permanently 
decreasing in the future. This is part of a general tendency of manufacturing in all OECD 
countries (Andersson et al.  2004, Jessop 2002, Langeland et al. (ed.) 1999, Moen 2002): 
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Countries that are already industrialised must increasingly focus on the development of innovative 
and knowledge-intensive industry, in order to remain capable of financing a high level of welfare 
(Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 6). 
 
The Norwegian government’s focus on innovation and knowledge can be seen as being in 
accordance with new economic growth theory. Joseph Schumpeter can be seen as one of the 
theoretical pioneers of such theory. Within new economic growth theory economic growth is 
perceived to be innovation-driven and the limits of innovation are endogenous, or only 
relative to the degree of human creativity (Jessop 2002, Reve and Jacobsen 2000, Romer 
1990). This view is also shared by Norwegian authorities: 
 
Human capital in the forms of manpower and competency makes up the main part of the national 
wealth in Norway, and how it is used is of decisive importance to our ability to innovate and create 
wealth (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 7). 
 
This statement is interesting, because it indicates that the Norwegian government is moving 
away from the traditional basis of wealth creation in Norway. According to this statement, the 
government does not perceive economic growth to be based on natural factor endowments, 
like petroleum, but to be based on human capital.  And the next quote makes it evident that 
Norwegian authorities view the competence of people as the main factor of national wealth: 
“Labour and competence make out the bulk of Norway’s national fortune. The capital of 
brains has much more value than the capital of the petroleum fond [My translation])”. 
(Børge Brende, Minister of Trade and Industry, in Dagens Næringsliv 30.7. 2004.  
As in EU, the problem of Norway seems to be how to retain and attract valuable human 
capital:  
 
The key is competent people. We have to provide the favourable conditions so that competent - 
highly educated and enterprising people wish to live in Norway, in the regions, in the districts 
and in the cities [My translation] (Speech by Ansgar Gabrielsen, [the preceding] Norwegian 
Minister of Trade and Industry, 2004). 
 
It is demonstrated here that the government is aware that Norway has to appear as an 
attractive nation, or “We have to provide the favourable conditions […] ”. This is in order to 
be competitive towards the right kind of people who are compatible with the competent, 
highly educated and enterprising human capital in the knowledge-based economy. According 
to the Schumpeterian account, innovation based competitiveness is presupposed by individual 
initiative of so-called entrepreneurs. However, it also depends on the cohesion between 
individual entrepreneurs and institutions. This perspective is reflected by the government 
here: 
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Innovation starts with individuals, businesses and institutions. One of our main challenges is the 
creation of a culture for innovation, which will motivate us and enable us to achieve pre-eminence 
within certain areas (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 5).  
 
Again, the ‘culture for innovation’ is necessary to achieve the main objectives of the action 
plan: 
 
The overreaching objective of the Government's innovation policy is to facilitate increased wealth 
creation across the country - which wealth creation shall provide society with the resources needed 
to provide overreaching welfare policy objectives (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003:  14). 
 
Like in the Lisbon Strategy, the social objectives of the Norwegian government’s 
competitiveness strategy seem to override the objectives of innovation. However, this point 
also illustrates where the Norwegian innovation strategy departs from the Lisbon Strategy. As 
showed above, the six categories concerned by the structural indicators of the Lisbon Strategy 
were not only connected to industry. So far, however, all the six underlying objectives that the 
Norwegian government have constructed in order to achieve the so-called overreaching 
objective are pointing only and directly towards the Norwegian industry sector:  
1] Favourable and predictable conditions for trade  
and industry, offering a good overall foundation  
for innovation and wealth creation  
2] An outstanding system for learning and  
education, offering industry access to people  
with relevant knowledge of a high quality  
3] More research-based industry  
4] More new start-ups with a potential for growth  
5] An electronic and physical infrastructure  
promoting effective interaction between  
businesses, markets, knowledge centres and  
public authorities  
6] A new administrative practice that facilitates  
the development of an effective, dynamic and  
comprehensive innovation policy (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14). 
 
According to the government, the objectives above are those that have directed which areas 
that are incorporated in the policy. These areas are:  
 
1. General conditions for trade and industry  
2. Knowledge and competency  
3. Research, development and commercialisation  
4. Entrepreneurship – starting up new businesses  
5. Electronic and physical infrastructure (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14). 
 
Based on this, it can be claimed that the competitiveness approach of the Lisbon Strategy has 
a more comprehensive character than that found in ‘From Idea to Value’.  The social policy 
objectives of the Norwegian strategy are not directly implemented as extra-economic factors 
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of competitiveness. Social issues are included, but they are not factors of competitiveness per 
se.  
The Norwegian government claims that innovation polices must be comprehensive and 
have a long-term perspective. This is also one of the overarching objectives of the strategy.  
The following quote from the action plan may indicate that the action plan will be more 
comprehensive in the future:   
 
Developing a comprehensive innovation policy is demanding, and is considered to be a pioneering 
effort, also in an international context. The presentation of this plan must thus be seen as a first 
step in the Government’s work on developing and implementing such an innovation policy 
(Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14). 
 
The Norwegian government here appears to be rather uncertain and searching in terms of the 
contents and comprehensiveness of its innovation strategy. There is, according to the 
government, to be appointed a specific committee with the mandate to develop a more 
comprehensive innovation policy. This prospective innovation policy will be coordinated 
across policy areas and ministries (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003). This may 
indicate the development of a politically super-structural Norwegian innovation policy. 
Currently, the coordination of policy areas concerned by ‘From Idea to Value’ is 
predominantly the responsibility of the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry. In 
accordance with the ‘sector principle’ of Norwegian governmental administration, each 
department has the final responsibility of pursuing research and innovation concerning its 
own sector and on behalf of its own sector. The Norwegian Research Council is to 
communicate and give advice across the government departments, but it does not have the 
authority to make decisions overriding them (Christensen and Lægreid 2002, Moen 2002, St. 
meld. 20 (2004-2005)):   
 
Implementation of a comprehensive policy requires new working styles. At present, different 
policy areas are managed more or less on a stand-alone basis at their respective political and 
administrative levels, based on their own objectives and values. There is today not sufficient scope 
for approaching the various areas as part of a larger context, and to take into account how these 
affect conditions for innovation and wealth creation (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2003: 14). 
 
Many of the Norwegian government departments are dealing with tasks that may be related to 
the development of a Norwegian approach to the knowledge-based economy. However, when 
it comes to the Department of Immigration which has the overall responsibility of refugee and 
immigration policies there is not developed a strategy for handling issues concerning the 
knowledge-based economy (www.odin.dep.no). The revision of Norwegian specialist 
provision in 2002 can be seen as an aspect of the generally increased demand for expertise in 
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Western Europe. This revision may also be seen as a contribution to enhance the 
competitiveness of Norway, like in IT. The alteration of this provision was also partly 
generated by the demands of highly skilled expertise Norwegian IT-industry (Kommunal- og 
regionaldepartementet 2000, Tjomsland 2002). However, considering the report that provided 
much of the basis for the revision, I will argue that the revision of this provision is far from a 
specific policy aimed to adjust immigration in Norway to the knowledge-based economy. The 
report generally focused on the long-term labour market needs related to demographic aspects 
in Norway. Further, the revision of the specialist provision seems to be very much based on 
the need to facilitate entrance regulations for skilled workers as well as highly skilled. In 
general, knowledge-based sectors are not in focus in this report. This probably reflects that 
‘knowledge’ was yet not a significant term in the political discourse on competitiveness at the 
time being. However, it also implies that there is not a Norwegian version of the Lisbon 
Strategy’s approach to immigration on any political level (Kommunal- og 
regionaldepartementet 1999).    
 
4.3 Comparison of the Strategies 
 
The demands for enhanced economic competitiveness that spur the EU and Norwegian 
strategies are based on relatively similar conditions. Norway and Europe are experiencing 
worrying demographic changes. Further, both Norway and Europe are perceived to be lagging 
behind according to the development of a knowledge-based economy. And, both Norway and 
EU argue that the aim of the strategies is to sustain the present welfare level. However, it shall 
be noted that as a petroleum-producing nation Norway has a significant position in the 
European economic context. Nevertheless, this aim is interesting, because it implies that the 
traditional welfare state model of Western Europe is to be maintained at the same time as 
there is to be developed a new basis of economic growth. This aim hence contradicts the view 
that the contemporary discourse on competitiveness implies that the economy in the North 
“seems to have increasingly lost any source of purpose” (Petrella 1995: 11). However, 
whether the aim is achievable is a different question. 
 The linkage between social objectives and economic growth is sensible according the 
much of the contemporary discourse on economic competitiveness. Generally, it can be 
argued that both the EU and the Norwegian competitiveness strategy is compatible with a 
Schumpeterian competitiveness approach. This is because they reflect a broad, social 
 62 
understanding of innovation as the key to economic growth. This perspective also involves a 
shift in the understanding of the importance of human resources to economic growth in which 
‘knowledge’ as a commodity has gained increased significance. The social and economic 
background of the Norwegian and the EU strategy accords with the breakdown of the Atlantic 
Fordist accumulation regime and its structural implications on the Keynesian Welfare State. 
Further, Norway and the EU member states’ engagement in these strategies is compatible 
with the general imperatives of the Schumpeterian Competition State. However, the 
respective approaches to competitiveness in the strategies also represent discursive and 
structural differences.  
In the Lisbon Strategy, social policies are incorporated as extra-economic factors of 
competitiveness.  In ‘From Idea to Value’, social polices are an overarching objective of the 
strategy, but they are not included as means of competitiveness per se. This demonstrates the 
flexibility of the Schumpeterian competitiveness approach. Extra-economic policy areas may 
both be included or excluded within this approach: “[…] competitiveness as an argument has 
shown the remarkable ability of broadening its meaning in such a way that it incorporates 
various highly appreciated issues into itself “(Kettunen 1998: 65).   
The political convenience of the Schumpeterian competitiveness approach is related to 
the incorporation of extra-economic factors in the concept as the key to enhance innovation 
based competitiveness. The broad variety of extra economic factors is making the concept of 
Schumpeterian competitiveness flexible and dynamic in a political context. The concept is an 
applicable political tool in terms of legitimating competition state policies: 
 
[…] it shall not be ignored that much of the ideological power of knowledge and innovation stems 
from the promise that competitiveness and its preconditions in global economy can – or even must 
– be seen from a wider perspective than that of neo-liberalist deregulation (Kettunen 1998: 67- 
68).   
 
This may contradict Jessop's claim that extra-economic factors primarily become 
subordinated under economic factors in the present Schumpeterian discourse on 
competitiveness. If the EU Commission and the Norwegian government had employed a 
purely economic competitiveness strategy, it is likely that it would have been perceived as a 
break with the social democratic tradition. On this background, the Schumpeterian approach 
legitimizes the role of political institutions within the knowledge-based economy. However, I 
will argue that the Lisbon Strategy represents a more structural form of competitiveness than 
‘From Idea to Value’.  The Lisbon Strategy can be seen as more structural both because it 
represents a broader understanding of, and incorporation of extra-economic factors of 
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competitiveness. The implementation of immigration in the Lisbon Strategy illustrates this. In 
the Lisbon Strategy, immigration is directly incorporated as a factor of competitiveness in the 
knowledge-based economy. Accordingly, this approach to competitiveness may legitimize 
that immigration policies become subordinated to more super-structural political reforms like 
the Lisbon Strategy. Norway has generally subscribed to the Lisbon Strategy. However, it 
does not exist a direct strategy aimed to integrate immigration in the development of the 
knowledge-based economy in Norway.  
 Building on the regulationist perspective, it may be issued whether it is possible to 
make significant alterations in the system of accumulation without influencing other social 
structures like the welfare system at the same time. The significance of this issue becomes 
further enhanced considering the interconnected relation between capitalistic and social 
concerns that the European welfare-states represents. Hence, the aim of juxtaposing the 
development of a knowledge-based economy with the social model of Western Europe may 
be achievable on the discursive political level, but encounter problems when it comes to 
political and practical implementation. The revision of the Lisbon Strategy can be seen as an 
acknowledgement of the difficulties connected to achieving this aim. The vast discourse on 
the concept of competitiveness can be seen as a core as to why comprehensive political 
strategies like the Lisbon Strategy may prove to have less internal consistency valuable for 
practical implementation (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). 
An interesting suggestion in terms of explaining the variety in the Norwegian and in 
the EU strategy’s approach to social polices is that it may illustrate that the competition state 
is operating in a scenario of political crisis. According to advocates of the hyper-globalization 
the hyper-globalization thesis12 the enhancement of global and international structures result 
in a weakening of the nation-state as an actor (Held and McGrew et al. (1999). The theory on 
the competition state rather anticipates an ambivalent revival of the nation state within the 
frames of globalization and internationalization. On the one hand, the emergence of the 
competition state can be seen as a result of the threatened position of the state form of Atlantic 
Fordism. The competition state may then bee seen as a response to a state crisis.  On the other 
hand, the competition state can also be associated with loss of state autonomy, because the 
transition to the competition state implies that the state, by becoming a promoter of 
globalization and internationalization, becomes part of these state-‘threatening’ processes 
itself. In any case, as a promoter of competition, the state is an actor in the discourse of 
                                                 
12
 Defenders of this thesis hold that globalization basically has an economic logic and that there will emerge a 
global market in which competition will be the very key to human progress (Held and McGrew et al. (1999). 
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competitiveness, and accordingly the EU member states and the Norwegian state can be seen 
as actors in the construction of the discourse on competitiveness. That way, the state 
contributes to alleviate the threat and revitalize itself as an institution (Held and McGrewet al. 
1999, Jessop 2002).  
This shows that the flexibility of the Schumpeterian competitiveness approach does 
not mean that this approach is completely relative in its scope of interpretation. Such a 
perspective would undermine the approach as a guide for political action. Indeed, I have 
pointed to the scope of social construction inherent in the predominant discourse on 
competitiveness. This aspect of social construction is what allows non-economic actors to act 
as units of competition (Kettunen 1998): 
 
Can cities, regions or nations achieve competitiveness in similar ways to firms, and, if not, do they 
at least pursue economic competitiveness in the same way as each other? The answer clearly 
depends on how broadly one interprets competition and capacities of action (Jessop 2002: 187-
188). 
 
A Schumpeterian Competition State's political challenge is to find a way to handle the crisis 
of Atlantic Fordism. As long as the crisis prevails, the political actions of the Schumpeterian 
Competition State can be seen as crisis-management in times of general political uncertainty. 
What a ‘comprehensive’ innovation policy implies is therefore not obvious in the present 
political context of the Norwegian state. Neither is the way to achieve the Lisbon Strategy 
objectives politically pre-given. This situation again emphasises that there does not exist or 
probably will not exist an ideal-type of the Schumpeterian Competition State. The form and 
function of such a type of state will be the result of continuous political construction (Jessop 
2002). 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
The analysis in this chapter leaves some fundamental issues regarding immigration polices 
and the knowledge based economy. As we have seen from the comparison of the Norwegian 
government’s and the EU Commission’s strategy, the contemporary discourse on 
competitiveness in the state allows a broad variety of possible political approaches to the 
relation between economic and social objectives, including the approach to immigration 
policies. At the same time I have suggested that seen from a regulationist and institutional 
perspective, it may be difficult to alter economic structures without influencing social 
structures. Further, there may be various contradictions between the discursive political level 
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of competition strategies and the political practical level. This contradiction is indicated by 
the practical problems of implementing the Lisbon Strategy which have resulted in a revision 
of the strategy. The sector-principle of Norwegian government departments can be seen as an 
example of the potential practical obstacles connected to implementing a supra-structural 
strategy of competitiveness in the Norwegian state.   
 In this chapter, I have opposed a relativistic approach to the concept of 
competitiveness and argued for a constructivist perspective. Hence, how the knowledge-based 
economy is to be politically related to social areas should not be seen as indifferent. However, 
I have also argued that competition state policies should not be seen as pre-given or absolute.  
These statements still broache the question as to how the Norwegian immigration policy is to 
be dealt with considering the knowledge-based economy. According to the analysis of this 
chapter it might be reasonable to assume that there is no direct political evidence of a new 
immigration agenda in the Norwegian state. However, I partly will contradict this assumption 
by pointing out the discursive link between immigration and the knowledge-based economy 
in the Lisbon Strategy. The ‘new’ aspect of the immigration agenda showed in the Lisbon 
Strategy is the approach to human resources and economic growth. I will argue that this 
discursive link is also implicated in the Norwegian government’s approach to human 
resources, even if it is not clearly expressed. In the next chapter, I will substantiate the 
relevance of this link by analysing the structural relation between the competition state 
policies on human resources and the institution of international knowledge-migrants. 
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5. The Institution of International                       
         Knowledge-migrants 
        
 
 
In this chapter I analyse Indian knowledge-migrants as partaking in an institution in the 
knowledge-based economy. I carry this out by focusing on the significant position of Indian 
knowledge-workers in this economic context. I argue that their significance is connected to 
the enhanced juxtaposition of knowledge and labour as fictitious commodities in the 
contemporary transformations of the global economy (Jessop 2002, Mahroum 2001).  
 
5.1 The Reflexivity of Knowledge-workers 
 
A consequence of the winding up of traditional industry of Western Europe in the 1970s was 
new requirements and power relations in the labour force. The production system of the 
knowledge-based economy involves that the need for unskilled workers in Western Europe 
has decreased while skilled workers have become more attractive to employers. 
This development is reflected in that the term ‘skill’ predominantly has been replaced 
by ‘competence’ within the present working life agenda. ‘Skills’ is connected to the early 
stages of industrialization in which the capacity of workers were measured by concrete tasks. 
The term ‘competence’ is employed by theorists in an attempt to “connect the complexities of 
learning to the growing complexities of modern work” (Gudmundsson 1998: 211). On the one 
hand ‘competence’ reflects the increased emphasis on education and learning within working 
life. One the other hand, it may also comprehend more individual capacities like ‘reflexivity’ 
which I will come back to underneath. As in the case of ‘competence’, the concept of 
flexibility may have various meanings. Often it is used to designate dynamic production 
strategies or workforce organization.  In this thesis, ‘flexibility’ in working life is related to 
the new ways of production implicated in the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism: 
 
The post-Fordist labour process also requires an appropriately flexible workforce that often 
combines multiskilled and unskilled workers in flexible ways in contrast to the dominant role of 
relatively inflexible semi-skilled labour in Fordist mass production (Jessop 2002: 98).  
 
The increased emphasis on ‘competence’ along with the concept of ‘flexibility’ can be seen as 
rather clear imperatives of the shift in the global discourse on competitiveness in working life. 
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The agenda of working life has been adjusted to a more dynamic model of competitiveness 
(Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2002).  
An imperative of the social forms of competitiveness is the connection between 
‘competence’ and comparison.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, comparative 
practices can be seen as an inherent part of competition as a social structure: “[…] 
comparative practices are a component of competence, not only of management, but also of 
employees” (Kettunen 1998: 65). This is partly what the reflexivity of knowledge-workers is 
about. In order to promote themselves as attractive workers, they need the ability to act 
strategically towards other actors in their professional environment. In my opinion, the term 
‘reflexivity’ is capturing the comprehensive capacities that are required of workers in the 
contemporary discourse on competitiveness within working life relations.  I will argue that 
within knowledge-based industries, the complex capacity of reflexivity stems from the 
juxtaposition of ‘knowledge’ and ‘worker’. However, the reflexivity of workers again 
influences the way that workers may face the new requirements:  
  
It is important to note that the economic demands for reflexivity even shape the life-world of 
employees (and those who are unemployed) with a new power. People in working life are not only 
supposed to develop such reflexive capacities, as those of communication, “direct participation”, 
commitment (combined with flexibility), and innovation. They are also supposed to conceive of 
their work, living and “competence” in the wider context of a competitive local, or perhaps even 
European, community. “We have to make ourselves attractive (Kettunen 1998: 19). 
 
We see in this quote that ‘reflexivity’ implies that employees in the contemporary working 
life agenda need to appear as ‘attractive’ in a complex working life context. This shows that 
today’s employees have become incorporated as ‘knowledgeable agents’ in the discourse of 
working life. I will claim that a key to understand the changing role of employees within the 
contemporary discourse on competitiveness is the perception of human resources as an extra-
economic factor. This entails that the difference between the worker as ‘labour’ and 
‘individual’ has become more blurred within the discourse on competitiveness on the labour 
market (Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2002, Kettunen 1998).  
This perception is even more eminent within working life in knowledge-based 
industries like those of the ICT sector. Within the knowledge-based industries, the focus on 
competence expresses the interconnection between human resources as a factor of 
competitiveness and knowledge as a fictitious commodity within the knowledge-based 
economy. In this regard, knowledge-workers have a special position, because they are such an 
incorporated part of the knowledge-based economy. Further, the developments within the ICT 
sector have been a significant incentive to the alterations of working life. ICT is characterized 
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by new means of technology and communication which again will involve enhanced 
globalization and flexibility within industrial relations (WITSA 2004, Xiang 2001).  
Knowledge is the most significant commodity of the knowledge-based economy, and 
this commodity is relatively compatible with knowledge-workers as individuals. In the case of 
knowledge-workers, the demands of reflexivity involve being able to enhance their 
attractiveness as an extra-economic factor of competitiveness. In accordance with this, it can 
be argued that the special position of knowledge-workers establishes them as some of the 
most competitive workers, or examples of ‘reflexivity-winners’, within the knowledge-based 
economy (Gudmundsson 1998, Kettunen 1998, Jessop 2002, Xiang 2001). This view is 
reflected in this respondent’s description of the IT industry: 
 
This is an industry where you get paid more, and it is a more talent based industry, knowledge 
based industry. If you want to learn, study, improve your skills – it is a very good industry (A-2). 
 
Being a ‘reflexivity-winner’ requires the ability to initiate and sustain individual 
competitiveness as an attractive ‘commodity’ within the knowledge-based economy 
(Kettunen 1998).  A way of interpreting what this respondent is expressing, is that if a 
knowledge-worker is able to meet with the requirements connected to knowledge as a 
commodity within the IT market he/she will be successful. It can be argued that a reflexive 
employee’s key to power within the knowledge-based economy first of all is – knowledge. 
This way, the requirements of competence makes the knowledge-based industry differ from 
more traditional industries:  
 
In industry, the shift towards a knowledge based economy involves a shift in organization away 
from top-down hierarchical structures to flatter structures such as networks of semi-autonomous 
teams. Tayloristic vertical structures were designed to enforce and coordinate certain physical 
behaviours while knowledge based work organization involves greater recognition of the 
autonomy and self-direction of the mind (Stiglitz 1999: 41).     
 
This is showed in the next quote, in which the respondent describes the premises of career 
progression, or more specifically of becoming a team leader, within the knowledge-based 
industry:    
 
In this way, basically I feel it is a knowledge based industry. You have more knowledge  –  and 
you will be demanding more. It is not like normal industry where...manufacturing industry if you 
look at...it is manual work, it is not a knowledge-based industry, whereas the IT-industry – it is a 
knowledge-business. You have more knowledge, and then you be considered the leads. You will 
have command of the whole groups (A-2).  
 
However, the focus on competence in working increasingly entails that the knowledge needs 
to be formalised. A higher degree of international standardization of education within 
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knowledge-based fields may lead to a more common international or global way of 
professional ‘thinking’ or reflexivity within the knowledge-based industries. This may again 
facilitate international migration of knowledge-workers, because a more common way of 
professional thinking would contribute to facilitate cooperation on working projects between 
knowledge-workers with different international background (Carmel 1999, Gudmundsson 
1998). Part of this perspective seems to be reflected by the respondent in the next quote, in 
which he is commenting the educational background of IT-workers in Norway versus India:   
 
B-3: I found that many people – like they are not degree holders like we are. In India most of the 
Indian IT people are engineers. But I do not find such educational background for IT people here. I 
have met a few cases – they are not that, so I feel that if you have like more educational 
qualifications, much would be better. 
Q: Do you think that is a problem when you work here? 
B-3: Not a problem. I told you like they are already experts in that area – I am not feeling any 
problem. But maybe it affects the way of thinking. If they are degree holders, if they have good 
educational background, it will help more. 
 
According to the respondent underneath, the basic competence requirement of a knowledge-
worker is having a formal education within IT:  
 
You need to have some kind of a master’s degree, or a bachelor degree or a Ph.D. to get into the IT 
scenario, where you have to prove oneself what you are, what kind of technical skills that you have 
to meet the client requirement and make yourself, you know - the more competitive person in the 
industry (A-1).  
 
Formal education is according to this respondent only the ‘entrance ticket’ to a further 
professional career within IT. In the era of mass-education, especially in a country like India, 
having a formal IT education may far from suffice in order to ‘prove’ yourself professionally 
as an attractive ‘commodity’ on the IT market. Being a ‘reflexivity winner’ or “the more 
competitive person in the industry” requires that a knowledge-worker is generally aware and 
updated on the various demands of individual competitiveness within the IT industry (Becker 
[1964] 1993, Kettunen 1998, Gudmundsson1998, Goss and Lindquist 1995). In that regard, I 
found the respondents to be both aware and updated on the working conditions in Norway. 
Some of the respondents commented that there was a more ‘relaxed’ or lower working tempo 
in Norway than what they were used to from India. This short-term knowledge-migrant feared 
that adjusting to the slow Norwegian tempo would become a problem for his career when he 
was back in India:       
 
No, it is not a good thing to be more relaxed. One should be more efficient and more competitive 
to survive in this business. If I want to grow in my career, then I should be fast and competitive 
(B-1).  
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In other words, this respondent feared that the stay in Norway would harm his/her 
professional attractiveness in the Indian IT market. Another respondent’s professional 
frustration in Norway was connected to not being able to work on a professionally satisfying 
technological level: 
 
 I am working on the main frame. This is degraded from a technology point of view, because 
earlier I was working on the client server and the new technology and now I am working on the 
main frame (B-2).  
 
This respondent told me that he/she tried to keep technologically updated during spare time in 
stead. Both of these latter quotes show that the interconnectedness between a knowledge-
worker as labour and individual also may imply personal vulnerability. In this case, 
knowledge as a fictitious commodity involves that if the knowledge-worker fails to present 
this ‘commodity’ of his/her as attractive, he/she as an employee and following as a person 
will feel the consequences (Gudmundsson 1998, Jessop 2000).  
This latter point is leading on to the international knowledge-migrants as an 
institution. On a macro level, the institution of international knowledge-migrants can be seen 
as a driven by global, capitalistic structures of the knowledge-based economy. On the 
individual level, this institution can be seen as the reflexive actions of knowledge-workers. 
Knowledge-workers migrate because they strive to become or remain attractive employees. 
And, within knowledge-based industries like IT, labour mobility can be seen as implemented 
in the character of the industry. The significance of IT is largely connected to the 
transferability of knowledge. As representatives of this knowledge, knowledge-workers are 
therefore expected to be mobile. The quality of the knowledge-worker is connected to his/her 
quality of knowledge. The more transferability the knowledge of the knowledge worker is, the 
more valuable is this knowledge as a commodity. As this respondent is saying, working in 
different places of the world may be crucial in order to be competitive as a knowledge-worker 
(Cappelen 2001, Coates and Warwick1999, Jessop 2000): 
 
In terms of career - I feel that I have a career both in Norway and India. There is a requirement in 
both places – there is a growing technology, a growing world, people are required to work 
different places in a different environment, so the more knowledge and technical skills that you 
gain - you are more competitive and you are more required in the market (A-1).  
 
What has so far been argued about the migration of knowledge-workers is also interesting in 
view of the connection between the knowledge-based economy and processes of 
globalization. Much of the global success of ICT is based on its capacity of geographical 
transferability. Often, this means that the knowledge of an IT-worker can be transferred 
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overseas without the IT-worker having to relocate. Some companies which are based in high-
cost countries use this advantage to out-source their industry to more low-cost countries like 
India. A company can be based in Norway and its services targeted on Norwegian customers, 
while the services that the company offer are mostly performed in India (Bergens Tidende 
20.01. 2005, Walsham 2001). Still, working physically overseas has great value for many IT-
professionals: 
 
I felt great, because I was selected for this project and I am going abroad, and it is…I do not  say 
‘great chance’, but it is a good opportunity to work opportunity to work abroad, so I feel great (B-
3).  
 
Even if ICT dramatically has improved the possibilities of communicating over distances, 
distance is not an irrelevant issue within the IT business. The degree of distance between 
collaborating software-teams, clients and project managers etc. still affects all manners of 
coordination, control and communication. Communication skills are important in terms of the 
reflexivity requirements of working life in general (Carmel 1999, Kettunen 1998). However, 
in terms of knowledge-migrants the ability to communicate may be one of the most important 
aspects of reflexivity: 
 
To survive abroad, you should have more communication skills. Communication skill, then 
technical skills, because when you interact with your client, you should be able to communicate 
with him properly: what you are doing, what the people under you are doing. If you can 
communicate with him, almost 90 % of your job has been done. That is all (A-2).  
 
Without being able to communicate properly, much of the knowledge that the knowledge-
worker is holding will not be transferable, but rather be ‘stuck’ with the knowledge-worker.  
This is also connected to the character of ‘immaterial’ knowledge. This knowledge may be so-
called ‘tacit’ knowledge which is only transferred through face- to face contact between 
people (Coates and Warwick 1999).  The assumptions above in terms of the value of direct 
contact or communication for knowledge-workers are emphasised in this quote: 
 
[…] basically, for soft-wear industry, your value increases when you go to on-site. You interact 
more with the clients, your value will increase (A-2). 
  
In other words, if the value of the knowledge attached to the knowledge-worker increases, the 
attractiveness of the knowledge-worker will increase. This may explain my impression that 
for short-time contract workers in the IT industry, going abroad per se matters perhaps just as 
much for the career as which country one goes to. This way, ICT contributes to relativization 
of geographical scale and ICT may therefore enhance globalization processes. This is 
substantiated in the following quote (Jessop 2002, Walsham 2001): 
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Q: So is it a disadvantage for you to work in Norway? 
A-2: I can say a 70 to 30 ratio - 70 % advantages. It is on-site – it is not Norway – anywhere. 
 
However, it should be noted that the value of working abroad or ‘on-site’ [where your client is 
situated] is only initial. The value of working abroad per se is relative to the durability of the 
stay. The importance of the work quality – being able to increase competence as a knowledge-
worker – increases throughout the stay. The country of destination will then not be indifferent, 
because various countries will offer different opportunities in terms of enhancing the career 
depending on their position in the knowledge-based economy. I will discuss this point further 
underneath.  
 
5.2 The Knowledge-based Economy and Globalization 
 
The shift in the discourse on competitiveness implies that a traditionally economic giant like 
the US has increased its global competitive advantage within the knowledge-based economy. 
However, several OECD countries that once were leading Fordist nations, especially in 
Europe, have not managed to adjust sufficiently to the new logic of competitiveness. On the 
other hand, a number of former less-economically developed countries have during the last 
decades gone through a significant economic transformation which has made them a severe 
competitive challenge to a region like Europe. This is especially relevant for India and the so-
called ‘Tiger-nations’ in South-East Asia. This development is indicating that the global 
scenario of economic competitiveness is altered. These global economic changes are also 
what the term ‘transformation of scale’ here refers to. The knowledge-based economy has 
contributed to a redefinition of the geo-economic organization of power in the world (Hall 
and Soskice (eds.) 1999, Held and McGrew et al. 1999, Jessop 2002).  
 
The key component of recent large-scale international migration, largely neglected in literature, is 
the complex of international and national institutions that transcend the boundaries of states and 
locales, linking employers in the developed or rapidly developing economies with individuals in 
the furthers peripheries of the Third World (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 335). 
 
The structure of the flow, or the migrant institution, of Indian knowledge-migrants can be 
seen as a mirror of the transformations of the knowledge-based economy. The US was the 
dominant economic actor within the Fordist era, and can be seen as the initiator and leading 
country of the knowledge-based economy. As it is argued by the respondent in the next quote, 
IT-migrants first of all seek to the US, but also Canada and the UK. However, during the 
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1990s, some countries in Europe (Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and Denmark), 
Australasia (Australia and Asia), East Asia (Japan and South-Korea) and South East-Asia 
(Singapore and Japan) became significant destinations of Indian IT-workers. These latter 
countries of destination show that the migration of IT-professional is decreasingly connected 
to the traditional post-war economic and/or migration structures of the Western countries, but 
increasingly diffused by the structures of the knowledge-based economy (Jessop 2002, 
Khadria 2001, Cervantes and Guellec 2002).  Hence, when in it is remarked in this quote that 
Norway is not among the main countries of destination for international IT-professionals, it is 
also illustrated that Norway is not one of the predominant actors of the knowledge-based 
economy: 
 
Q: What do you think is important to know about Norway for a foreign IT-professional? 
A-2: Very good question. Norway is actually not in this IT-wave scenario – not in the radar. 
People look at USA, UK, Germany, Japan to some extent, whereas IT-professionals in India will 
try to go to US first, then UK if it is not possible to go to US, otherwise Germany, otherwise 
Japan. These are the major four. Now people are spreading, because of recession in the US, people 
are more looking at the Scandinavian market and all others. Basically my perception is, when I 
told my friend that I was going to Norway what he asked me was…whether it is in Africa. Norway 
is like a neighbouring town in India – people say US is the only foreign country. 
 
An interesting point here is that this respondent connects knowledge-migration to Norway to 
economic recession in the US. According to this quote, it seems like the economic recession is 
forcing knowledge workers to lower their professional demands. And, according to this quote, 
knowledge-migration to Norway may be the consequence of such reduced professional 
demands.    
In order to capture what it implies for a nation to be leading or lagging behind in the 
knowledge-based economy, it is necessary to look at the predominant forms of 
competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. As we have seen, national competitiveness 
in the knowledge based economy is linked to institutional reflexivity and the capacity to 
dynamic competition on a local, regional or global scale.  
One of the most significant aspects of competitiveness in the knowledge-based 
economy is the flexibility of knowledge as a commodity. Knowledge can be standardized and 
made non-material and is therefore globally transferable more than any other commodity, 
except capital (Cappelen 2001, Jessop 2002). For a country like Norway to be competitive in 
the knowledge-based economy, the products or services Norwegian companies/institutions 
offer on the global IT market need to be globally negotiable. The following statement from a 
respondent, suggests that the Norwegian IT market is not competitive as a commodity 
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knowledge-based economy. Further, it shows the link between having a competitive IT 
industry and being an attractive nation for international IT-professionals:    
  
The service is oriented typically for a Norwegian type of company. It will fit here  [in Norway] 
very well, but my feeling is that it will not hold competition with another service provider, so in 
the long run it might be a difficult thing for an IT professional –  if somebody wants to grow 
within an IT company (B-4).  
 
According to this respondent, ‘small market’ means that the knowledge to be acquired in the 
Norwegian market is not sufficiently transferable. The ICT service that is offered in this 
company is targeted on a Norwegian, but not a regional or global market. This means that the 
professional knowledge that a knowledge-worker will attain in this company is inferior in 
terms of enhancing the knowledge-migrant's competitiveness outside the Norwegian IT 
market.  
This also reflects that, in contrast to the era of Atlantic Fordism, being a nation with a 
‘small market’ in the knowledge-based economy is relatively disconnected from having a 
small economy. As it has been stated above, this is because national competitiveness in the 
knowledge-based economy is less dependent on natural factor endowments than in the 
Atlantic Fordist era. A relatively small economy may well be competitive in a knowledge-
based economy. The difference between the competitiveness of the Norwegian and the 
Finnish economy may illustrate this point.  
It should not be ignored that the technological competence implicated in the 
Norwegian oil-industry is absolutely competitive within the knowledge-based economy. 
However, Norway’s heavy dependence on oil and fishery also labels the country’s economy 
as generally based on raw materials.  Accordingly, it can be assumed that the national 
competitiveness model of Norway is less dynamic than other more knowledge-based 
economies. Finland can be seen as a knowledge-based economy. The country has transformed 
from a predominantly raw-material economy to one of the global leaders of the knowledge- 
based economy. The national innovation system can be seen as the strategic core of Finnish 
economic politics. However, the success of this system is linked to a long tradition of science 
and technology in the whole Finnish society. The comprehensive national culture for 
innovation can therefore be seen as the basis of Finland’s technological lead in the 
knowledge-based economy (Moen 2002). Finland has both found a way of adjusting to the 
knowledge-based economy and becoming a global winner of competitiveness. This latter 
point may be very significant because the character of knowledge implies that a range of 
countries may be capable of adjusting to the knowledge based economy:    
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Knowledge is considered to be non-rivalrous in that use of it by one country or individual does not 
prevent its use by another country or individual (Arrow 1962). In addition, the use of knowledge is 
not a zero-sum game: if all used knowledge all would be better off. However, there are advantages 
to being ahead, thus having a technological lead i.e. either using later knowledge or using 
knowledge more effectively than rivals means extra advantages whatever the level of technology 
(Stoneman 1999: 59).  
 
India may in this case be seen as an even more interesting example than Finland. Since the 
1990s, the country has transformed from being an industrial developing country to one of the 
global leading nations of the IT-industry (Bergens Tidende 22.01. 2005, Chandrasekhar 2001, 
WISTA 2004):  
 
This phenomenon started only ten years back. This whole globalisation of IT thing....people started 
talking around ten years time about the software thing. The boom started, actually, ten years back. 
So, since ten years only, this infrastructure has been...before that it was not a normal thing. Only 
elite people, or highly competent people, used to go abroad then. After this IT-thing came, it has 
become a common phenomenon in South India (A-2). 
 
In this thesis, the national advantages of being ahead in the use of knowledge are focused on 
the international competition on knowledge-workers. As has been argued in the previous 
chapter, immigration has become an “inseparable segment of national technology policies” 
(Mahroum 2001: 23).  In that case, the US may be a more relevant example. In the US, the 
development of a leading knowledge based economy and extensive immigration of 
knowledge-workers are very much interconnected. Both of these factors have been 
presupposed by each other. It is for example hard to imagine the technological development 
of Silicon Valley without the influence of Indian software engineers and the possibilities of 
technological exposure (and of course economic opportunities) have in the next round made 
the place more attractive to new flows of Indian knowledge-migrants (Saxenian 1999).   
It can be asserted that part of the American success in terms of ICT is connected to 
reflexive business management. The US’ government’s involvement in the recruitment of 
Indian knowledge-workers from the late 1960s can be seen as an expression of national 
reflexivity of the value of foreign expertise in terms of global competitiveness. This can be 
seen as part of the American business’ ‘forefront’ attitude within IT:   
 
Q: So you think that Norwegian companies are extra sceptical in comparison with for example 
American companies? 
B-5: Yes, I think so, very much. I think that American companies are maybe more business 
oriented. That is what actually really surprises me, because in IT you really have to be in the 
forefront, especially if you have to be in the world market. So the decision-making is very slow in 
Norway. By the time they make the decisions the products are already out from the rest of the 
world, and the products are on the market. 
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As we see from this quote, being on the global forefront within the knowledge-based 
economy is considered as an advantage by this respondent. Based on what has been stated 
above on the reflexivity of knowledge-workers, it can be assumed that this kind of perception 
of the Norwegian and American IT companies will be taken into consideration when for 
example this respondent is deciding in which country to work.  
  When some of the respondents expressed that they were not happy about the 
technological exposure they were getting in Norway, I got the impression that the general 
problem about the Norwegian IT-industry was not the technological quality, but rather the 
technological range:  
 
And the solutions are very local – and I am talking about the technical side now – the Norwegian 
way of IT. Companies in Norway are very local. They do not extend to the customer outside (B-4).  
 
Again, this quote shows that in order to be competitive according to the demands of the 
knowledge-based economy, the products and services provided by companies in Western 
European countries will need to be increasingly targeted on a global market. This can be seen 
as a rather changed scenario of competitiveness compared to the era of Atlantic Fordism in 
which economies were more national and the major economic competitors were other 
Western countries (Jessop 2002). According to many of the respondents’ perspective it can be 
argued that if Norwegian companies do not adjust to these new global structures of 
competitiveness, they will not be attractive to international knowledge-workers.  
 
Q: What about the Norwegian IT business or market in general – what could make it more 
attractive for foreigners?  
B-7: There are few things there as well: the language, because a lot of companies have Norwegian 
as a working language – so foreigners can not come here. It is hard for them to get job. And the 
second thing is: the service sector is quite low, compared to other countries. 
 
In Norway, there is a high penetration of ICT per capita. However, Norway lags behind 
internationally when it comes to the importance of ICT for employment (Andersson et al. 
2004). If Norway aims to be attractive international IT-professional there has to be available 
and suitable jobs for foreign workers. Like the respondent remarks in the previous quote, the 
relevant jobs for international IT-professional will often be connected to the service sector, 
especially if they are software-experts. Further, this quote leads on to the issue local language. 
It has often been pointed out that one of the problems of European countries in terms of 
competitiveness in the ICT-sector, is local language. It shall not be ignored that some of the 
global competitive advantages of countries like the US, UK, Australia and India in the IT 
industry, is English as official national language (Home Office and DTI (2002):   
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Q: Do have any ideas about what the Norwegian government could do to improve the conditions 
for foreign IT-professionals in Norway? 
B-1: One thing I feel is that maybe it is the language, because now we are moving towards 
globalization. It is such a small country and they should not expect the others to learn their 
language! So maybe it would be wise to have a more formal working language, and maybe we can 
move to English – all the documentation and all official language – that means [?], what you talk. I 
think that would be better for foreigners. 
 
This respondent, a short-time contract worker, here connects the necessity of using English in 
stead of Norwegian to globalization. This respondent expects Norway to adjust to 
globalization, not the opposite. Another short-time contract worker who neither had started 
learning Norwegian, commented that it would take almost one year to learn the Norwegian 
language. The respondent saw this as a disadvantage of working in Norway compared to 
working in the US:   
 
I would recommend to go to Norway from India, but not to Norway from the US. It’s not Norway 
it’s Europe. Everywhere in Europe it is like that, because if you go to Germany you have to learn 
the local language. If you go to the US, you gain more compared to this. That is what I look at in 
the software industry – why should I invest one year sitting here learning language? … It is a 
regional thing. It is just applicable to Norway – small market (A-2).  
 
This indicates that investing time and effort in a language like Norwegian, which is not useful 
almost anywhere else in the world, is rather a waste of competence in terms of enhancing 
one’s professional competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. This quote further 
shows that the language problem of this IT-professional is first of all connected to the 
character of his profession. The essence of the IT-industry is the degree of transferability of 
knowledge.  If the transferability of the professional knowledge of an IT-worker is ‘disturbed’ 
by being attached to a non-international language, the value of the professional knowledge 
will be reduced. That also means that value of the IT-worker as a professional (outside the 
market in which the language knowledge is applicable) will be reduced.    
The respondents who were in Norway for a longer time or on more permanent basis, 
told me that they had started to learn Norwegian. For international knowledge-migrants who 
are staying in Norway for a relatively longer period of time, the value of learning the local 
supersedes pure investment in the knowledge economy. They have not only started to invest 
in Norwegian language as a type of personal competence which is necessary to compete in the 
relatively local, Norwegian knowledge business, but also as a personal competence which is 
necessary to be integrated in the Norwegian society in general. Short-time workers who do 
not want to learn the local language, may see themselves in Norway mainly on a professional 
basis, and their rationality of action will be mainly structured by the business they are in. The 
actions of the foreign workers on a longer stay in Norway, will be more structured by the 
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social factors are necessary to be somewhat integrated in the Norwegian society. As we have 
seen above, settling in Norway rather than the US may imply a reduction of the professional 
ambitions as an international knowledge-migrant: 
 
Q: What is it like to live in Norway? 
A-2: It depends on your personal aims. If you want to work on different technologies and the latest 
technologies and hi-fi things – you prefer go the US. But if you prefer to settle in life, have a cool 
life, work at slow pace with technological improvement, you would like to stay in Norway. 
 
Shortly, we can say that the knowledge-migrants who start to learn the Norwegian language 
have changed from a more international mentality to a local or Norwegian oriented mentality. 
Another way of seeing this is that the respondents who had started to invest themselves more 
as persons in the Norwegian society are shifting identity from ‘transients’ to ‘immigrants’. 
They are no longer just on a professional ‘cross-country trip’ to Norway but have started the 
process of becoming a more permanent inhabitant of the Norwegian society. However, 
settling more permanently in Norway as a foreign knowledge-worker may be based on a 
change in the professional reflexivity, since Norway may not be the most obvious country in 
the global IT context.   
Accordingly, none of the respondents came to Norway because they specifically 
intended to. Many of them referred to it as a matter of coincidence. The degree of 
‘coincidence’ should be seen as relative here, since all but one of them came here through 
some kind of professional IT connection. For instance, this connection could be their Indian 
company having made a contract with a Norwegian company. All but one of the respondents 
came here because they were directly involved in the exchange of knowledge as a commodity 
in the knowledge-based economy. However, when several of the respondents said that coming 
to Norway was coincidental it should rather be seen according to the position Norway had in 
their professional reflexivity before they were offered the job opportunity here. Norway was 
not in their ‘mental maps’ of professionally attractive or eminent IT work sites (Malmberg 
1997).  
This illustrates that the processes through which international knowledge-migrants are 
relocated within the knowledge-based economy are not random, but based on capitalist 
market relations (Hollifield 1992):  
 
The structural conditions for international labour migration are created at the level of the global 
economy and longue duree, essentially beyond the control of individual agents if not beyond the 
influence of some formal institutions that have sufficient capacity for time-space distanciation 
(such as large MNCs and nation states) (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 336).   
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These respondents’ arrival in Norway is therefore not coincidental but structured according to 
the predominant geographical axes of which international knowledge-migrants are being 
exchanged. According to the general international streams of IT-professionals, it would be 
more ‘plausible’ that these respondents were relocated in say, the US. Here, it should be noted 
that one of the respondents came to Norway exactly because Europe was not in the usual IT 
scenario, and this respondent wanted to try something ‘different’ besides professional 
concerns. This illustrates that a country’s attractiveness to knowledge-migrants may be based 
on more than just professional concerns. Globalization also involves that many people in the 
world increase their interest in getting cultural exposure and therefore are more likely to seek 
out remote countries. People will travel more because they have incorporated in their mind-
set, or reflexivity, that they can do so (Fuglerud 2001, Papastergiadis 2000): 
 
Q: So the normal thing – I guess that depends on where you are going – is there like a big 
economic motivation among people for going abroad, or has it more to do with the general career 
possibilities? 
B-7: Mainly it is economic. 
Q: Because they can also get the same experiences and challenges by working within India? 
B-7: Yeah, that is quite possible, but again our cultural differences also means a lot, so people 
want to go out to meet different people, to see a different technological environment, because most 
of the people have been for the economical reasons, but there are a few percent of the people who 
just want try something new, something different. 
 
This quote illustrates that there are limits to the knowledge-based economy as an explaining 
factor of international labour migration. Increased globalization initiated by the knowledge-
based economy is a significant incentive to international labour migration. However, the 
emphasis on knowledge-based economy should not overshadow other explaining factors to 
professional labour migration. That would reduce the complexity of international labour 
migration as a phenomenon, and exaggerate the knowledge based economy as a structural 
explanation to international labour migration. Here, it shall be noted that there is an economic 
aspect connected to the international migration of knowledge-workers. Knowledge-workers 
migrate because there are considerable economic opportunities abroad. This latter point was 
also stated by several others of the respondents. Further, knowledge-migrants are 
economically privileged compared to many other international labour migrants. However, I 
will argue that the economic motivation is not specifically significant to international 
knowledge-migrants, but rather an aspect of economic migration in general (Fuglererud 2001, 
Fischer et al. 1997, Goss and Lindquist 1995).  
Nevertheless, the structures of the knowledge-based economy increasingly implies that 
countries’ and regions’ participation in the international competition on highly skilled labour-
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migrants will not be a matter of choice, but “impose itself as a global de facto” (Mahroum 
2001: 27). Further, whether a country or region is economically competitive may also be 
indicated by the capacity to retain and attract human resources. The global transformations of 
the knowledge-based have involved a relative change in the factors of competitiveness that 
influence this capacity (Mahroum 2001). In the next section I will connect the national and 
regional capacity to retain human resources in the knowledge-based economy to the issue of 
brain drain.      
 
5.3 The Issue of Brain-drain  
 
For many years India has been a sending country of doctors, nurses, engineers, scientists, 
teachers etc. and students being educated within these fields. As a corollary, India has been 
considered as an example of brain drain: 
 
The brain drain is of particular concern for developing countries who can least afford to lose the 
investments which they have made in education and training particularly of those who benefited 
from tertiary education. The problem is increasing for a number of countries, notably in Africa and 
in India, and it  is likely to grow as shortages in Europe and other parts of the world in certain 
highly skilled sectors, together with important wage differentials, continue to attract qualified 
people from the developing world to emigrate (COM (2000) 757 final: 9) . 
 
Brain drain theory focuses upon the negative effects on the sending countries in terms of 
highly skilled emigration. Large scale emigration of highly skilled from developing countries 
is assumed to reduce economic growth and increase the level of poverty and inequality among 
the population who remain in the country (Khadria 2001, Findlay and Lowell 2001).  
Some economic theories suggest that economic emigrants are more resourceful as 
human capital than people who stay put in the country of origin. In terms of migration of 
knowledge-workers, this perspective has a further dimension. Until the 1970s most of the 
skilled (and unskilled) Indian migrants sought for the UK. In the late 1960s the US 
governments actively began to welcome Indian knowledge-workers. Gradually, the US has 
evolved as the recipient of 80-90 percent of Indian highly skilled migrants. This has been 
estimated to make out 100 000 Indian professionals every year. And, it has been asserted that 
the hundreds of thousands of Indian knowledge workers who have migrated, mostly to the 
US, during the last decades have not only been among the country’s most highly skilled but 
also the most talented among India’s highly skilled (Chiswick 2000, Khadria 2002, Mashelkar 
2005).  
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This leads to another dimension about the migration of highly skilled. As we have seen above, 
a dominant perspective is that the key to economic growth and welfare in the knowledge-
based economy is human capital. However, the value of knowledge-workers as human capital 
supersedes purely economic measures. For example, it is hard for a nation to make an exact 
estimate of its loss of knowledge through knowledge-migration, because knowledge is a 
fictitious commodity. Again, this illustrates that a significant aspect of national 
competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy is the increased value of extra-economic 
factors. That is a core to the understanding of brain drain issues in the knowledge-based 
economy. As the value of labour decreasingly is a purely economic concern, the more 
comprehensive are the extra-economic losses that need to be considered in terms of highly 
skilled migration (Becker [1964] (1993), Jessop 2000, Gudmundsson 1998). According to 
R.A. Mashelkar, director general of the Indian Council of Scientific & Industrial Research: 
“[…] the bulk of scientific and technological creativity lies in the minds and abilities of a 
small number of highly talented individuals” (Mashelkar 2005: 1416).  This entails that in a 
global knowledge based economy, the cutting edge as to whether a nation is winner of 
competitiveness may be based on the intellectual driving force of its most exceptionally 
talented (Findley and Lowell 2001, Mashelkar 2005).  
When I asked the respondents about the influence of the IT-industry on the Indian 
society, they all described it in positive terms. The rather rhetorical question of mine in the 
next quote also conveys a suggestion to the respondent to bring reflections on potentially 
negative implications of the migration of IT-workers from India. However, the respondent did 
not see any problems in that regard:   
 
Q: But it is not a problem that so many people go abroad – because you educate so many, like 
hundreds of thousands… 
B-7: We have like one billion people! 
 
Whether or not Mashelkar’s view is valid, this respondent’s statement may illustrate that if 
there is a problem of brain drain connected to the migration of Indian knowledge-workers, it 
is not necessarily because of their large numbers.  This number will nevertheless be relative to 
the total number of the Indian population. Based on Mashelkar the issue is rather the quality 
in terms of talent of those who leave India. Shortly, the question may not be how many, but 
who.  
Further, the very term of ‘brain-drain’ may be questioned.  Some scholars are instead 
using the term ‘brain-gain’, ‘brain-circulation’ or brain-exchange’. Like the respondent in this 
quote points out, contemporary migration of professionals does not always mean that when a 
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person goes overseas, he/she is permanently lost in terms of the country of emigration. The 
person may come back to the country of origin after a period overseas. The competence that 
the professional has acquired overseas may then be possible to transfer to the country of 
origin, especially in a knowledge-based sector (Saxenian 1999, Mahroum 2001): 
 
I think India is the biggest exporter of IT- professionals in the whole world. And that helps India a 
lot. India becomes a better place. Both economically and also people-wise, because people have 
been like going out and learning new things. Seen things in a different manner and going back to 
India and implementing the good things about it. So I think it has helped a lot (B-7). 
 
In the quote above, the respondent is describing the migration of Indian knowledge-workers 
as a type of investment for the country. The knowledge-workers who return to India 
contribute to the country’s positive development.   
Broadly, it can be argued that it is the transformation of scale within the knowledge-
based economy that makes the former South-North bias of the brain-drain debate more 
complex. In terms of the international flow of professionals it is no longer inevitable that the 
stream has a South-North direction. In this regard, it has become a serious issue of European 
governments that Europe is both facing problems in terms of attracting international highly 
skilled labour and there is also the perception that the region is loosing considerable parts of 
its own highly skilled human resources, especially to the US (Employment in Europe 2004, 
www. europa.eu.int/growthandjobs). 
As has been stated, many Southern countries have become attractive working sites, so 
that that many professionals may actually go from North to South, North to East, or South to 
South-East, etc.  Since the end of the 1990s there has been an increasing trend in which India 
has partly transformed from a purely sending country of knowledge-migrants to a receiving 
country of knowledge-migrants. This development is described by a respondent here: 
 
Q: And how is it with Indian IT- people who work in India – is it really attractive to go abroad? Is 
that something you need for your career or something? 
B-7: Actually it depends, and it is quite different from now and from before. Because a lot of 
people, what they want is intellectual exposure, like try something different, and then they work 
abroad for five/six years, and then come back. And then work in India. Because in India right now 
there are lot of interaction companies, a lot of multi-nationals, who have their big offices and big 
wall. And they are paying extremely much to Indian IT people in India right now, so what I think 
people want do is – they want to live abroad for a few years, and then come back. 
 
Many of the fresh graduates from Indian universities and elite technology institutes that 
previously would have gone to US or Europe are now staying in India to work. 
Simultaneously, Indian overseas knowledge-workers are increasingly returning to India:  
“There is a silent scientific repatriation taking place in India” (Mashelkar 2005: 1416). This is 
strongly connected to the tremendous growth in the country’s IT industry, especially the last 
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five years. One the one hand, it implies that due to the economic success of the Indian IT-
industry Indian salaries within certain IT-areas are rising to a level more similar to those of 
the US or Europe. On the other hand, the increased attractiveness of the Indian IT industry is 
not linked to purely economic factors, but to the access to knowledge as a commodity. 
Accordingly, an important incentive for foreign companies and MNC’s to locate in India is 
the country’s great competitive advantage in terms of its abundance of knowledge through 
cheap highly skilled human capital. As we have seen, the attractiveness of knowledge-
workers on the labour market is based on his/her professional knowledge. A career-oriented 
knowledge-worker will therefore seek to places where his/her knowledge-development has 
the better conditions. The improvement of quality of the Indian IT industry which has 
occurred the recent years may therefore be an important explanation to the turning of the 
knowledge-worker tide. (Chandrasekhar 2001, Jessop 2002, Mashelkar 2005). Again, this 
might suggest that in terms of the knowledge-based economy, the driving force of potential 
brain drain of a country’s knowledge-workers is not only better economic opportunities in 
other countries. Brain drain may also be based on the opportunities to improve professional 
knowledge. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The main issue of this chapter has been the global transformations connected to the transition 
to the knowledge-based economy, especially the use of human resources. One the hand, it is a 
matter of significance that the mobility of certain human resources have become a ‘de facto’ 
in the knowledge-based economy. This is very much connected to the enhanced juxtaposition 
of knowledge and labour as fictitious commodities. This juxtaposition has also contributed to 
the relative re-organization of the geo-economic power in the world. A country’s or region’s 
capacity to retain or attract the ‘right’ human resources according to the demands of the 
knowledge-based economy can also be seen as a reflection of this country’s or region’s 
competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. In that regard the institution of 
international knowledge-migrants is predominantly structured by the global economy. On the 
other hand, the individual level of the institution of international knowledge-migrants is an 
important aspect of the knowledge-based economy. This institution is consisting of reflexive 
professionals who will act as individual promoters of competition according to the demands 
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of the knowledge-based economy. It can hence be argued that in this regard, the influence of 
individual actors has increased through the transformations of the knowledge-based economy.  
The reflexivity of individuals will be an aspect that nations or regions of 
competitiveness will need to consider when they compete on human resources. I have argued 
that this individual reflexivity first of all will be based on professional concerns, and 
especially on enhancing professional knowledge. However, there are other aspects than 
professional concerns that will be of importance.  In the next chapter, I will connect the issue 
of national and regional competitiveness on human resources in the knowledge-based 
economy to immigration policies.  
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6. The Contradictions of the Norwegian  
      Immigration Policies  
 
 
      
The regulationist approach perceives contradictions between economic and social factors to 
be inherent in capitalism as a social relation. Such contradictions will also spread into and 
affect other connected social relations. I hence presuppose that present contradictions and 
dilemmas of Norwegian immigration policies may be imposed by the knowledge-based 
economy. Here, the starting point of illuminating such contradictions of the Norwegian 
immigration policies is labour-power as a fictitious commodity (Jessop 2002).  
Building on the two previous chapters of analysis, the contradictions are two-folded. 
Firstly, we have seen that the importance of human resources as a key to national and regional 
competitiveness has been enhanced within the knowledge-based economy. This is because of 
the enhanced juxtaposition between labour-power and knowledge as fictitious commodities. It 
can therefore be argued that labour-power has become increasingly commodified in the 
knowledge-based economy. However, an aspect of this commodification is that employees in 
the knowledge-based economy will need to be reflexive in order to be attractive 
‘commodities’. I hence assume that the reflexivity of international knowledge-migrants will 
first of all be guided by their professional concerns as a human ‘commodity’. However, since 
they do represent a fictitious commodity, their reflexivity will also be influenced by the 
lifeworld in general (Jessop 2002). Accordingly, I will search for contradictions in the basis of 
reflexivity of international knowledge-migrants. Secondly, the other aspect of the 
contradictions is evident in the concept ‘knowledge-migrant’. While the ‘knowledge’ of 
international knowledge-migrants has become increasingly globally liberalized in line with 
capital, the ‘migrant’ is still strongly controlled by the nation (Hollifield 1992). This basically 
means that non-Western knowledge-migrants, like Indians, will need to relate to Norwegian 
immigration policies. Their relation to Norwegian immigration policies can also be seen as an 
aspect of their reflexivity on the general lifeworld. Accordingly, the contradictions are 
interconnected.    
I will predominantly relate the contradictions of the Norwegian immigration policies 
to the welfare state, the labour market and the nation. I see the relation between these three 
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premises of the Norwegian immigration policy as complex and intertwined. Hence, I will not 
structure the following analysis according to a strict division between these premises. 
 
6.1 International Knowledge-migration and the Nation 
 
Within globalization theory it is often pointed to the significant global de-regulation of capital 
movements. Global and international restrictions on labour mobility on the other hand, have 
been more complicated to liberalize. People are for various reasons more difficult to transfer 
across the globe than capital. One reason for this contradiction between the mobility of capital 
and labour, is that labour migration is still strongly regulated by the nation (Held and McGrew 
et al. 1999, Hirst and Thompson [1996] 2000):  
 
A world market for labour just does not exist in the same way that it does for goods and services. 
Most labour markets continue to be nationally regulated and only marginally accessible to 
outsiders, whether legal or illegal migrants or professional recruitment (Hirst and Thompson 
[1996] 2000: 29). 
 
According to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, article 14, people are free to depart from 
their country of origin (http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html [05.05.2005]). However, 
they may not freely cross the borders of another country. This paradox is based on the 
sovereignty of the nation (Hollifield 1992). In other words, capitalism is implemented in the 
modern nation state (and the modern/world system of nation states) and vice versa, and yet 
there are continuous struggles in this relationship (Hollifield 1992, Kettunen 1998, Jessop 
2002). “Thus the national state is still the most significant site of struggle among competing 
global, triadic, supranational, national, regional and local forces (Jessop 2002: 211).  
Jessop (2002) claims that the crisis of the KWNS neither entails the gradual 
dissolution of the nation state, nor that its power is simply being taken over by market forces. 
Rather it is the KWNS that has been eroded. The crisis of the KWNS implies that the 
boundaries of the nation state are being maintained in other ways and/or other forms of 
politics are emerging.  However, Jessop does acknowledge that as rule- and decision-making 
powers are transferred to supranational bodies, there is some loss of the nation state’s 
sovereignty.  
Jessop’s argumentation on the nation must be seen in relation to the regulationist 
perspective, in which the nation is a significant institutional site and discursive framework of 
the contradictions of capitalism. As an aspect of capitalism, international labour migration is 
in my view simultaneously implicated in both global and national structures, as these 
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structures are intertwined in each other. Based on the regulationist approach, I will hence see 
international labour migration as a reflection of, rather than a cause per se of capitalist 
controversies on the nation state and the global. In the light of this perspective, there is 
nevertheless an issue whether international labour migration should be perceived to verify the 
prevalence of national sovereignty or whether it is rather a disturbance of the idea of the 
nation (Joppke 1999, Brochmann and Borchgrevink et al. 2002): “Immigration strikes at the 
heart of controversies over the sovereignty and autonomy of the democratic state” (Hollifield 
1992: 227).  Issues connected to Norwegian visa-regulations may on this background be seen 
as an illustrating aspect of the continuous contradiction between mobility of capital and the 
mobility of labour. India is one of the countries from which a visa is generally required 
(www.udi.no).  
Many of the respondents uttered frustration in terms of the Norwegian visa policy. 
Several of them argued that Norway should facilitate the visa regulations for foreign IT-
professionals. However, generally they were not frustrated because they personally had faced 
visa problems, but mostly because visa for their spouse and/or children had taken too long 
time, or visa for their parents had either taken too long time or been rejected. According to the 
Norwegian immigration act, the immediate family (spouses and children under age 18) of a 
person having a work permit, normally has the right to work and settlement in Norway. 
However, Norwegian visa policies require that also the immediate family of a specialist 
staying in Norway has to apply for visa before being able to enter Norway (NOU 2004: 20, 
www.udi.no).   
All the respondents who came to Norway as specialists first came without their 
immediate family, if they had one. And all but one of those who had an immediate family had 
later brought it to Norway: 
 
Q: Is there something that the Norwegian Government could do to improve the conditions for 
foreign IT-professionals in Norway? 
B-3: Almost all Indians are family related, they would like all their family to be here, that means 
where they work or where they stay. If I come here for work, I expect my family also to be here, 
but there are some problems with getting visa for family. 
 
What this respondent is indicating here, is that he, like most of the respondents with a family, 
had experienced a period of time in Norway where they waited for visa being issued to their 
spouses and children. It is my impression that for most of them the length of this period of 
time extended far beyond what they had expected: “I am quite irritated, and I don’t know why 
it takes such along time to get a visa” (B-7).  
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The respondents’ frustration has at least three explanations. Firstly, the frustrating visa-
experiences of the respondents stem from the uncertain life situation, emotional strain and 
practical problems connected to being geographically separated from spouse, children or 
elderly parents while the time waiting for the visa to be issued or rejected drags on: 
 
I waited for six months to get visa for my family. Six months is a very long time, and I faced some 
problems there – not only me – even my wife and my kid faced [?], and even my parents also 
started asking me “when are you taking them?!” It was like personal problem for me! (B-3). 
 
Secondly, the difference in time it took to get a visa issued for a specialist versus for his/her 
family: 
 
[…] but one thing I don’t understand is why it takes such a long time to  issue the visa, the person 
who wants to work – he gets it quite quickly – maybe after two months, but his wife gets up to 8 to 
10 months, and that is very sad. In other countries it is different –  I mean like if you are married to 
somebody, it is already a visa for the two to US, you get all the bench and you can travel with your 
husband….I think they should do something about it (B-5).  
 
In other words, it seems unreasonable to this respondent that a specialist can get a visa issued 
after relatively short time while the specialists’ family has to wait considerably longer. 
Thirdly the respondents’ frustration can be connected to the respondents’ experience of 
unreasonable long time to get an application for visa treated by Norwegian authorities, 
compared to the time they assumed it would take in other countries, especially the US: 
 
So even if I was here, and my wife should come here, then it would take nine months. So that is 
not very good. Even in the USA it would take one week. So within one week you could go to the 
USA. So that is a lot of difference. So that is another reason why most of the people prefer the US. 
So over there everything is fine – there is no problem (B-1).  
 
If it is hard to bring the immediate family to Norway, it seems to be even more difficult to get 
a visa for other family members like the parents of specialists or their spouses:    
 
Q: Is it hard to bring your family to another country? 
B-7: If you talk about Norway, I think it is almost impossible, because a few of my friends they 
moved to America, or Canada, or Australia, because they did not manage to bring their old parents 
here. And it is almost impossible for their parents to live alone in India, so one thing I heard was 
that if one of your – like father or mother – if one of them die, then it might be possible to bring 
them over, but that is not a very…nice excuse! So I think it’s almost impossible to have your 
parents come over and live with you. 
 
In the case of India, it seems like while the specialist and their immediate family are exempted 
from immigration policies, other family members are not.  This respondent had tried to get his 
wife’s parents to Norway, but found that their application for visa was being rejected: 
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[…] we found it was bit silly also, no reason, why this should be rejected. We have a valid visa, 
and everything is there, and we will be going back in a year (B-1). 
 
Obviously, I do not know the exact reason why this respondent’s parents-in-law were rejected 
a visa. However, it may be assumed that for one reason or another, Norwegian authorities 
asserted that it would be too risky to give them entrance to Norway. In any case, this quote 
shows the scenario that may occur when certain individuals from countries that are required 
visa in order to enter Norway are being exempted from immigration regulation while visa for 
the nationals in general will be evaluated according to immigration policy concerns. Because 
of its rapid knowledge-based economic development in the recent years, India is an 
interesting example here. In certain areas, India is very highly economically and socially 
developed, while on other areas it is still a developing country. This means that while some 
Indians, like knowledge-workers, are well adjusted to live in a Western country, many Indians 
live in deep poverty and are feared to be an economic burden as immigrants in the West. The 
general Norwegian visa requirements for Indians, still seems to be based on the latter scenario 
(Bø [2001] 2002, Chandrasekhar 2001, www.undp.org.). Accordingly, the respondents’ visa-
experiences can be seen in line with the political controversies that emerge in the wake of 
globalization and the transformations of the knowledge-based economy. This illustrates the 
contradictions between the global and the national inherent in the term ‘knowledge-migrant’. 
While the ‘knowledge’ of knowledge-workers has become increasingly globalized like in the 
case of capital, the ‘migrant’ is still strongly controlled by the sovereignty of the nation. 
Much of Norwegian immigration policies towards people from NICs are based on the 
presumption that they are likely to become a burden on the welfare state. However, because of 
labour market concerns, Norway and many other Western-European countries have made 
‘loopholes’ in the general immigration policies. The Norwegian specialist provision 
represents such a loophole (Brochmann 2002, Thorud 2002). Building on Jessop (2002), it 
can be argued that some of the inflexibility of Norwegian visa-policies reflects that parts of 
the general immigration policy is not in accordance with the socio-economic transformations 
in certain countries and regions of the world. While there in the Norwegian government’s 
competitiveness policies is focus on the need for human resources in accordance with the shift 
in global economic scales, the Norwegian immigration policy still seems to focus on the 
‘burden’ on the welfare state.   
In the next section, I will argue that this contradiction may be partly reduced by not 
only approaching the international migration of knowledge-workers as an institution, but also 
the family members of these migrants as part of this institution.  
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6.2 The Family as a Migrant Institution  
 
In terms of working issues, the respondents often mentioned the slow tempo they had 
experienced in Norway as having a potential negative influence on their career. However, 
when it came to family issues, the feeling of ‘slowness’ often had a positive signature: 
 
Before I was married I wanted to move out of Norway, because the rhythm was very slow, but 
after you have a family you feel like you want to spend more time with your family (B-7).  
 
In a society like India, where paid work often is the most direct social security a person can 
have for his/her family, giving prior to work will feel like a matter of necessity.  A person will 
have to spend time at work in order to secure his/her family. Therefore, taking care of family 
implies spending time at work. It can be argued that many of the respondents had been 
socialized into a more ‘Scandinavian’ family life during their time in Norway (Devi 2001, 
Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000, Hochschild 1997): 
 
The whole thinking process has changed, because there are so many different things which are 
happening in England or in Norway which are good about the way of working, the way of 
thinking, and giving prior to the family, understanding the rules and regulations. In India it is like 
people do not have time! So it has changed a lot (B-7).  
 
This socialization can also be seen as a change in this respondent’s reflexivity on the relation 
between work and family.  
For other knowledge-migrants, family considerations may be the reason why they 
decide not to become migrants on a longer term. The respondent in the next quote had made a 
type of compromise between an international labour migrant’s tricky issue of having job 
possibilities in one country and family obligations in another:   
 
Q: What do you think about staying in Norway on a more permanent basis? 
B-1: No, actually, I do not have any plans, so even if my company asked me to stay here I do not 
think I would…Because it is not because Norway is not…it has nothing to do with the work 
culture here, because I have some responsibilities in my place, actually, I will take care of my 
parents, for example, I have to spend some time with my relatives. So one or two years will be 
okey, but stay in long term – no. For me it is not possible, but it is a nice place to work.  
 
Some of the respondents told me that they wanted to leave Norway after a while because of 
their children’s education. They explained that they did not think that the Norwegian school 
system was good enough. 
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13Others mentioned the concern for their spouse as a consideration as to whether they would 
leave or stay in Norway. One of the relatively short time workers mentioned that his wife who 
was not working, felt lonely in Norway. Among some of the married couples it had been 
agreed that the male’s career would be prior while the female would take care of the family. 
For others it was important that the female spouse had career possibilities of her own in 
Norway. My general impression from the respondents, however, was that most of them gave 
most priority to the male’s career. 
It seems like the favourable conditions for these knowledge-migrants are associated 
with being able to spend more time with their family when they were working abroad. The 
concerns for their family seemed often to be decisive for whether they wanted to stay in 
Norway or not. Some of them wanted to leave Norway because of family considerations while 
others decided to stay. Family considerations can thus be argued to be some of the relevant 
factors for these respondents in terms of Norway’s attractiveness as a job country. It was 
often remarked by the respondents that Indians are very family oriented people. Nevertheless, 
the family is also a common human concern, not just for Indians. This means that family 
considerations could be seen as an extra-economic factor of competitiveness for a reflexive, 
competitive state. Because the family is often involved in aspects concerning individual, 
international labour migrants, it could even be seen as part of the ‘migrant institution’. 
The discussion of this section therefore shows that a strict concept of knowledge 
migrants as single, individual transients could be rather misleading. If a reflexive state 
incorporates the family considerations of potential knowledge-migrants as a factor of 
competitiveness, it could increase the respective nation’s attractiveness as a job country to the 
knowledge migrants. To decrease the difference of mobility between labour and capital, could 
therefore imply to increase the mobility of labour by treating it more like an extra-economic 
factor compared to capital. Paradoxically, decreasing the difference between labour and 
capital could in this case be achieved by increasing the difference (Findlay 1995, Hollifield 
1992). This paradox is based on family concerns as an aspect of the capitalist contradiction 
between the social and economic relations in contemporary working life. Since most 
knowledge workers are men and family regards still are generally considered a female 
concern, increased emphasis on the family considerations of knowledge migrants could also 
                                                 
13
 It was claimed that the Norwegian school system does not keep a high enough level of quality, that there is not 
sufficiently focus on science subjects, and that there is lack of discipline and competition between the pupils. 
This view partly accords with various public reports and research on the education system in Norway (see 
St.meld 30 (2003-2004). However, one of the respondents wanted to keep the children in Norwegian schools 
because there was less stress on pupils.  
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contribute to compensate for gender inequalities, by improving the situation for their female 
partners or female knowledge workers (Devi 2001).  Some of the respondents commented that  
they perceived Norwegians to be less family oriented than Indians. In the following section I 
will argue that such perceptions may be based on the different basis of societal trust between 
Norway and India.  
 
6.3 International Knowledge-migrants and the Welfare State 
 
As we have seen, generous welfare states have been perceived to work as immigration 
‘magnets’. In this section I will discuss the relevance of this argument for Indian knowledge-
migrants. I will connect the discussion to various national systems for securing social risks. 
These systems may be seen as different institutional approaches to alleviating so-called 
‘market failures’ caused by modern capitalism (Borjas 1999, Jessop 2002) 
In the Norwegian welfare state system, it is a public responsibility to secure its citizens 
against social risks. This is further perceived to support people’s trust in interactions and 
transactions. This can be an incentive to private economic investment and boost the economy 
as a whole. Norway can be seen as a 'high-trust society’ because the population strongly relies 
on the social welfare system to take care of social risks (Andersson et al. 2004, Barth and 
Moene et al. 2003).  
In countries without a universal welfare system, social security is primarily a private 
responsibility of the family or market (Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000). It is likely that there is 
a difference between professional reflexivity in countries that have a universal welfare system 
and those countries that do not. Because employees in India do not have a social security 
'ventilator' through the public system, work becomes the most important factor of social 
security. In terms of the social welfare system, India can be termed a ‘low-trust society’. It 
can therefore be argued that Indian knowledge-migrants are unlikely to have a welfare state 
‘mentality’ which can make them perceive a foreign welfare state as an attractive immigration 
factor (Andersson et al. 2004, Barth and Moene et al. 2003). On the contrary, it can be argued 
that the respondents primarily had a professional reflexivity when they entered Norway. This 
implies that the Norwegian welfare state system may be attractive to knowledge-migrants 
who are in Norway, but not to potential knowledge-migrants in India. One can see this logic 
in the quote from one of the respondents who had tried to persuade other Indians to come to 
Norway to work: 
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But I can not manage to convince many people, because of the severe weather conditions and the 
language, and the cold society, and the low pay scales compared to the US in that field, and higher 
taxes, high costs of living. So an Indian will always think how much he will be able to save at the 
end of the day, and I do not think that is the wrong way to think, because in India you have to save 
for everything, because you do not have any kind of security, so you have to secure yourself, 
which means that you have to save money for your security, so naturally they are oriented to think 
that way. And I see that thinking in many Indians that come in the beginning, until they really 
understand the culture and after a while they realize that they are secure because of the system (B-
5).  
 
Based on this quote, it can be argued that Indian knowledge-migrants have to be relatively 
well socialized into the Norwegian culture before they can obtain a welfare state ‘mentality'. 
The lack of welfare state mentality may illuminate other competitive advantages of the US in 
terms of attracting Indian IT professionals.  The US can be seen as the symbolic hallmark of 
capitalism (Cappelen 2001). To people who have not embodied a welfare state  ‘mentality’, 
the US social system may be seen as attractive because of the US market's prominence as the 
primary area of social risk management.  For IT professionals in particular, it is also likely 
that the US market will be found attractive in terms of social risk management. As employees, 
these professionals are already part of a capitalistic market.  Secondly, because of their degree 
of professional competence it is plausible that they will have a fair chance of succeeding in 
this market. However, this logic presupposes that their professional competence is attractive 
in the US market. In times of economic recession in the US economy, there will be less 
demand for IT-professionals in the market, and knowledge as the key to market based risk 
management will reduce its value. At the time when the interviews were taped, there was a 
recession in the US market. The respondent underneath can therefore be claimed to express 
the personal ambivalence between whether to live in a society based on welfare state risk 
management (Norway) or in society based on market risk management (the US).  
 
Q: So would you like to still stay in Norway, or would you like to go somewhere else? 
A-2: That depends on the market. As up now, people are saying from August the market should 
improve. Since almost one and a half year the market has been under recession. When it is still 
under recession we can not go. And feedback from people is that it is improving [in Norway]. But 
if you compare Norway to the US, here you have more social security. Social security means that 
after three years of work, you have got a permanent work permit. If you loose your job, the 
government will pay your [?]. Whereas in the US, if you loose your job, they will kick you. So 
Norway is more socialistic type of society. 
 
This shows that because this respondent has lived in Norway for a while, he is both familiar 
with the welfare state and the market as different keys to personal risk management.  Because 
of the recession in the US economy at the time being, he calculated that the Norwegian 
society would be more secure at the moment. In the end, however, he seems to prefer market 
based risk management:     
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Q: If you could choose, would you like to stay here on a more permanent basis, or would you like 
to go somewhere else? 
A-2: As up now, in this recession market I would like to stay here…because now Norway is better 
than the US, but from people I have got feedback – you will be paid more, you can add more in the 
US compared to here. So if you look at the income, I would feel for the US. If you look at the 
peaceful life, more secure life, you like to stay in Norway. So as up now, I would like to stay in 
Norway.  
Q: US – is that the next country you are going to apply for? 
A-2: Absolutely. 
 
This respondent may seem rather opportunistic at first sight. He prefers to live in a 'socialistic 
market' only as far as it is to his advantage.  On the other hand, this may be understandable for 
a person who is not fully socialized into a welfare state society. He may not actually trust the 
Norwegian welfare system but rather that ‘everyone is the architect of his own future’.  In this 
respondent's view the basic key to that future is personal talent:  
 
A-2: […] Now, basically all the IT- people will like to go to the US. Our ultimate gain is, when 
you have come to Norway, you will be going to UK, you finally end up in the US 
Q: So that is their ultimate goal- is it yours too? 
A-2: As up now – it is not, because the US economy is worse affected, so Norway is better than 
the US. It depends. If the US improves further, we will like to go to the US…because you have 
more liberalism, a more competitive market there. In Europe you see more socialistic markets. In 
US you see more a liberal – if you are talented, you will be paid more. It depends on your talent. 
Q: So it is based basically on the liberal economy, the things that make people want go to the US?  
A-2: yes, basically, because it is based on your talent […] 
 
When I ask the respondent here whether the competitiveness of the US in terms of 
international IT-professionals is based on its ‘liberal economy’ he confirms the 
competitiveness of the US economy by connecting it to the role of ‘talent ’. The perspectives 
of this respondent shows that the issue of the attractiveness of welfare states and national 
systems for securing social risks and can be associated with the complex relation between 
types of welfare states and types of political economies. Obviously, a country’s social policy 
is embedded in its political economy. This perspective is also in accordance with regulationist 
theory. A more controversial issue is whether the coordinated market economies with their 
rather expansive welfare systems are as competitive as the liberal market economies and their 
‘liberal’ social policies within the knowledge-based economy. In other words, the issue is 
whether the European welfare states contribute to decrease the European competitiveness in 
the knowledge-based economy. This question is compelling, since both the Norwegian and 
the EU competitiveness strategies seem to presuppose that the welfare state can and is to be 
sustained through the transition to the knowledge-based economy (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 
2001, Barth and Moene et al. 2003).  
 
 95 
6.4 The ‘Competitiveness’ of the Welfare State  
 
The US can be seen as a liberal market economy. In liberal market economies, firms rely 
more on market mechanisms than on non-market institutions to regulate their activities. 
Liberal market economies are usually accompanied by residual welfare states. This type of 
welfare states emphasises means-testing and low levels of benefit which again contribute to 
reinforce the fluid labour markets of the liberal market economy (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 
2001).   
The labour markets of liberal market economies have few restrictions on layoffs, 
which is an incentive to high labour market mobility. This implies that companies that are 
interested in economically risky production can hire qualified personnel which will be easy to 
release if the production proves unprofitable, or in case of market failure. Because of the 
relatively low labour market security, employees in liberal market economies are inclined to 
invest less of their effort in the company, and more in their personal career. This means that 
career success will depend on the employee’s capacity to enhance personal training and to 
switch jobs relatively often in order to acquire general skills that can be used in many 
different firms (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001).   
 
[…] start- up software companies in the USA take advantage of a highly flexible labor market with 
university-educated people combining excellent general skills with valuable knowledge about the 
industry acquired from switching from one job to another (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001: 149).   
 
Accordingly, the US market is more likely to offer employees significant career possibilities 
and rather high wages, on the condition that they accept relatively high social risks. The 
relation between the market and employees is organized quite differently in coordinated 
market economies. Here, the expansive social policy arrangements can be argued to function 
as a compensation of workers for their disadvantaged position in the labour market (Mares 
2001, compares Jessop 2002). This perspective is compatible with the following respondent 
quote, in which the social security is perceived to be the main advantage of working in 
Norway. However, this advantage is seen as relative, since the respondent would first of all 
recommend other Indian IT-professional to go to the UK or US rather than Norway:  
 
Q: What do you think you would tell another Indian from the IT-area who were considering 
coming to Norway to work- would you recommend or not recommend the country? 
B-7: If he has another option, like go to the UK or go to America, I would say “do not come to 
Norway – go there first”. But if he has come to Norway, then you should be prepared for working 
environment and then weather. Because the best part about Norway is job security, so that is an 
advantage. 
Q: Because you cant just get fired… 
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B-7: No, you can get that also, but the social security, Aetat or [?] they take care of you. Because if 
you are alone and you are not married, then it’s no problem. But when you have a family with you, 
that makes a difference. 
 
In so-called coordinated market economies like Norway, the labour market is regulated 
through centralized, nation-wide and co-ordinated bargaining. Especially in Nordic countries, 
this bargaining on wages and working conditions contributes to produce relatively 
homogeneous and egalitarian labour markets. Firms in coordinated market economies have 
been inclined to offer longer-term employment contracts and the existence of corporate 
institutions provides workers with rather secure employment (Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000, 
Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001).   
In Norway, the welfare state interacts strongly with industrial relations actors in the 
shaping of the institutional framework of labour market behaviour.  The Scandinavian welfare 
state model and employment policy has been directed by ‘productivism’. Productivism is 
guided by the objective to maximize the productive potential of the population.  This 
objective is premised by the welfare state’s obligation to secure that all people obtain the 
necessary resources and access to work (Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000).  
According to the ambivalence that the respondents show on the relation between the 
professional opportunities of the US and the welfare of Europe, the welfare state may 
represent a Gordian knot for Western European countries. Many Western European countries 
have established regulations for specialists to facilitate immigration of highly skilled people 
from non-Western countries. As we have seen, these regulations have been established in 
order to adjust labour immigration to the economic conjunctures of Western Europe 
(Brochmann 2002). However, in a globalized economy, these conjunctures will increasingly 
be connected to global conjunctures. That implies that economic recessions and upswings in 
Europe will often be parallel to the economic situation in other parts of the world, and 
especially in the economic giant US (Held and McGrew et. al. 1999). In the case of 
international knowledge-migration, this parallel is disturbed by the differences in the socio-
economic systems between Europe and the US. In times of economic upswing, international 
knowledge-migrants who are sited in Europe are likely to be attracted to the more competitive 
markets in the US. In times of economic recession they are likely to remain in the European 
markets, because of the European social protection system. This indicates that the European 
social policies entail that the specialist arrangements are not as feasible to adjust to shifting 
economic conjunctures as they are supposed to be. However, as we have seen from some of 
the respondents, the social policies of Europe may also give incentive to long-term settlement. 
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Long-term settlement may work as a positive compensation or reduction of potential welfare 
state losses if the negative economic conjunctures are relatively short-term. Further, Mares 
(2001) argues that many scholars have focused too much on the role of labour in welfare state 
research. Mares claims that such labour-centred views ignore the significance of social 
policies to employers. Mares’ suggestion is that “social policies can offer distinct institutional 
advantages to employers […]” (2001: 211). These advantages include wage indexation, 
lower risks connected to balancing the relation between long-term and short term investments, 
such as the opportunity to give priority to enhance employee skills in favour of continuously 
intensive production. Further, more equal conditions of competition between firms, because 
social policies will entail that risks are more equally redistributed among firms. The European 
welfare systems may therefore work as an indirect ‘means’ of competitiveness in terms of 
international knowledge-migration (Barth and Moene et al. 2003, Brochmann 2002).      
Hall and Soskice propose a solution to this question of comparative institutional 
advantages in the spirit of the classic Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. What they suggest, is a 
‘labour’-division of innovation between coordinated and liberal economies (Wood 1982). Hall 
and Soskice argue that more coordinated market economies are better suited to support so-
called ‘incremental’ innovation, while liberal market economies are better at providing the 
frameworks for so-called ‘radical’ innovation. Incremental innovation is “marked by 
continuous but small scale improvements to existing product lines and production processes” 
(Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001: 39). The challenge of incremental innovation is how to 
maintain high quality of the products and provide consumers’ loyalty and trust in the 
products. Further, the problem is to secure continuous improvements of the quality of the 
products and to keep down costs. Radical innovation on the other hand, “entails substantial 
shifts in product lines, the development of entirely new goods, or major changes to the 
production process” (Hall and Soskice (eds.) 2001: 38-39). Radical innovation requires a 
capacity for taking risks on new product strategies and that these strategies are rapidly 
implemented by large-scale and tightly coupled organizations with diverse employees.     
Nevertheless, the US’ leading position in the knowledge-based economy may seem as 
a major explanation for the country’s competitiveness in terms of international knowledge-
migration. As we have seen, many of the respondents had the impression that the US was 
more attractive than Europe in terms of professional concerns, but they also acknowledged the 
welfare advantages of Europe. Accordingly, the reflexivity of employees is not limited to 
working life issues, but to the lifeworld in general. Reflexivity can be seen as a common 
human capacity, which is being changed or enhanced by globalization processes (Kettunen 
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1998, Jessop 2002).  It can be argued that international labour migrants are likely to obtain an 
especially strong capacity of reflexivity. Like showed by many of the respondents, these 
migrants are inclined to make comparisons and reflections based on the complexity of their 
international experiences. Part of this reflexivity may be based on the experience of cultural 
differences between nations (Papastergiadis 2000). The respondent in the next quote seemed 
to have the understanding that the Norwegian work culture is different from the Indian:  
 
Q: The occupational part of it – what are disadvantages and advantages about working here? 
B-1: Working here? If I am India, if I work for eight hours, I have more work to do. But here, the 
people are relaxed and the work culture – the working time is kind of relaxed, so everything will 
take some time 
 
Further, the same respondent reflected on how one is to compare which country is the better: 
 
So when you compare the facilities in Norway and the facilities in India, if you are looking for 
something better the actual truth is – if the importance is to be here and earn some money, then 
you will be fine. If you want to have friends and talk to everyone, I do not think this one is best (B-
1).  
 
Again, this respondent confirms that knowledge-migrants may not only consider professional 
aspects when they consider which country to go to.  Another respondent commented that he 
had experienced more racism in England than in Norway:  
 
[…] if I you compare with England, there is a lot of racism. That I do not like. That was the main 
reason I did not go back to England – I could have (B-7).  
 
According to the conversation in general which I had with this respondent, he appeared to be 
quite career oriented. For instance, he had a clear intention to go into management and be in 
the lead in terms of his professional competence. It can be assumed that from a professional 
perspective, it would be more sensible for this respondent to stay in England than in Norway. 
As we have seen above, many of the respondents would consider the Norwegian IT-market to 
be less attractive compared to the English, as it may offer better professional opportunities. 
However, when this respondent chose to work in Norway, he also evaluated other aspects of 
Norway than its professional possibilities, like the degree of racism. Hence, this quote shows 
that a country's competitiveness in terms of knowledge- migration is based on more than its 
attractiveness from a professional point of view. Further, it may be argued that these 
respondents' professional reflexivity is broader than just 'purely' professional concerns. It can 
be assumed that in order to fully develop one's professional potential in a knowledge-based 
industry, it is favourable to be in a generally positive life situation. Hence, whether they are 
seen as subordinated to the professional reflexivity or not, many areas in life can be assumed 
to influence professional reflexivity.  
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Building on Hall and Soskice’s suggestion it seems that the issue of national competitiveness 
in the knowledge-based economy depends on how the notion of ‘efficiency’ is being 
approached (Barth and Moene et al. 2003). As in the case of innovation, there may be various 
ways of estimating whether a nation is organizing its economy ‘efficiently’ considering the 
scope of social policies. Again, I will argue that the answer to this latter issue of 
competitiveness, shows that the contents of ‘competitiveness’ is dependent on political 
ideology.   
Finally, I will argue that the distinctive profile of this embeddedness seems to have 
further cultural and social repercussions connected to the keys to inclusion and exclusion of 
‘strangers’ like immigrants in society (Bauman [1990] 2001, Brochmann [1968] 2003, 
Longva 2003). One potential area of social exclusion is the Norwegian labour market:  
    
I think US is a very commercial society, I mean you can go to any heights in the US, depending 
upon your personal capabilities, but in Norway, no matter how capable you are, still other factors 
play a role in determining where you reach (B-5).  
 
The respondents was here pointing out the difficulties that foreign workers may face in 
Norway, because many of the career possibilities in Norway depend on having the right social 
network (Aftenposten 26.06.2005). One possible reason for this is that many foreign workers 
have stayed in Norway for a relatively and have therefore not been able to establish the same 
social network as many Norwegian employees. However, an interesting aspect is that the 
respondent in this quote is not connecting this problem to being an immigrant per se, but 
seemingly to differences between the Norwegian and the US society. Accordingly, I will 
relate the discussion on the social exclusion versus inclusion of immigrants to the relation 
between socio-economic models and immigration regimes, especially in terms of the 
differences between US and Norway.  
 
6.5 The Welfare State and Inclusion of Immigrants  
 
USA, Canada and Australia can be termed ‘settler nations’. In all of these three countries, the 
role of immigration as part of nation-building is stated in the national constitutions. 
Immigration can therefore be assumed to play a different role in the collective national 
identity of these three nations than in Europe, where most countries have been reluctant to 
define themselves as immigration countries (Meyers 2004).     
During the two last centuries, the US has admitted more immigrants than any other 
country in the world. Speaking on broad historical lines, there has been large-scale 
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immigration of dissimilar ethnic composition to the US, even if US immigration polices 
periodically have strongly favoured Western immigrants. In contrast to welfares state regimes 
like Norway, the regulation of immigration in US is predominantly external. This means that 
in the US, immigration control is focused on entrance to the country, while having been 
admitted to the country immigrants are treated more or less equal to the rest of the population. 
In other words, immigrant integration is not an eminent aspect of US immigration policies. 
Rather, economic and political debates on immigration in the US have centred on the tension 
between legal and illegal immigration (Brochmann and Hammar (eds.) 1999, Hollifield 1992, 
Meyers 2004).   
US administrations have been relatively absent in immigration regulation in favour of 
the labour market. The strong market influence on US immigration regulation has contributed 
to the often harsh conditions of immigrant life. Because of this, there have been intense 
political struggles to develop and secure immigrant rights. In the US, immigrants now obtain 
full rights of employment, settlement and citizenship rather shortly after entrance (Djuve and 
Rogstad et al. 1999, Hollifield 1992).   
 
What I see as a difference between Norway and the US is that in Norway there are more 
immigrant societies. In the US everyone is an immigrant (A-1). 
 
Compared to many other Western countries, immigration to Norway has been relatively low. 
Immigration has been regulated according to the principle of ‘restricted and controlled 
immigration’. This principle is significantly based on the universal Norwegian welfare model. 
According to this model, settlement in Norwegian is compatible with full welfare rights. If the 
welfare state is not to be overloaded, this practically implies that immigration to Norway is 
rather strictly regulated and limited. The existence of a comprehensive welfare state also 
entails that Norwegian authorities are expected to preserve Norway as a relatively 
economically egalitarian society.  
The equality norm of the Norwegian welfare state accounts for the rather strong focus 
on integration in Norwegian immigration policies. In the Norwegian context, integration 
policies mean that immigrants are expected to be absorbed into the general Norwegian living 
standards (Brochmann 2002, Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003).  
 
It is not easy to be a foreigner. And especially in countries like Norway and Scandinavia where it 
is more homogenous – see – you have your origins here and Norwegians have like…like in the US 
everyone is an immigrant, that is different. But here you are a homogenous, indigenous people, so 
naturally there is a difference between the indigenous and foreigner people (B-5).  
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Longva (2003) remarks that in Norwegian language the notion of ‘equality’ (No: ‘rettferd’) is 
often confused with the notion of ‘equity’ (No: ‘likhet’).This mixing-up may have various 
expressions in the Norwegian society. In terms of immigration policies, it can be argued that 
the equality norm of the Norwegian welfare state is often associated with ethnic equity. 
Accordingly, the maintenance of welfare state is assumed to rely on an ethnically 
homogeneous population. Further, the mixing-up may involve that only immigrants who are 
culturally similar to ethnic Norwegians are perceived to be truly integrated (Brochmann and 
Tjelmeland 2003, Esping-Andersen [1999] 2000).  
The conviction about going to the US was not clearly shared among all of the 
respondents. Some of them wanted to go to the US for a shorter time period, while others 
wanted to stay in Norway on a more permanent basis or return to India. However, many of the 
respondents had the opinion that most other Indian IT people would prefer the US. As one of 
the respondents told me – “the US is the promised land” (B-3). The reality of the US as the 
‘promised land’ may be more mixed in the contemporary complex global migration scenario 
(Papastergiadis, 2000). Nevertheless, many of the respondents seemed to have the perception 
that in the US they would have been more respected because of their professional competence 
and not been stigmatized as ‘immigrants’ like they often were in Norway: 
 
Like in US you are respected and you are…So my cousins and uncles living in the US never 
complain about being an outsider (B-5).  
 
 The general restrictive Norwegian immigration policies have been largely legitimized by the 
equality norm of the Norwegian welfare state. However, the universalism of the Norwegian 
welfare model seems to imply certain imperatives of exclusion of immigrants which has a 
further scope than merely the external immigrant selection mechanisms (Longva 2003).   
 
My impression of Norway is that they see every coloured guy as a refugee. We feel the pinch of 
that. They will not look at me as a software-professional, highly demanded guy who is wanted in 
Norway (A-1). 
 
According to this quote, the respondent seems to have the understanding that a person is 
judged on a fairer basis in the US than in Norway because in the US you are judged by your 
talent whilst in Norway you are judged by the colour of your skin. This difference may be 
partly based on the structure of Norwegian immigration policies, which again is strongly 
connected to the Norwegian welfare state. 
In Norway, being an immigrant is generally associated with being ‘coloured’. This 
means that the term ‘immigrant’ is mostly connected to non-Western immigrants. Further, 
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non-Western immigrants are often associated with asylum seekers and refugees, since non-
Western labour immigration has been relatively minimal since the labour immigration ban in 
1975. As we have seen, refugees and asylum seekers have often been considered to be a 
burden on the welfare state (Rogstad 1998, Tjomsland 2002). It can be assumed that these 
perceptions linked to ‘innvandrere’ in Norway also will be transmitted to most non-
Westerners who live in Norway. This latter scenario on ‘innvandrere’ seems compatible with 
the way that most of the respondents told me that they were perceived in Norway. Only one of 
the respondents told me that he had not had any negative experiences in Norway because of 
the colour of his skin. 
It has been argued that since the late 1990s there has been some change in the common 
perception of immigrants in Norway. However, according to the respondents, it seems to be 
difficult for many Norwegians to associate non-Western people with anything else than 
asylum seekers and refugees.  This may be based on the fact that even if there has been more 
political and public attention on immigrants in the Norwegian labour market and the need for 
foreign labour, the actual number of labour immigrants has not increased and Norwegian 
labour immigration policies have been rather stable since the ban on labour immigration 
(Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Tjomsland 2002). Correspondingly, there may be certain 
obsolete perceptions on today’s Indian labour migrants in Norway:   
 
Q: so you are generally happy with your experience here or…? 
B-1: It is fine, yeah, but there are some small things, that I think will be there, I guess, in every 
foreign, Western country. Because people have a kind of…because in the 70s and the 60s some 
people came here because of war between India and Pakistan, some kind of refugees. People still 
think that if they see some kind of Indians and Pakistanians, they are some kind of refugees and 
working in low class labour. 
 
In other words, the reflections made by the respondent in this quote are indicating that Indians 
in Norway are generally not associated with the contemporary knowledge-based 
transformation in India. The same perception seems to be shared by the respondent in the next 
quote: “I think they always will think of you as either a political refugee or an economic 
refugee” (B-5).This suggests that principles of immigration control and regulation will 
influence the way immigrants are being perceived in society:  
 
If non economic motives dominate the selection of migrants, it is less likely that they perform well 
in the economy. Their skills may be less transferable to the host country, and consequently labour 
market assimilation is more difficult. This all implies that the choice of migration policy should be 
expected to have an impact on the sentiments of natives and foreigners (Boeri and Hanson et al.  
2002: 106). 
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This view is also supported by Tjomsland (2002) who maintains that taking in more highly 
skilled, non-Western labour migrants would have a positive effect on the general attitudes 
towards non-Western immigrants in Norway. In the next section, I will discuss how Norway 
could select immigrants according to the demands of the knowledge-based economy. 
 
6.6 Selection of Immigrants in a Knowledge-based Economy 
 
Attractive knowledge-workers from non-Western countries may only be permitted to work in 
Norway through the specialist provision. After the ban on labour immigration in 1975, the 
specialist provision can be seen as the most explicit tool of the Norwegian immigration 
policies for recruiting labour from non-Western countries. However, in perspective of the 
general immigration stock, the annual number of specialists during the last years has been 
very modest.14  
 
[…] like there have been 350 specialist taken in in year 2000, and the number of ‘innvandrere’ , 
it’s in order of 10 000, then what the common man faces…his experience will be based on that, 
well, I do not blame it, but it will take a while for me to get used to that!” B-4). 
 
Based on the analysis so far of this thesis, it can be stated that the specialist provision is only 
one among many conditions that will influence Norway’s attractiveness to international 
knowledge-migrants. It can also be argued that in terms of knowledge-migrants, the issue of  
Norwegian immigration policies is more how to attract rather than how to select the ‘right’  
kind of immigrants. This shows that in this area the Norwegian immigration policies are 
increasingly being intertwined with the discourse on competitiveness on the labour market. 
Accordingly, Norwegian immigration policies will need to be more reflexive in order for 
Norway to appear as an attractive ‘immigration market’. This alteration may also be seen as a 
significant aspect when it comes to identifying a potential new immigration paradigm in 
Norway (Borjas 1998, Brochmann 2002 and [1968] 2003, Kettunen 1998, Ringen 2004). 
Following, I will argue that the specialist provision has to be seen in accordance with the 
general immigration policies. Like the respondent in this quote remarks, it may be reasonable 
that specialists will generally be perceived according to stereotypes on ‘innvandrere’ or 
immigrants, because specialists make out such a small fraction of the general immigrant 
stock. This tendency may also be enhanced because many specialists, like some of the 
                                                 
14
 The quota for specialists is 5000, but since year 2000 annul number of specialists has never been more than 
1700 (www.udi.no).  
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respondents, are short-time contract workers who are not officially categorised as immigrants. 
Highly skilled specialists may therefore be claimed to make out an ‘invisible’ fraction of 
immigration to Norway (Findlay 1995).  However, Indian specialists may also be ‘invisible’ 
because they come from a non-Western country and immigrants from non-Western countries 
generally come to Norway on a humanitarian and not a labour market basis.    
Further, as Indians these respondents come from South Asia – a region from which 
Norway has received many low skilled immigrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers. 
However, this picture is mixed, because since the 1970s many highly skilled and middle-class 
people have arrived from India. This is also relevant for the immigrant and minority 
population as a whole. Even if the political criteria of immigrant selection have a certain bias 
and imply categorization of foreigners, it does not mean that these tendencies and categories 
may be empirically transferable to individuals in the relatively multicultural context of the 
Norwegian society. The term ‘immigrant population’ employed in official Norwegian 
statistics comprise an endless social and cultural complexity of individual factors attached to 
people with a more or less foreign background At the same time, it seems like the empirical 
repercussions of these categories may be interconnected, because stigmas attached to one 
category of immigrants may cause prejudices towards the whole immigrant population 
(Brochmann and Tjelmeland 2003, Fuglerud 2001, www.ssb.no).      
This discussion on the selection mechanisms of immigrants boils down to what it takes 
for immigrants to be included in the Norwegian society or what can be termed the national 
‘us’.  As stated above, international migration may both confirm and disturb the perceptions 
on what a nation ‘is’ (Hollifield 1992, Joppke 1999, Kettunen 1998). Would Norwegian 
perceptions of ‘innvandrere’ be altered if Norwegian immigration policies had a stronger 
focus on adjusting the immigrant selection to the government’s aims of a more knowledge-
based economy?  
Kettunen (1998) argues that the discourse on competitiveness in working life implies 
that various national actors increasingly need to perceive themselves from an international or 
global perspective in order to be economically competitive. This involves a re-orientation of 
the national ‘us’ into the national ‘us’ of competitiveness.  Hence, it is possible that increased 
use of foreign knowledge-workers either on Norwegian territory or in an out-sourcing setting 
may enhance the common public understanding of the contribution of foreign human capital 
for competitiveness of Norway. In other words, a more knowledge-based economy may 
enhance the inclusion of foreigners in the national society in the way that it may extend the 
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feeling of social cohesion beyond the nation (Brochmann and Borchgrevink et al. 2002, Reich 
1991):    
 
What do we owe one another as members of the same society who no longer inhabit the same 
economy? The answer will depend on how strongly we feel that we are, in fact, members of the 
same society (Reich 199: 303).   
 
Jessop predicts that the Schumpeterian Competition State will entail the development of 
Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regimes (hereafter SWPR). As an ideal-type the 
SWPR involves a workfare regime in which social policies are subordinated to economic 
policies. Accordingly, accumulation strategies and state projects will be organized under the 
knowledge-based economy. In line with the contradictions of capitalism, Jessop’s predictions 
may imply that the present competitiveness policies in the Norwegian state will imply an 
undermining of the welfare-state bias of Norwegian immigration policies concerns in favour 
of labour market concerns. This could entail that non-Western knowledge-migrants would be 
increasingly accepted in the Norwegian society because they would be seen as more suitable 
to the knowledge-based economy than many other non-Western immigrants. On the other 
hand, a potential negative affect could be that immigrants who are not seen as ‘right’ 
according to the knowledge-based economy would accordingly be less accepted in Norway 
than earlier. However, I will argue that this represents yet another example of the question of 
how broadly competitiveness is to be perceived. Nevertheless, based on the discussion above, 
it can be claimed that immigrant selection should not and can not be based only on strictly  
economic concerns.15  
It shall not be understated that highly skilled labour immigration may have different 
implications on the Norwegian society than for example humanitarian based immigration 
(Borjas 1989, Chiswick 2000, Saxenian 1999). At the same time, this distinction should not 
be exaggerated, since humanitarian based immigration policies may not be strictly opposed to 
economic based immigration policies. This perspective is reflected in the Lisbon Strategy. For 
example, many asylum seekers and refugees may be highly educated when they arrive in 
Norway. Utilizing the knowledge of the immigrant population in a better way, could 
contribute to the enhancement of a more knowledge-based Norwegian economy. As we have 
                                                 
15
 This is a relatively matter of fact because Norwegian immigration policies are also based on international 
commitments like the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (www.un.org, www.ilo.org).  
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seen, the competitiveness issue of Europe is not only connected to developing a more 
knowledge-based economy, it also involves making use of Europe’s full labour force 
potential. This means that there has to be made an increased effort to include immigrant 
groups in Norway, like refugees, in the Norwegian labour market. This could again 
emancipate knowledge resources that would enhance the knowledge-based economy. This 
effort also entails working with the attitudes of Norwegian employers towards job seekers 
with an immigrant background. Based on this it can be argued that the Schumpeterian notion 
of a ‘culture for innovation’ in ‘From Idea to Value’ is compatible with a ‘culture for 
immigration’ (Fjeldstad 1994, Ringen (ed.) 2004, Rogstad 1998). At least, there seems to be a 
link between the US’ knowledge-based economy and certain aspects of the country’s 
immigration policy. 
However, since humanitarian based immigration has been a predominant aspect of 
Norwegian immigration policies, it is reasonable to expect that for instance refugee and 
asylum seeker issues often are associated with immigrations in the common public. This 
seems to be the one of the respondents’ excuse on behalf of Norwegians, or ‘them’, on the 
negative experiences he had because of being coloured: “ […] but I do not blame them, 
because if you go to Grønland [Oslo] you see only refugees” (A-2). 
It can be assumed that a stronger input of say, non-Western knowledge-migrants in the 
Norwegian society would make the associations about what it is to be an ‘innvandrer’ more 
complex: 
 
It has been shown that the success of immigration policies selecting migrants on the basis of their 
skills, such as in Canada and New Zealand, seem to be successful, not primarily because they 
attract the most skilled migrants from a given country, but because they alter the mix of 
immigrants which immigrants come from (Boeri and Hanson et al.  2002: 121).  
 
Nevertheless, it is likely that some of the ‘innvandrer’ notions stem from prejudices or even 
racism towards people in Norway with a darker skin colour per se rather than the social mix 
of the immigrant population. Racism is a prevalent feature in Norway like in all the various 
immigration regimes in Western-Europe. It can therefore be assumed that prejudices that for 
example Indian specialists experience in Norway may be partly based on their ‘invisibility’ as 
specialists but paradoxically also on their ‘visibility’ in terms of ethnicity (Rogstad 1998, 
Castles 2000).     
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6.7 Conclusion 
 
Throughout the analysis of this chapter both complex and compelling contradictions of the 
present Norwegian immigration policies have been exposed. I will argue that the welfare state 
has emerged as the Gordian knot of Western European competition states in the knowledge-
based economy. As we have seen, the Western European states legitimize their competition 
policies through the aim of preserving welfare.  
The concern for the welfare state significantly accounts for the strict restrictions on 
non-Western labour immigration in Norway. However, when it comes to non-Western 
knowledge-migration, the welfare state is not an incentive to immigrate to Norway.  This is 
because this kind of migration primarily is structured by the capitalist structures of the labour 
market. International knowledge migrants will be guided by professional concerns when they 
evaluate the attractiveness of a country in terms of migration. As we have seen, this logic can 
partly be explained by how people have been socialized in terms of personal risk 
management. It is likely that people from India will find the US attractive as a country of 
immigration because of this country’s eminence in market based social risk management. It 
can also be assumed that for reflexive Indian knowledge-migrants this incentive to migrate 
will be even stronger because they stress to promote themselves as ‘commodities’ in the 
knowledge-based economy. In that regard, the political economy of the US is attractive 
because of its emphasis on market and competition.    
  The key issue is whether the European welfare states contribute to decrease the 
European competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. According to the analysis of this 
thesis, it seems like the discourse on competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy 
implies that the labour market is gaining increased significance within immigration policy. As 
has been stated, this is connected to the enhanced importance of human resources as a factor 
of economic competitiveness. This may imply that the welfare state will have decreasing 
importance within immigration policy. However, whether welfare state policies should be 
perceived to contradict the knowledge-based economy more than in the previous forms of 
modern capitalism is indeed a difficult issue. I have indicated that the political economy of the 
US economy seems to be more competitive than the European when it comes to attracting 
international knowledge-migrants. On the other hand, this point made on competitive 
institutional advantage does not properly capture the more indirect and extensive competitive 
institutional advantages of the European social model. I have hence suggested that how this 
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issue of competitiveness is perceived may boil down to political ideology. Further, it may be 
assumed that in the contemporary discourse on competitiveness, the importance of the 
broader, extra-economic competitive advantages is enhanced. This latter point may both entail 
advantages and disadvantages to Western Europe. The social model of Western Europe 
contributes to social and economic stability for employers. If one perceives international 
knowledge-migrants to be especially reflexive workers, it may be assumed that they will 
evaluate such extensive national institutional advantages as the welfare state system as well as 
professional concerns. This illustrates that the institutional advantage of the social model of 
Western Europe also is based on its capacity to alleviate capitalist contradictions connected to 
labour as a fictitious commodity. However, it can be argued that because the comparative 
advantages of social policies are more indirect or blurred in the knowledge-based economy, 
international knowledge-migrants will first of all be attracted to countries which can offer the 
most obvious favourable professional conditions.  
Further, in the case of Norway, the analysis has pointed out certain negative effects of 
the universal welfare state model. I have argued that the way that social and economic 
concerns are politically embedded in a nation, may have wide cultural and social 
repercussions. The political economy of the US is more inclusive to immigrants in the 
juridical sense because social welfare rights for the population in general are less prioritized.  
In Norway, the general population has rather strong welfare rights, but in order to preserve 
these rights there are more juridical restrictions in terms of entrance to Norway. Somewhat 
schematically, it can be argued that while the US is a country of immigration, Norway is a 
country of welfare.  
A further issue is whether the apparently fixed political opinion that there is a choice 
between either a high degree of immigration or a high welfare state level, will be enhanced or 
alleviated if the Norwegian economy becomes more knowledge-based. As we have seen, the 
welfare level of Norway was generally appreciated by the respondents who had lived in 
Norway for a while, and it partly worked as an incentive to stay more permanently in Norway. 
On the other hand, the universal welfare state may contribute to social exclusion of 
immigrants in Norway. Because of these welfare state concerns, non-Western immigrants are 
often perceived to be a burden on the welfare state, rather than productive workers. According 
to the respondents, it seems like in the more market based US, immigrant are more 
appreciated and socially included because of their contribution to the economy than in 
Norway. I have discussed whether adjusting the selection of immigrants more in accordance 
with the demands of the knowledge-based economy will change the public attitudes towards 
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immigrants in Norway. If the basis of social cohesion is becoming more adjusted to the 
discourse on competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy, non-Western knowledge-
migrants may be increasingly included into a potential national ‘us’ of competitiveness. This 
may also entail more positive association connected to immigrants in general. On the other 
hand, it may also entail that some immigrants are being further excluded because they are not 
perceived to be ‘right’ according to economic demands. However, what these demands are, 
will again depend on the perception of the concept of ‘competitiveness. At the same time, a 
more international/global oriented national ‘us’ in accordance with the knowledge-based 
economy may contradict immigration policies, because they are basically rooted in the nation. 
Some of these contradictions may be alleviated if Norwegian immigration policies are being 
more adjusted to some of the global transformations of the knowledge-based economy, while 
others may be prevalent, because contractions are inherent in capitalism.  
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7. Concluding Remarks  
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will summarize some of the general findings of the analysis. These findings 
will revolve around the new immigration agenda. Then I will go back to the starting point of 
the thesis – the issue of coherence between the predominant Norwegian immigration policy 
and the knowledge-based economy. Both of these sections will be framed by the regulationist 
approach. Finally, I will raise some further principal issues about the Norwegian immigration 
policy that have been generated by the regulationist approach.  
 
7.1 Key Findings 
 
The analysis of this thesis has generated some basic findings on what the ‘new’ immigration 
is and what it is not. The relevance of these findings will need to be critically seen in 
accordance with the concept of competitiveness. I have stated in the analysis that the 
importance of competitiveness should not be seen as a new aspect of the knowledge-based 
economy. The new way that this concept is being discursively perceived by political actors is 
human resources as the key to competitiveness. This is connected to the enhanced 
juxtaposition of labour and knowledge as fictitious commodities in the knowledge-based 
economy. The importance of these fictitious commodities also illustrated the increased 
emphasis on extra-economic factors of competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy.   
The significance of international knowledge-migration in the knowledge-based 
economy can partly be seen as a reflection of the increased commodification of knowledge. 
Because knowledge is a fictitious commodity, this commodification is also the source of the 
contradictions of the knowledge-based economy. Following, international knowledge-
migration is on the one hand structured by contemporary capitalism. On the other hand, the 
institution of international knowledge-migrants should not be seen as totally structured by 
capitalism. Firstly, the degree of reflexivity of employees in the knowledge-based economy 
can be seen as a structuring force on the individual level. According to the analysis of the 
Indian respondents, I will claim that the reflexivity embodied by these respondents certifies 
them as ‘knowledgeable agents’ who are able to cope with the demands of working life. 
Secondly, it can be argued that reflexivity is not only an aspect of the knowledge-based 
economy, but a common human trait. This implies that part of the reflexivity that international 
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knowledge-migrants draw on, neither is based or targeted on the demands of the knowledge-
based economy. Accordingly, it can be argued that these ‘external’ reflexive aspects will be 
incorporated in the knowledge-based economy through the actions of these international 
knowledge-migrants. Hence, international knowledge-migrants may contribute to expand the 
extra-economic aspects of the discourse on competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy.  
This latter point is relevant to Norwegian immigration policies. What I have so far 
argued on international knowledge-migrants implies that the individual level of this institution 
can be seen as part of the reason why international knowledge-migration has become a global 
de facto.  The individual level is part of the increased relevance of this institution which 
competition states have to relate to. I have also shown that the new immigration agenda is 
discursively and structurally connected to the transformations of the knowledge-based 
economy. Human resources as a key to economic competitiveness comprise immigrants. This 
means that when Norwegian governments try to attract non-Western knowledge-migrants, 
they will need to consider which factors about Norway that these migrants themselves will 
find attractive or not. Accordingly, it can be argued that the state and international 
knowledge-migrants as institutions are being increasingly inter-connected in the knowledge-
based economy.   
The new immigration agenda should not yet be seen as a new immigration paradigm. 
At the present, the knowledge-based economy has not imposed a general alteration of the 
Norwegian or the Western European immigration policies. At the time being, the new 
immigration agenda implies that Norway and other Western European countries will need to 
relate to international labour migration in a different way. This is based on the predominant 
discourse on competitiveness. As we have seen, the approach to economic growth in this 
discourse entails that access to the right kind of human resources is crucial to enhance 
competitiveness. International knowledge-migrants can be categorized as some of the ‘right’ 
human resources in this case. Following, it is sensible that Norwegian immigration policies 
will need to be further developed according to the aim of attracting international knowledge-
migrants. However, according to international knowledge-migrants as reflexive professionals, 
Norway is not one of the most attractive countries to the international labour migrants of the 
knowledge-based economy. 
Hence, it is a significant aspect of the new immigration agenda that Norway and many 
other Western European countries are not among the most competitive nations when it comes 
to the most attractive international labour migrants. As it has been stated in this thesis, this is 
as a change compared to the immigration agenda that led to the ban on labour immigration in
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the 1970s. It can be claimed that the Western European governments of that period tended to 
take their countries’ attractiveness to non-Western labour migrants for granted. The new 
immigration agenda implies that this taken-for-granted-ness needs to be re-considered by 
Western European governments. The complex, global shift in the geo-economic scales of 
competitiveness imposed by the knowledge-based economy both implies that Western Europe 
will need to relate to other forms of competitiveness and other actors of competitiveness.  
The migration flows of the most attractive human resources of the knowledge-based 
economy will be generated and structured by knowledge as a commodity. Hence, these flows 
will be drawn to the countries that will offer the best conditions in terms of enhancing their 
professional knowledge. Further, knowledge as a key to competitiveness has also implied that 
a new range of countries has emerged as competitive, global actors. This relatively new global 
scenario is what Norwegian governments will need to relate to in the shaping of immigration 
polices in a more knowledge-based economy. Labour migrants from Southern countries 
increasingly see knowledge-based economies in the South and South-East parts of the world 
as attractive work sites. However, the US can still be seen as the most attractive country of the 
labour migrants of the knowledge-based economy. In line with other actors of 
competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy, the Norwegian governments will have to 
be reflexive in accordance with the demands of this economy. This reflexivity also includes 
international knowledge-migrants as an institution.  
‘Reflexivity’ can be seen as the key word to understand the way that the 
transformations of the knowledge-based economy have contributed to alter the basic premises 
of the Norwegian immigration policy. The Norwegian government’s concerns for the welfare 
state, the labour market and the nation in the shaping of the immigration policies will now 
have to be dealt with according to a different social and economic scenario in which global 
structures will increasingly be part of the general political agenda. It can be argued that the 
increased discursive and structural influence of globalization, will force national and regional 
actors to look at themselves – ‘us’ – from the view of the global ‘others’. This reflexive 
capacity will be necessary in order to act strategically towards other competitors on the global 
level. However, the new requirements of reflexivity should not only be seen as a reflection of 
a more globally challenged state power. It could also be perceived as an enhancement of the 
scope to legitimize state polices. By becoming more reflexive, the state may enhance its 
competitiveness on international human resources like international knowledge-migrants.  
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7.2 The Issue of Coherence 
 
I will argue that the most crucial issue that has been generated through the analysis of this 
thesis, is whether the competitiveness policy of the Norwegian government coheres with the 
present immigration policy. This issue is based on the assertion that the knowledge-based 
economy may contain aspects that are not compatible with the welfare state model of Western 
Europe. Hence, the transformation to the knowledge-based economy may imply that a 
significant basis of social cohesion in Western Europe will be eliminated.  
This issue can be seen in line with the classic sociological issue as to whether 
modernity contains the elements capable for destruction of its own idea of society. 
Schumpeter’s notion on ‘creative destruction’ can be seen in accordance with this classic 
issue. Compatible with the regulationist approach to capitalism, Schumpeter sees capitalism 
as a social relation and institutional intervention as significant to capitalist reproduction. 
However, in Schumpeter’s perspective institutions are subordinated in the way that individual 
entrepreneurs are the basic driving force of capitalist development. The function of 
institutions is to facilitate the innovative actions of entrepreneurs, especially in terms of 
providing and regulating the necessary credit. Crucial to Schumpeter’s theory is that 
economic recessions are not only inherent in, but also necessary to innovation based capitalist 
development. This point is what is implied in the notion of ‘creative destruction’. This notion 
implies that the process of innovation will go through certain stages causing inflation and 
reduced revenues, until there begins a new face of innovation. Accordingly, such economic 
cycles should not be seriously disturbed by institutional intervention (de Vecchi 1995, 
Kettunen 1998). 
  As we have seen, Schumpeter would be hostile to the perception of the regulationist 
approach that institutions have an essential role in capitalist development. The way that 
institutions have appeared analytically in this thesis contradicts Schumpeter’s perspective. 
While Schumpeter can be argued to perceive the role of institutions within capitalism in a 
rather functionalist way, institutions are more structurally embedded according to the analysis 
of this thesis. Hence, there is no question of institutional intervention or not, because I already 
presuppose this ‘intervention’ in terms of institutional embeddedness (Hollingsworth and 
Boyer (eds.) [1997] 1998Mjøset and Bohlin 1985). My regulationist approach to institutions 
does not exclude the importance of individual actions within capitalism as a social relation. I 
agree with Schumpeter that institutions are basically consisting of individuals. However, my 
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point is that acknowledging the structural aspects of institutions does not necessarily reduce 
the possibility for individual action.  
When I have perceived international knowledge-migrants as an institution, it is in 
order to illuminate the prevalence and extensity of international knowledge-migration as a 
phenomenon. It has been important to emphasise the significance of this phenomenon in order 
to be able to illuminate the key aspects of the new immigration agenda. Further, it may be 
assumed that because international knowledge-migration has developed into an institution, the 
individuals that this institution comprises may obtain increased value. By this I mean that 
because the importance of international knowledge-migrants in general has increased, the 
social and economic acknowledgement of individual knowledge-migrants may be enhanced. 
This latter point may imply that non-Western knowledge-migrants will be increasingly more 
accepted in Western European societies. However, because the institution of international 
knowledge-migrants is so little evident in the Norwegian society at the time being, it is not 
likely that knowledge-migrants like the Indian respondents of this thesis will appear as a 
significant aspect of the Norwegian economy. I will hence argue that the way that 
immigration is connected to the knowledge-based economy is severely understated in 
Norwegian immigration policy. In the analysis, I have shown that immigration is both 
discursively and structurally implemented in the transformations of the knowledge-based 
economy. It can therefore also be seen as a problem that immigration is not incorporated in 
the Norwegian government’s competitiveness strategy. I have argued that international 
knowledge-migrants may be seen as some of the most structurally incorporated institutions of 
the knowledge-based economy. Which other categories of immigrants that are to be perceived 
as structurally significant to the knowledge-based economy, depends on the conception of 
‘competitiveness’.  In the analysis, I have sought to substantiate that other categories of 
immigration, including humanitarian based, are significant to development of a knowledge-
based economy in Norway. However, to which extent immigration in general may be seen as 
a factor of competitiveness, will eventually depend on political ideology.  
Nevertheless, according to what I have found in the analysis on the new immigration 
agenda, it is relevant to ask whether the transformations imposed by the knowledge-based 
economy may imply a version of ‘creative destruction’ of the Norwegian society. As we have 
seen, the welfare state as a premise for the structuring of Norwegian immigration polices may 
also be seen as part of the reason why humanitarian and not economic based immigration has 
become the legitimate form of immigration. Further, this welfare state concern may implicate 
that non-Western immigrants in general are socially excluded in the Norwegian society. This 
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latter factor may entail that Norway becomes a less attractive work site to non-Western 
knowledge-migrants.  
According to this logic, the welfare state may work as a bottleneck to the development 
of a more knowledge-based economy. Hence, the Norwegian state’s competition polices 
should seek to decrease the concern for the welfare state, and rather focus more on the labour 
market concerns of the knowledge-based economy in the structuring of immigration policies. 
This scenario could imply that the requirements of a universal welfare state were alleviated in 
favour of a more globally oriented labour market. Decreasing the egalitarian based welfare 
state model would also imply that an important aspect of Norwegian immigration policy – 
integration – would be less emphasized. In other words, these immigration policies would be 
more equal to the US’ immigration policies. The aspect of creative destruction lies in that the 
Norwegian government’s political effort to become more competitive according to the 
knowledge-based economy would entail that the social policy concerns that initially premised 
this effort would be weakened. Instead, the political economy of Norway would be more 
juxtaposed to that of the US. This transformation of the basis of social cohesion in Norway 
could hence be seen as ‘creative destruction’ of the national ‘us’. As it has been indicated in 
the analysis, the US political economy may contribute to the leading position in the 
knowledge-based economy.  
 However, I will argue that the approach to institutions as embedded in capitalism, 
contribute to legitimize extra-economic factors of competitiveness. This aspect is important 
because it means that the Norwegian state does not necessarily need to perceive social 
policies as opposed to the competitiveness strategies. Further, it implies that immigration in 
general, and not only knowledge-based labour immigration may be seen as relevant to the 
development of a knowledge-based economy in Norway. However, the relevance of this 
perspective presupposes a broad approach to extra-economic factors of competitiveness. In 
other words, this perspective on institutions implies that the market will not be the only 
structural force of capitalism as a social relation. Reflexive competition states will need to 
consider a wide spectre of extra-economic factors in the global competition on human 
resources. This argument has also been supported throughout the analysis, in which we have 
seen that the Indian knowledge-migrants consider many social aspects when they relate to 
Norway as an attractive country to work in or not.  
At the same time, fictitious commodities are an inherent aspect of capitalist market 
relations. That means that even if there should be political consensus on the need to alter the 
structuring of Norwegian immigration polices, changing immigration polices will not suffice 
 116 
to enhance national competitiveness on international knowledge-migrants. The most attractive 
immigrants will primarily not come to Norway because of immigration policies, but because 
of job opportunities (Borjas 1989). If Norway aims to attract international knowledge-
migrants like Indians, the Norwegian government should seek to increase Norway’s 
prominence in the global, knowledge-based economy. However, the competition on 
international knowledge-migrants will cause political controversies, because these migrants 
are and will represent a fictitious commodity.   
 
7.3 Further Issues 
 
A starting point of this thesis was the aim to expand the understanding of Norwegian 
immigration policies as a social phenomenon. Accordingly, I have in line with the 
regulationist approach to capitalism connected Norwegian immigration polices to the social 
and economic context of certain significant institutions. The social and economic context has 
been the knowledge-based economy.  
The regulationist approach has traditionally mostly dealt with the state as an institution 
(Mjøset and Bohlin 1985). I have inserted the institution of international knowledge-migrants 
as an institution in the knowledge-based economy. Because of its significant embeddedness in 
both market and social relations, the institution of international knowledge-migrants has 
proved to be empirically most interesting. However, I have also taken the state as an 
institution into consideration in terms of this embeddedness. Accordingly, I have tried to 
expand the scope of capitalist regulation. However, the analysis of the relationship between 
these two institutions in contemporary capitalism has only briefly been dealt with in this 
thesis. This relationship should be further researched in order to get a more valid 
understanding of the present immigration agenda in Norway. As a corollary, this could 
contribute to improve the Norwegian immigration policy.   
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Appendix 1 
 
The attachment in the e-mail which I sent to the respondents/informants called: ‘Inquiry from 
a master student’:  
 
Hello!  
I am a female master student at the Institute of Sociology, University of Bergen. My master 
project is on the relations between globalisation of the labour market and international 
migration, and is part of a larger research program on globalisation and internationalisation at 
the Rokkan Centre in Bergen. In connection with this project, I want to do interviews with 
Indian IT- professionals working in Norway.   
 
I have already been in contact with an Indian IT-professional; [Name anonomous]. He is the 
one who has given me your e-mail address and a bit of information about you. Now I hope 
that it would be possible for you to have an interview with me, as it can give me very 
interesting information for my master project. 
 
A prospective interview will not be very comprehensive, and limited by the amount of time 
you can afford. My starting point is that it should not last more than two hours. I will be 
flexible on both time and place for the interview. I live in Bergen, but I will of course come to 
Oslo to interview. I can interview in both English and Norwegian.   
 
As a matter of form, I can inform you that if you choose to join in an interview, all 
information given off will be made anonymous, in accordance with the strict Norwegian legal 
regulations on personal data that the project must adhere to. You can withdraw at any time, 
even after the interview is done. If you withdraw, all the information from the interview will 
be deleted and not used in my project. All information you give me will be kept confidential 
to everyone but me, and the interview will be deleted when my project is finished. 
 
I hope you can respond to my inquiry as soon as possible, even if your answer is negative. If 
you have any questions, or my information so far is insufficient, you can just contact me 
through e-mail or on mobile number [….]. 
 
I really hope you can participate in an interview! 
 
Friendly regards 
 
Ingunn Kvamme   
 
 
 128 
Appendix 2 
 
Interview Guide: 
 
Part one: Personalia. 
-Age  
-Citizenship 
-How long have you stayed in Norway 
-Temporarily or permanent basis in Norway  
-Contemporary Profession and Employment 
-Family 
- (Language) 
 
Part two:  Profession and work 
1. Education and occupational experience before coming to Norway 
-What is your education? 
-Why did you take this kind of education? 
-How is the Indian recruitment system for IT-professionals going abroad 
-Past occupation from India and/or other countries 
-What do you think about your profession; advantages/disadvantages 
-How are your career possibilities in India and/or Norway/ and/or other countries 
(considering your work experiences from abroad) 
 
2. Work in Norway 
-How and why did come to Norway  
-Past occupation in Norway 
-What do you think about the place you work now? 
-What do you think about working in Norway; advantages/disadvantages 
-Permanent: What made you stay in Norway 
-Temporarily: Why do you stay in India/other country.  
-What do you think are advantages/disadvantages by staying in Norway.  Both for 
professional and non-professional life.  
-What can Indian/foreign IT-professionals contribute with in the Norwegian IT- area/market 
-What do you think are important personal abilities for a someone who wants to work in a 
foreign country. 
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-What do you think are important to know about Norway for a foreign IT-professional who 
wants to come to Norway to work. 
-What would you tell an IT- professional from India who was considering going to Norway to 
work? Recommend/ not recommend? Why/ why not 
-Would you like to work and live in other countries than Norway. Why and/or which 
-What could the Norwegian government do to improve the conditions of foreign IT-
professionals in Norway 
- (What is your impression of the Norwegian migration politics) 
-What could make the Norwegian IT-business more attractive to foreign IT-professionals 
 
Part three: Identity and non-professional life  
1. Non-professional life and background from India . 
-Area,  
-city/village,  
-family,  
-(religion) 
-Do you miss anything important about India 
 -How do you think the growth in the IT-industry influences the Indian society 
(esp. the IT-migration to foreign countries) 
 
2. Non-professional life in Norway  
-What do you do in your free time  
-Do you have many friends or acquaintances in Norway/ 
       a)From where do you know your friends –  Work or outside work 
        b) Indian or non-Indian, Norwegian or non-Norwegian 
-How is it to get in contact with Norwegians or getting Norwegian friends 
-What is your experience with the attitudes of  Norwegians toward Indian IT-professionals 
-What do you think it takes for a foreigner to get into the Norwegian society. 
-Things you like /dislike about Norway and Norwegians 
 
3. Identity 
-Do you think being Indian or a foreigner has an influence when you interact with 
Norwegians in professional/non-professional work. Advantage/disadvantage. 
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-Do you have something you feel especially connected to/ dependant on (person, place, 
religion, interests, principles), in the way that it influences the choices you make in life? 
-How important to you is your non-professional life compared to your professional life 
-What is important to you to feel content in your professional life/non-professional life. 
-Do you think working and living outside India has changed you as a person  
 
4. Future plans and hopes 
-Profession and private life 
 
 
                          
 
 
